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Abstract 
This thesis is comprised of four main chapters. Although the chapters are distinct 
works, they are related by their focus on housing and land markets and their 
reliance on urban economic theory and methods. They aim to contribute to the 
understanding of how these spatial markets function in order to work towards 
an improved implementation of urban policy. In particular this thesis tries to 
understand how house prices are determined by demand- and supply-side 
factors across different scales. It provides support for the idea that at a local level 
prices are determined by demand, in that they compensate for differences in 
locational amenities. It also investigates some of the consequences of price 
determination such as displacement of original residents from gentrifying 
neighbourhoods and welfare losses as a result of planning restrictions to 
development. The overall message that emerges from the body of work is that 
urban policy should pay close attention to the way that supply and demand 
interact to determine prices in markets for housing and land.   
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 Urban economics 
According to the United Nations (2014), more than 54% of the world’s 
inhabitants live in urban areas. However, urban areas cover just 0.5% of the 
word’s land area (Schneider et al., 2009). Putting these estimates together 
suggests that each person living in a rural area has an average of 45,000m2 of 
space, whereas each person in an urban areas has just 200m2 (i.e. 14m × 14m).1 
Despite the apparent roominess of rural compared with urban life, people all over 
the world continue to cram into cities. Whilst the share that lived in cities was 
just 30% in 1950, it is predicted to reach 66% by 2050 (United Nations, 2014). It 
is clear that urban life provides something valuable, such that it is becoming the 
standard mode of living for human society. As such, understanding urban areas 
and urban issues is increasingly important. 
Urban economics is a discipline that tries to understand cities using the methods 
and theories of economics. Questions such as ‘what makes some cities more 
successful than others?’ and ‘how does urban policy impact on urban economic 
performance?’ are typical in urban economics. To provide theoretical answers to 
such questions, urban economists typically start out by thinking about the 
location decision of individuals and firms. How individuals and firms behave is 
crucial to understanding differences in urban performance and the potential 
effects of urban policy. In an urban economic model, individuals and firms are 
assumed to behave rationally, choosing locations based on costs and benefits. 
Urban models often involve agents interacting in markets for locations (i.e. 
housing, commercial space or land). These are assumed to be in a spatial 
equilibrium where prices adjust to ensure that supply equals demand for each 
location. Such models are then used to generate theoretical predictions about 
how urban areas function. 
                                                        
 
1 Taking 148,300,000 km2 as total land surface are and 7.125 billion as the population of the 
world. 
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Empirical urban economics tests theoretical predictions by examining data on 
economic agents and spatial market prices. Data on factors such as house prices, 
wages, and firm performance are analysed in the urban context to discover the 
costs and benefits that determine the success of cities and the impact of urban 
economic policy. On a methodological level, such analysis must pay careful 
attention to econometric issues. Comparing differences in outcomes across 
locations can be problematic since correlation and causality are not the same 
thing. Therefore, ‘identification’ of effects plays a key role in urban economics. 
Section 1 of this introductory chapter continues as follows. Section 1.1 gives a 
quick tour of some of the key ideas is urban economics, placing emphasis on 
explanations for differences in urban economic performance. Then in Section 1.2 
I very briefly explain the importance of housing and land markets in urban 
economics. These spatial markets are one of the key focuses of this dissertation. 
In Section 1.3, I examine a common methodological problem in urban economics, 
focussing on panel fixed effects as a standard solution. This method is used 
throughout the chapters of this thesis. Section 2 gives a summary of the 
individual chapters (Section 2.1) and a synthesis of the overall findings drawing 
some policy implications (Section 2.2). 
 A lighting tour of ideas in urban economics 
A pre-occupation of urban economics is understanding the determinants of 
urban economic performance. Probably the most fundamental reason why some 
cities are considered successful and others not, is to do with the wages they offer. 
In general, high wages are one of the major attractors of people to cities. This can 
help explain the growth of a particular city and the general trends in urbanisation 
across all cities.  
Cities pay higher wages, predominantly because they have greater levels of 
productivity. A whole branch of urban economics looks at ‘agglomeration 
economies’ that describe how firms are more productive when they are more 
densely located (e.g. Henderson, 2003; Rosenthal & Strange, 2001). This idea 
goes back to Marshall (2009), originally published in 1890, who developed a 
theory of knowledge spillovers. Here, proximity of firms in the same industry 
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facilitates the exchange of ideas and techniques and boosts productivity, 
innovation and growth. Agglomeration economies also come about when density 
reduces transport costs between firms allowing for more efficient inter-industry 
trade. This is shown to the most important determinant of co-agglomeration by 
Ellison et al. (2007). Another source of productivity gain related to agglomeration 
is through enhanced forms of collaboration enabled by frequent face-to-face 
interaction (Storper & Venables, 2004).  
Beyond agglomeration, another important determinant of productivity in cities 
is human capital. The most productive and most successful cities have the most 
highly skilled labour force. This may be because individuals become more skilled 
from living in cities (Glaeser, 1999; Gould, 2007). However, there is mounting 
evidence that the mostly highly skilled worker ‘sort’ themselves into the most 
productive cities (Combes et al., 2008; Yankow, 2006). It is thought that the best 
labour is attracted to places that offer the best quality of life amenities. Therefore, 
amenities are a major explanation for different economic performances of cities.  
This relates to the emerging concept is that cities as not just centres for 
production but centres for consumption (Florida, 2002b; Glaeser et al., 2001). 
The argument goes that people do not choose to live in cities just because of 
higher wages but because in cities there are more ways and better ways to spend 
time and money. From cultural amenities, like theatre and art, to the variety of 
consumption opportunities, like restaurants and shopping experiences, there is 
just more ‘stuff to do’ in cities. Indeed in both an inter-urban and intra-urban 
context, a massive literature document people are willing to pay more for 
locational amenities (e.g. Albouy, 2009; Black, 1999; Chay & Greenstone, 2005; 
Gibbons et al., 2011; Linden & Rockoff, 2008). The idea that cities are becoming 
centres of consumption is also consistent with the documentation of the trend of 
‘gentrification’, where middle-class households return to the urban cores that 
they had deserted in previous decades (Ellen & O'Regan, 2008). Urban areas are 
no longer just a place for work that are to otherwise be avoided but a place where 
people wish to live in and spend time in. All this means that if agglomeration 
economies disappeared tomorrow, we might all still live in cities the next day.  
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Public policy interventions are also an important determinant of city 
performance. Transport investment, in particular, plays a major role in urban 
economic thought. The monocentric city model, for example, describes how city 
size is determined by the speed by which residents can travel to the city centre 
(Alonso, 1964; Brueckner, 1987; Mills, 1969; Muth, 1969).  A larger, faster 
transport network allow resident to locate further from the city centre and the 
city to grow in size or population. There has been much research that documents 
the willingness to pay for transport improvements (e.g. Gibbons & Machin, 2005), 
the effect of transport on urban structure e.g. suburbanisation (e.g. Baum-Snow, 
2007) and whether development follows transport or the other way around 
(Ahlfeldt et al., 2014b). What is clear is that the development of the transport 
network is intertwined with the urban performance of cities.  
Planning policy plays a key role in the performance of cities. Planning has the 
potential to maintain the amenity level of cities. It can ensuring buildings are of a 
high architectural quality, keeping cities beautiful. It preserves public parks and 
open spaces that keep cities liveable. It can also prevent development to ensure 
cities are neither too dense nor too sprawling, improving the quality of life for 
residents and environmental impact of the city. However, overly restrictive 
planning regimes may stop a city from delivering sufficient housing for its 
current and future populations, resulting in increased housing costs (e.g. Albouy 
& Ehrlich, 2012; Cheshire & Hilber, 2008; Cheshire et al., 2011; Glaeser et al., 
2003; Glaeser et al., 2005; Hilber & Vermeulen, In Press). 
Of course it is only possible to cover here a fraction of the topics of urban 
economics but what has been covered gives an overview of some of the relevant 
literature that this thesis contributes to. Next I move on to highlight the 
importance and housing markets in urban economics. 
 The importance of housing and land markets 
Housing and land markets are crucial to the study of urban economics because 
they reveal the costs and benefits of locations. Urban economists are not (in 
particular) interested in house price trends over time at a national level (e.g. 
bubbles, crashes) but in differences across locations. In the UK context, this 
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means looking at prices across cities (London compared to Liverpool) or within 
cities (Soho compared to Hackney). These comparisons are useful because they 
contain so much information about the costs and benefits of different locations. 
Across cities, house prices tell us about wages and quality of life. For example, 
London is very expensive because it is in very high demand because it provides 
high wages, elite jobs and endless consumption opportunities. On the firm side, 
high business rents and commercial real estimate prices tell us directly about 
agglomeration economies and human capital. At the local level, price differences 
reveal amenity differences. Locations with high levels of amenities, such as 
transport access or good schools will have high prices after controlling for 
structural characteristics. This tells us about the things that are important to 
individuals and therefore why they choose to live in cities and what it is that 
makes cities successful. 
 Methodological issues 
Urban empirical analysis that attempts to investigate the effect of some factor (or 
policy) 𝑋 on some economic outcome 𝑌 could begin by running the following 
bivariate cross-sectional regression across locations 𝑖 using OLS: 
 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (1) 
where 𝛽 provides an estimate of the effect of the factor or policy.  The error term 
𝜀𝑖 is made up of potentially observable variables  𝑍𝑖  and inherently unobservable 
variables 𝑈𝑖. Some of these location variant factors may be time-invariant and 
some may vary over both locations and time. Specifically, 𝑍𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡 and 𝑈𝑖 =
𝑢𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡. If any of these factors are correlated across locations with 𝑋𝑖 then the 
estimate of 𝛽 will be biased.  
A similar regression could be run using time-series data. This would be the same 
as above replacing the 𝑖 locations with time periods 𝑡. In this case, bias is caused 
by any time-variant factors that impact on 𝑌. These may be location-invariant or 
vary over both time and location i.e. 𝑍𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡 and 𝑈𝑡 = 𝑢𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 .  
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The collection of a panel dataset and inclusion of time and location effects can 
eliminate or reduce many of these sources of bias. The following fixed effects 
model can be estimated: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
where 𝑓𝑖  are location fixed effects and 𝑦𝑡 are time, or ‘year’ effects. The major 
advantage of this model is that, even before thinking about control variables, all 
time-invariant and location-invariant observables and unobservables are 
controlled for: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + (𝑧𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖) + (𝑧𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3) 
That this controls for fixed or time-specific unobservables is a clear advantage. 
However, it should not be overlooked that model also controls for all fixed 
observables. Realistically, for several reasons, even a very thorough researcher 
will fail to find control variables for all potentially observable factors. Countless 
observable factors will not be thought of or may be too time consuming to collect. 
Controls will be subject to measurement error. Multicollinearity may preclude 
inclusion of all controls. But the inclusion of fixed and time effects deals bypasses 
all these issues where the factors are fixed over space or time. In the spatial 
context, this eliminates some huge sources of bias e.g. due to sorting of different 
individuals across locations. Temporally there are also likely to be important 
effects, e.g. where policies correlate with macroeconomic trends.  
Of course, there remains the problem of time-location variant factors. All the 
problems of unobservables and omitted variables are pushed onto this channel, 
which is hopefully a lesser source of bias. The researcher will, of course, not 
estimate the above model without controls. The model estimated will include a 
set of time varying controls 𝐴𝑖𝑡, which is to be as complete as possible: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
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Finally, beyond observable controls, effort should be made to ensure that units 
are as similar as possible across different amounts of the ‘treatment’ factor 𝑋. 
This can be done, for example by restricting the sample to units that are have 
different amount of 𝑋 but are spatially nearby, since nearby units will be 
unobservably similar.  
This final model is comparable to a difference-in-difference. The fixed effects 
ensure that only time-variation in the treatment variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is used to estimate 
the effect. This is comparable to the first (𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  −  𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑡) difference. The year 
effects ensure that any general trends correlated with the treatment are taken 
out. This is comparable with the second (𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 − 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖) difference. In 
fact, panel fixed effects is simply a more general model and collapses to a diff-in-
diff when the treatment is a dummy variable equal to one for treatment group in 
the post-treatment period and zero in all other cases (i.e. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡). 
In Table 1, I illustrate how many sources of bias exist in the panel fixed effects / 
diff-in-diff model, compared with cross-sectional or time series analysis, and 
(perfect) instrumentation or randomisation. I assume that a researcher will 
realistically only ever think of controls for half of the potentially observable 
determinants of 𝑌. This means that even with controls a threat of bias remains 
for observables. I assume give this an arbitrary point score of 0.5. This means that 
compared with a cross-sectional regression, panel fixed effects eliminate all fixed 
unobservables and half of the fixed observables (those that were not thought of). 
Further, by ensuring that ‘treated’ observations are arguably similar to ‘control’ 
observations the threat from time-variant factors is also reduced. Here I cut them 
by half. Of course it is impossible in reality to put an accurate point score on the 
size of any of these threats but this table does give a simple indication of where 
threats come from and where they are reduced across different methods. 
To conclude this discussion on methodology, the panel fixed effects model can 
eliminate or reduce many sources of bias. In cases where it is possible to collect 
a panel dataset, then this method should be considered the minimum standard. 
In many cases, it may also be the best option available if, for example, no plausible 
instrument is available, or randomisation is not feasible. As such it represents a 
workhorse in urban economic research and in this thesis. 
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Table 1: Threats to internal validity 
Threats to 
internal validity 
Cross- 
sectional 
+ controls 
Time- 
series  
+ controls 
Panel fixed effects 
(or diff-in-diff) 
+ controls 
Randomisation 
or 
instrumentation 
Time 
Observable 𝑧𝑡 
Unobservable 𝑢𝑡 
 
0 
0 
 
0.5 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
Location  
Observable 𝑧𝑖  
Unobservable 𝑢𝑖 
 
0.5 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
Time-location  
Observable 𝑧𝑖𝑡 
Unobservable 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
0.5 
1 
 
0.5 
1 
 
0.25 
0.5 
 
0 
0 
 
Sum of threats 
 
3 
 
3 
 
0.75 
 
0 
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 Overview of thesis 
This thesis is comprised of four main chapters. Although the chapters are distinct 
works, they are related by their focus on housing and land markets. They aim to 
contribute to the understanding how of how these markets function in order to 
help work towards an improved implementation of urban policy. In particular 
this thesis tries to understand how housing prices are determined by demand- 
and supply-side factors. It also investigates some of the consequences of the ways 
prices are determined such displacement from gentrifying neighbourhoods and 
welfare losses as a result of planning restriction to development. The overall 
message that emerges from the body of work is that urban policy should pay close 
attention to the way that supply and demand interact to determine prices in 
markets for housing and land. Section 2.1 provides a summary of the individual 
chapters and Section 2.2 synthesises the findings to deliver some broader policy 
implications. 
 Summary of chapters 
In Chapter II: ‘Does the law of one price hold for hedonic prices?’ I specifically 
examine the concept of spatial equilibrium. I argue that hedonic prices of 
locational attributes in urban land markets are determined by a process of spatial 
arbitrage that is similar to that which underpins the law of one price. If hedonic 
prices deviate from their spatial equilibrium values then individuals can benefit 
from changing locations. I show that, under commonly adopted assumptions 
regarding individuals’ preferences, spatial equilibrium is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the law of one price to hold for hedonic prices. I go on to 
test whether the law holds for the hedonic price of rail access using a unique 
historical dataset for Berlin over a historical period (1890-1914) characterised 
by massive investment in the transport infrastructure. I estimate the hedonic 
price of rail access across multiple urban neighbourhoods and time periods to 
generate a panel dataset of hedonic price differences that I test for stationarity 
using a panel unit root test. Across multiple specifications I consistently fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of no unit root and accept the alternative hypothesis 
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that LOP holds. My estimates indicate a half-life for convergence to the law of one 
price that lies between 1.2 and 2 years. This result is consistent with spatial 
equilibrium. 
Chapter III: ‘Gentrification and displacement in English cities’ uses the British 
Household Panel Survey (1991-2008) and the UK Census (waves 1991, 2001 and 
2011) to examine whether gentrification of neighbourhoods in English cities 
leads to displacement of the original residents. Gentrification is the phenomenon 
of a large and relatively sudden in-migration of wealthy or middle class residents 
into a previously poor or working class neighbourhood. I use the change in the 
share of neighbourhood population that holds a degree certificate as a measure 
of the pace of gentrification. I relate this measure of gentrification to 
neighbourhood exits at the household level. My empirical strategy aims to control 
for differences in natural mobility rates due to the sorting of households across 
different neighbourhoods. I take several steps to deal with this issue such as 
estimating a neighbourhood fixed effects model and interacting of the 
gentrification treatment with household characteristics that indicate 
vulnerability to displacement. The findings indicate that gentrification is 
associated with significant displacement of low income (private) renters 
especially in the early stages of the process. These are the first estimates of 
displacement for English cities and the first to estimate the effect at different 
stages of gentrification and at different income levels. The evidence presented in 
this chapter is contradictory to the prevailing evidence on displacement and is 
more consistent with the theoretical understanding of gentrification as process 
of outbidding. 
Chapter IV: ‘Game of zones: The political economy of conservation areas’ 
examines the process behind the designation of conservation areas by looking at 
the costs and benefits to local homeowners. The chapter asks whether local 
homeowners are somehow able to game system to their advantage. Provided 
there are positive external benefits attached to the historic character of buildings, 
owners of properties in designated conservation areas benefit from a reduction 
in uncertainty regarding the future of their area. At the same time, the 
restrictions put in place to ensure the preservation of the historic character limit 
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the degree to which properties can be altered and thus impose a cost to their 
owners. Given the existence of local costs and benefits, this chapter tests a simple 
political-economic theory of the designation process which postulates that the 
level of designation is chosen to comply with interests of local homeowners. The 
implication of the model is that a) an increase in preferences for historic 
character should increase the likelihood of a designation, and b) new 
designations at the margin should not be associated with immediate house price 
capitalisation effects. The empirical results are in line with these predictions. 
Finally Chapter V: ‘The welfare economics of conservation areas’ looks at the 
costs and benefits of conservation area at the wider level. These policies improve 
the quality of life in cities by preserving neighbourhoods of special architectural 
and historic character. But they do so by restricting the supply of housing and 
increasing its cost. A crucial policy consideration, therefore, is how large each of 
these effects are and what the net effect is. This chapter provides evidence on this 
question by looking at ten years of conservation area designations in England 
(1997-2007). I employ the two-step approach outlined by Albouy and Ehrlich 
(2012), which is underpinned by a general equilibrium model of a system of 
cities, and allows for the disentangling of demand and supply effects on the price 
of housing. The first step is to estimate the supply-side cost function across 
English cities (Housing Market Areas) using a unique panel dataset of house 
prices, land values and construction costs. This step reveals the impact of city 
characteristics on housing productivity, defined as the amount of physical 
housing that can be produced for given quantities of inputs. I find that a standard 
deviation increase in conservation area designation (equivalent to an increase of 
0.013 in the designated land share) significantly decreases housing productivity 
by between 7% and 9%, implying a supply-driven increase in house prices of the 
same magnitude. The second step is to estimate the demand-side amenity effects 
by generating a quality of life index for cities based on house prices and wages 
and then to regress the quality of life index on housing productivity differences 
predicted by designation. I find the effect to be statistically insignificant. These 
findings suggest that the overall impact of conservation areas is welfare 
decreasing. 
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 Synthesis of findings and policy implications 
Taken together, the findings presented over the four chapters of this thesis 
suggests that an understanding of the functioning of the housing market is 
essential for urban policy if social welfare and distributional outcomes in cities 
are a consideration. The findings support two policy stances. The support for the 
first stance is more circumstantial in nature and relies on a threading together of 
the evidence to support the view that area-based policy may have harmful 
distributional effects. The second is based on direct evidence on the effects of 
conservation areas. This view suggests that restrictive planning policies set at the 
local level can reduce social welfare. Again this is likely to have distributional 
consequences. 
2.2.1 Area-based policy 
Here I use the findings of this thesis to argue that are-based improvements to 
neighborhoods in the role of regeneration or revitalization strategies should be 
carefully thought through if they wish to have helpful distributional impacts. I 
argue that polices that regenerate neighbourhoods, especially if they are based 
in a major part on physical improvements (e.g. to the dwelling stock), could have 
adverse consequences for low income residents, who rent in the private market. 
Firstly, improvements to a neighbourhood will lead to price increases via 
capitalisation. I show in several parts of this thesis that price differences at the 
neighbourhood level are determined by differences in demand as a result of 
differences in amenities. This capitalisation effect is theoretically supported by 
the spatial equilibrium assumption that I test directly in Chapter II. Further 
evidence that local costs and benefits capitalise into prices are presented in 
Chapter II, for rail, and Chapters IV and V for the preservation of heritage.  
Secondly, gentrification of neighbourhoods is likely to accompany improved 
amenities and be the driving force behind price increases. This is not something 
I provide significant evidence on here, but is an important step in the argument. 
The evidence I do provide is from the first stage of the instrumentation strategy 
in Chapter V that shows that amenities (rail access and museums) do predict 
gentrification. Furthermore, it is a theoretically and empirically established idea 
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in the literature that amenity improved amenities are associated with 
gentrification (e.g. Brueckner & Rosenthal, 2009; Helms, 2003).  
Thirdly, and finally, I show that gentrification of neighbourhoods leads to strong 
displacement of private renters (presumably due to outbidding in the housing 
market). This displacement effect is demonstrated empirically in Chapter III. 
Displacement is likely to be the main outcome of gentrification for low income 
renters, since evidence from recent field experiments suggests that no improved 
economic outcomes for the disadvantaged from living in more mixed 
communities (Ludwig et al., 2013; Oreopoulos, 2003). 
Putting these three points together suggests that area-based improvements to 
amenities will likely result in the displacement of original residents who rent 
privately (and especially if they have a low income) due to the escalation of 
housing costs. Original residents who rent socially or own their homes will not 
be displaced.  
This suggests that area-based policy concerned with distributional outcomes 
should be combined with support for private renters, either through rental 
assistance, the provision of social housing, or help towards gaining 
homeownership. It should also avoid purely physical improvements to 
neighbourhoods, since these are unlikely to directly improve economic outcomes 
of residents. Improvements combined with the provision of services such active 
labour market policy or better employment access (e.g. rail upgrades) may allow 
some residents to resist displacement by increasing employment and incomes. 
Furthermore, area-based schemes could be designed such that benefits are 
attached to original residency as is the case for many Employment Zones policies 
where local tax relief for firms is conditional on the employment of local 
residents. Finally, area-based schemes could be avoided all together in favour of 
people-based measures such as education and redistribution through the tax 
system that directly target the causes of inequality. 
2.2.2 Planning systems 
The above arguments are based mostly on evidence presented in the first two 
chapters. The last two chapters examine a particular form of planning policy that 
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restricts development in historic zones in order to preserve built heritage i.e. 
conservation areas. I argue here that planning policy should not be implemented 
on a local level if the benefits are localised and the costs are incurred at the wider 
market level. 
Chapters IV and V are based on an understanding of housing markets that 
suggests that price differences at the local level (i.e. between neighbourhoods) is 
determined principally by demand, but that price at the market level (i.e. 
between cities) is based on both demand and supply. Chapter IV demonstrates 
by means of a local level analysis that conservation area designation appears to 
adhere to the interest of local homeowners. These owners stand to gain from 
designation through house price growth related to the fact that the policy 
provides increased security over the future character of the neighbourhood i.e. it 
represents an amenity improvement. Before coming on to the supply side effects, 
the above arguments on the impact of area-based policies already suggests that 
this policy may have distributional consequences via potential the displacement 
of private renters in the conservation area. Indeed this chapter demonstrates that 
conservation area designation is tightly interlinked with the gentrification 
process. 
Chapter V examines the Housing Market Area (HMA) level effects of conservation 
area designation. These HMAs roughly correspond with urban areas and allow 
for the analysis of the effects of supply restrictions. The findings suggest that 
through the restrictions placed on development the cost of housing is 
significantly increased by designation. However, the amenity, or quality of life, 
benefits of designation are found to be insignificant at the city level. Taken 
together with the findings from Chapter IV this suggests that the benefits of 
designation are highly localised and insignificant compared with the costs when 
examining the wider housing market. Conservation areas impact negatively on 
the economic welfare of wider society but are influenced locally by homeowners 
who stand to benefit from localised house price increases. These findings are 
easily generalised to suggest that planning systems should be designed so as 
there is limited influence at the very local level over development permission. 
Whilst local impact is an important consideration, this should be balanced with 
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societal needs for housing.  Such decisions would better be made at the city level 
or larger. 
Taken together, the findings presented over the four chapters of this thesis 
suggest that an understanding of the functioning of the housing market is 
essential for urban policy if social welfare and distributional outcomes in cities 
are a consideration. 
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CHAPTER II 
DOES THE LAW OF ONE PRICE 
HOLD FOR HEDONIC PRICES?
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 Introduction 
Glaeser (2008) states that the spatial equilibrium condition is to urban 
economics what the no-arbitrage condition is to financial economics. Indeed, 
spatial equilibrium is one of the fundamental concepts around which urban 
economics is built. However, to date, the assumption has received no empirical 
scrutiny, perhaps because it not clear how it could be tested. In this paper, I 
demonstrate that under homogenous preferences that are log-linear in 
amenities, spatial equilibrium is a necessary and sufficient condition for the law 
of one price (LOP) to hold for hedonic prices of amenities in urban land markets. 
Therefore, a test of LOP for hedonic prices represents a joint-test of some of the 
most commonly adopted assumptions in urban economic theory. I develop a two-
stage test for whether LOP holds for the hedonic prices and  implement this test 
for the amenity of rail access in the case of Berlin over 1890-1914, a period 
characterised by large and frequent transport innovations. 
The law of one price states that in an efficient market the price of an identical 
good or asset must be the same at all locations, otherwise there would be an 
opportunity for arbitrage. If a local supply (or demand) shock increases the price 
in one location, then rational agents will transport the good to the expensive 
location from the cheaper location to make a profit. This arbitrage will quickly 
eliminate the price difference. A similar argument unpins the assumption of 
spatial equilibrium in the determination of hedonic prices of the attributes of 
land (or housing): land prices must exactly compensate for differences in 
amenities across locations otherwise individuals would want to change location. 
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A local shock to amenities (e.g. a new rail line) without a land price adjustment 
would imply the amenity (rail access) is ‘too cheap’ in the improved locations i.e. 
that the hedonic price is below its spatial equilibrium value. Utility maximising 
households would demand land at the improved locations where rail access is 
cheaper. This pushes up the price of land until it fully compensates for the 
amenity improvement i.e. until the spatial equilibrium hedonic prices of rail 
access are restored. This process is similar to LOP but where individuals move 
themselves to where non-tradable goods (attributes) are cheaper instead of 
transporting the goods.  
This paper investigates the case of Berlin between 1890 and 1914, a period 
characterised by a series of massive infrastructure projects that represent a 
barrage of local shocks to the hedonic price of rail access across different 
neighbourhoods and time periods. Significant spatiotemporal variation in 
hedonic prices allow me to test if neighbourhood-specific shocks to hedonic 
prices are persistent or if price deviations from equilibrium are eliminated via 
spatial arbitrage. Put another way, this historical case provides an excellent 
scenario with which to examine if hedonic prices across urban locations are tied 
together in a long-run LOP relationship, and therefore (under certain 
assumptions) whether spatial equilibrium holds.  
I provide evidence on this question by developing and implementing a two-stage 
approach. In the first stage I use a unique historical panel dataset of land values 
and transport infrastructure for Berlin (1890-1914) where I estimate the 
hedonic price of rail access in city-neighbourhoods over time. I use these 
estimates to produce a panel dataset of hedonic price differences between 
neighbourhoods. In the second stage, I adopt a standard test in the LOP literature 
which is to examine the price differences for stationarity using a panel unit root 
test. In particular I employ a test which exhibits good properties for short panels 
(Blander & Dhaene, 2012). Across multiple specifications I consistently fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of no unit root and accept the alternative hypothesis 
that LOP holds. My estimates indicate a half-life for convergence to the law of one 
price that lies between 1.2 and 2 years.  
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This evidence provides support for some of the most commonly adopted 
assumptions in urban economics. If the assumptions about preferences are 
appropriate then these results tell us that spatial equilibrium holds in the long 
run. Conversely, if spatial equilibrium is accurate then this result tells us that 
commonly adopted utility functions work well enough to empirically capture 
spatial adjustment in hedonic prices. Whilst this approach is not able to the test 
the assumptions individually, the findings are broadly consistent with the way 
urban economists think about spatial arbitrage and the determination of land 
prices in cities. This provides reassurance that the theoretical frameworks in 
urban economics are describing the actual processes at hand and lends strength 
to results founded on these frameworks. 
These results contribute to the theoretical literature in urban economics that 
relies on the spatial equilibrium assumption such intra-urban models of the 
Alonso-Mills-Muth type (Alonso, 1964; Brueckner, 1987; Mills, 1969; Muth, 
1969) and inter-urban models of the Rosen-Roback type (Albouy, 2009; Roback, 
1982b). It also contributes to the literature on the determination of hedonic 
prices in equilibrium (Epple, 1987; Rosen, 1974) and the literature that estimates 
the value of urban amenities and policies using the hedonic method (e.g. Black, 
1999; Chay & Greenstone, 2005; Linden & Rockoff, 2008), particularly that which 
values transport innovations (e.g. Gibbons & Machin, 2005). Finally it contributes 
to the literature on the law of one price (e.g. Frankel, 1986; Frenkel, 1980; Hakkio, 
1984; Isard, 1977; Jenkins & Snaith, 2005; Krugman, 1978; Protopapadakis & 
Stoll, 1983; Richardson, 1978; Rogers & Jenkins, 1993), in particular to the more 
recent work that looks to test the absolute/relative versions of LOP with panel 
unit root tests (e.g. Blander & Dhaene, 2012; Funke & Koske, 2008; Goldberg & 
Verboven, 2004, 2005; Parsley & Wei, 1996) and that which looks to test if LOP 
applies for heterogeneous goods (e.g. Spreen et al., 2007). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
literature on LOP, highlighting the different versions of LOP and the typical 
empirical tests. In section 3, I ask the question of whether I would theoretically 
expect hedonic prices to conform to the LOP. In section 4, I outline the data on 
historical Berlin. Section 5 develops the two-stage empirical approach. Section 6 
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gives the results of the hedonic price estimation and unit root tests. Section 7 
concludes. 
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 The Law of One Price 
In this section I provide a brief outline the law of one price and its interpretations. 
In particular, I highlight that long-run LOP implies price differences across 
locations will exhibit convergence. In the Absolute version of LOP, the 
convergence will be to zero and under Relative-LOP the convergence is to a non-
zero constant i.e. there exists a fixed price difference between locations. Both 
versions imply that price differences between locations will be stationary which 
lends itself conveniently to empirical testing via a unit root test. This section 
provides just sufficient detail for understanding the approach taken in this paper. 
However, an interested reader may see the more detailed overview of the LOP 
literature that is provided in the appendix.  
 Strong (short-run) LOP 
The strong, or short-run, version LOP is the most literal translation of the law and 
requires instantaneous elimination of price differences between locations. This 
implies that prices must be equal across locations at all times. The early empirical 
literature focussed on testing strong LOP by examining price differences of 
homogenous goods across countries (e.g. Frenkel, 1980; Isard, 1977; Krugman, 
1978; Protopapadakis & Stoll, 1983; Richardson, 1978). This literature used 
regressions of the log of prices in a home country against the log of prices in a 
foreign country and the exchange rate. Generally, though, the law performed 
badly and the null hypothesis that the coefficient on foreign prices is equal to one 
(i.e. that LOP holds) was usually rejected. 
 Weak (long-run) LOP 
Confronted with this poor performance, the next wave of empirical literature 
examined whether LOP held in the long run (e.g. Frankel, 1986; Hakkio, 1984; 
Jenkins & Snaith, 2005; Rogers & Jenkins, 1993). This less strict interpretation 
(the weak version of LOP) allows for price differences to exist, but states that they 
cannot persist in the long-run. Price differences are not necessarily eliminated 
immediately since there are transportation, information and transaction costs 
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that may inhibit arbitrage (Engel & Rogers, 1994; Parsley & Wei, 1996, 2001). 
But the larger the price differences the more likely the good will be the subject of 
arbitrage. This entails convergence of price differences to an ‘attractor 
equilibrium’. Therefore, this wave of literature focuses on testing for the 
existence of convergence through the application of unit root tests2. Most 
recently, tests of LOP have found strong support for price convergence using 
panel unit root tests on the price differences for homogenous goods across 
numerous countries (e.g. Blander & Dhaene, 2012; Funke & Koske, 2008; 
Goldberg & Verboven, 2004, 2005; Parsley & Wei, 1996). The test provided by 
Blander and Dhaene (2012) is of particular relevance to this paper, since it is 
suitable for short panels. This is the test I will use in the empirical section. 
 Absolute and Relative LOP 
As discussed above, weak LOP suggests that price differences between locations 
will not persist in the long run and will, therefore, exhibit stationarity. Stationary 
series, however, do not necessarily converge to a mean of zero. The literature on 
Relative-LOP provides some reasons why there may exist a persistent and 
constant price difference between locations. For example, Goldberg and 
Verboven (2005) suggest reasons such as differences in trade policies, local 
distribution costs, or elasticities of demand. For example with local distribution 
costs, the price differences should converge to a constant that is equal to the 
difference in distribution costs between the locations. Therefore, Absolute-LOP 
is defined as a stationary price series that converges to a mean of zero and 
Relative-LOP is convergence to a non-zero constant.  
 LOP in this paper 
Before going on to the next section, it worth considering for a moment which of 
these versions of LOP is likely to be relevant to the context of hedonic prices in 
                                                        
 
2 The methods of co-integration and error-correction have also been used in the LOP 
literature but are less common. See Froot and Rogoff (1996) for a detailed 
comparison of the different methods 
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an urban context. Whilst short-run LOP has not received great support in cross-
country tests, it is possible that there are fewer frictional costs to arbitrage in an 
intra-city context. Information should flow fairly quickly over such short 
distances. Transportation, in terms of individuals moving between urban 
locations, on the other hand, represents an entirely different cost structure to the 
cross country transportation of goods and it is difficult to suppose which is more 
or less costly. Finally, there may be transaction costs in the form of rental 
contracts, zoning restrictions and regulation. Overall, it seems plausible that 
either the short-run or the long-run version may hold for hedonic prices. This 
paper concerns itself nevertheless with testing the long-run version. Notably, if 
LOP holds in the short run, then it would also hold in the long-run.  In terms of 
Absolute- and Relative-LOP, whether hedonic prices are identical across 
locations or characterised by a fixed differences is partially addressed the next 
section where I examine theoretically whether I expect hedonic prices to adhere 
to any version of LOP.  
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 Should hedonic prices adhere to the law of one 
price? 
In this section I aim to demonstrate that equilibrium hedonic prices should 
adhere to the law of one price under some common assumptions regarding 
individuals’ preferences. Firstly, I outline in a general model, the theory behind 
hedonic price determination, based on Rosen (1974). Further details on this are 
in the appendix. Secondly, I show how spatial equilibrium leads to hedonic prices 
adjustment. Thirdly, I impose assumptions on preferences and demonstrate the 
equivalence of spatial equilibrium with LOP. I show that for homogenous 
preferences that are linear in amenities then spatial equilibrium is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for Absolute-LOP to hold. I also briefly discuss the case 
of heterogeneous preferences, which relates tangentially to Relative-LOP. Finally, 
I discuss the case of log-linear homogenous preferences, which implies a LOP in 
percentage terms. This final model resembles that which is commonly observed 
in the literature and this is the model I will take to the data. 
 Hedonic price determination 
This section provides a brief overview of hedonic price determination in spatial 
equilibrium that is based the theoretical framework provided by Rosen (1974). 
(The appendix provides further detail.) I depart from Rosen (1974) by assuming, 
for simplicity, that individuals consume land directly. This bypasses the housing 
supply side of the model and entails that locational amenities are given 
exogenously. Plots of land are characterised by a vector of 𝑁 amenities 𝑧 =
𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑁 and the price of land is function of its amenities 𝑝(𝑧) =
𝑝(𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑁). This is the hedonic price function, where the partial derivatives 
with respect to each amenity, denoted 𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑁, are the hedonic prices of 
those amenities. Individuals’ utility is a function of consumption good 𝑥, the price 
of which is the numeraire, and the amenities 𝑧. Individuals have a budget 
constraint 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑝(𝑧), where 𝑦 is their exogenous income and must choose a 
location that maximises their utility. Individuals’ bid functions 𝜃 describe the 
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maximum amount they are willing to pay for land with amenity levels 𝑧 in order 
that they achieve given utility level 𝑢: 
 𝑈(𝑦 − 𝜃, 𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑁) = 𝑢 (1) 
The bid function is therefore given by 𝜃(𝑧; 𝑢, 𝑦). Maximisation of utility occurs 
when individuals choose a location where the hedonic price for each amenity is 
equal to their marginal rate of substitution for those amenities 𝑝𝑛 = 𝜌𝑛. This 
means that individuals are located on their highest possible indifference curve 
when their own bid function is tangential to the hedonic price function for each 
amenity. Solving the maximising decision for each individual gives us the demand 
at each amenity level for any given set of hedonic prices. Spatial equilibrium is 
given by the set of hedonic prices that that equalise demand with the exogenously 
given supply at each amenity level3. If there is excess demand at a particular 
amenity level then that level is under-priced and the hedonic prices must rise 
until the demand matches the available supply.  
 Adjustment to spatial equilibrium hedonic prices 
It is possible to describe the process by which spatial equilibrium is achieved by 
imagining a counterfactual where spatial equilibrium does not hold. In Figure 1 
below, the line 𝑝∗(𝑧) describes the spatial equilibrium hedonic price function 
where this is only a single amenity 𝑧. (This switch to a single attribute is for 
simplicity, and is the only change from the model presented in the previous 
section.) I assume that each location is associated with a different amount of 
amenity 𝑧. Three bid functions are given for three different individuals who have 
chosen locations that maximise their utility with respect to these equilibrium 
hedonic prices. These individual choose different locations because they have 
different preferences for amenity 𝑧 or different incomes. However, the 
parameters that deliver these equilibrium choices are not the focus of the 
                                                        
 
3 As mentioned I have ignored the producer side from Rosen (1974) since I aim to deal 
only with land where the attributes are assumed to be given exogenously. 
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following analysis, rather, how individuals react to deviations in the hedonic 
prices from equilibrium.  
Individual 2 has chosen the location 𝑎 associated with the amenity amount 𝑧𝑎. 
This is because this person’s equilibrium bid-rent 𝜃2(𝑧; 𝑢∗) is tangential to the 
hedonic price function at this point 𝑎. The individual cannot gain by moving 
because other locations with different amounts of 𝑧 would offer this individual a 
higher indifference curve (i.e. a lower utility) at the equilibrium hedonic prices.  
Figure 1: Spatial equilibrium and spatial arbitrage 
 
Note: this figure is based on Figure 1 from Rosen (1974: p.39) but has been adapted to 
demonstrate out of equilibrium situations. 
What would happen if the price at location 𝑎 was at 𝑝′(𝑧𝑎) below the equilibrium 
price? The dash, instead of an asterisk, represents simply an out of equilibrium 
price. In this situation, individual 1 is indifferent between his or her current 
location and location 𝑎. All individuals located between individual 1 and location 
𝑎 will find they can reach a higher indifference curve by moving to location 𝑎. 
This means there is a spatial disequilibrium and an adjustment is necessary. 
Since many individuals are demanding just one single location (𝑎) the price of 
that location must rise until it is equal to the spatial equilibrium hedonic price. 
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Further, suppose that the price at location 𝑎 was equal to 𝑝′′(𝑧𝑎), above the 
equilibrium price. In this case, individual 2 would be indifferent between his or 
her current location (𝑎) and the location where individual 3 resides since both 
would offer the level of utility 𝑢′. All of the locations between the two locations 
would therefore offer individual 2 a higher level of utility than 𝑢′ and individual 
2 would benefit from moving away from 𝑎 to one of these locations. This is also 
spatial disequilibrium since there is not enough demand to match the supply at 
location 𝑎 and therefore the price must fall. 
It is clear from this thought experiment that spatial equilibrium implies that 
hedonic prices are related to one another across locations. If the hedonic price in 
one location violates spatial equilibrium then there exist other locations that 
offer a better deal to some individuals. These individuals will move themselves 
(or at least place their demands to move) until prices return to the equilibrium 
relationship. The described process is one of spatial arbitrage that is comparable 
to the law of one price but where rational agent move goods from cheaper 
locations to more expensive locations (instead of moving themselves). However, 
precisely how they are related remains unclear. In fact, in the following I show 
that it depends on the particular assumptions made regarding the preferences of 
individuals. In the next paragraph I examine different scenarios to see what 
different sets of assumptions imply for hedonic price relationships across 
locations. 
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 Linear utility with homogenous preferences 
I return to the case with 𝑁 amenities but now individuals are now assumed to 
have homogenous preferences. To begin with I also assume individuals possess 
utility functions that are linear in amenities and the consumption good4: 
 𝑈 = 𝑥 + ?̅?1𝑧1 + ?̅?2𝑧2 +⋯ + ?̅?𝑁𝑧𝑁 (2) 
where ?̅?1, ?̅?2, … , ?̅?𝑁 represent the common marginal willingness to pays for each 
amenity (since individuals are identical). As discussed above, maximisation of 
utility occurs when individuals choose a location where the hedonic price for 
each amenity is equal to their marginal rates of substitution for each amenity, e.g. 
for the 𝑛-th amenity it is 𝑝𝑛 = ?̅?𝑛. The common bid functions ?̅? can then be 
obtained by asking what is the maximum willingness to pay for any given set of 
amenities to achieve a common attainable utility level ?̅?. Slightly rearranged this 
gives: 
 𝜃 = (?̅? − ?̅?) + ?̅?1𝑧1 + ?̅?2𝑧2 +⋯ + ?̅?𝑁𝑧𝑁 (3) 
Given this bid-rent, spatial equilibrium then occurs when hedonic prices are such 
that the quantity demanded at each location associated with a particular amenity 
level is equal to the quantity supplied. Rosen (1974) demonstrates how this can 
be solved depending on the distributions of preferences in the city relative to the 
distributions of amenities. However, under the case of homogenous preferences, 
without a housing supply sector, the problem is trivial. If the equilibrium hedonic 
price function  𝑝∗(𝑧) is simply equal to the common bid rent then all individuals 
are indifferent between all locations and supply equals demand at all amenity 
levels. Therefore the spatial equilibrium hedonic prices are given by the partial 
derivatives of the common bid rent function 𝑝𝑛
∗ = 𝜃𝑛 = ?̅?𝑛. This makes the 
                                                        
 
4 Here, units of 𝑥 have been normalised such that its parameter is equal to one. This 
aspect means that 𝜌𝑛 is the parameter for the𝑛-th attribute and the marginal rate of 
substitution between 𝑧𝑛 and 𝑥. 
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equilibrium hedonic price difference across locations 𝑖 and 𝑗 always equal to 
zero5: 
 𝑝𝑛,𝑖
∗ − 𝑝𝑛,𝑗
∗ = ?̅?𝑛 − ?̅?𝑛 = 0 (4) 
Therefore under the case of linear homogenous preferences, spatial equilibrium 
is a necessary and sufficient condition for a law of one price for the hedonic price 
of all amenities. It is necessary since because if there is spatial equilibrium then 
hedonic prices must be equal. It is sufficient because if prices are equal then all 
locations offer the same utility and there must be spatial equilibrium. However, 
linear preferences are not intuitive and for this reason not commonly adopted in 
theoretical or empirical literature. In reality a degree of complementarity is 
expected which implies utility is determined by a complex product of utility-
bearing attributes. 
 Homogenous preferences – log-linear 
I present a homogenous preferences model with a log-linear utility function that 
depends on rail access, among other amenities. This model captures a more 
typical theoretical set-up in the urban economics literature (e.g. Glaeser, 2008). 
As such it provides the framework for my empirical analysis. Identical individuals 
maximise utility at each location 𝑖 in a city by allocating their exogenously given 
budget 𝑊 between a consumption good 𝐶, whose price is the numeraire, and land 
𝐿𝑖 , whose value is given by the bid-rent 𝜃𝑖:  
 max
𝐶,𝐿
𝑈𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖𝐶
𝛾𝐿𝑖
1−𝛾    s. t.    𝑊 = 𝐶 + 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑖  (5) 
                                                        
 
5 In general, the equilibrium hedonic price at any urban location 𝑖 is a function of the 
amenity level at that location 𝑝𝑛,𝑖
∗ =
𝑑𝑝∗(𝑧𝑛,𝑖)
𝑑𝑧𝑛,𝑖
. However, given individuals are identical 
and preferences are linear the price at all location is simply 𝑝𝑛,𝑖
∗ = ?̅?𝑛 irrelevant of 
the amount of the amenity there. 
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where the amenities term 𝐴𝑖  is defined as 𝐴𝑖 = 𝑒
a𝑖
′Ω𝑒𝛹𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖 , where a𝑖 represents a 
vector of 𝑚 amenities, Ω is a vector of amenity preferences6, 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖 is the urban 
rail access at 𝑖 and Ψ is its preference parameter. 
In spatial equilibrium each location must offer the same level of utility ?̅? to 
maximising individuals such that no individual can gain by changing location. 
Since this has no given units, I set this equal to one for simplicity:   
 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑒
a𝑖
′Ω𝑒𝛹𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖(𝛾𝑊)𝛾 ((1 − 𝛾)
𝑊
𝜃𝑖
)
1−𝛾
= ?̅? = 1 (6) 
and solve for land values: 
 𝜃𝑖 = (1 − 𝛾) (𝛾
𝛾𝑊𝑒a𝑖
′Ω𝑒𝛹𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖)
1
1−𝛾
 (7) 
The derivatives of the hedonic function with respect to amenities give the 
hedonic prices of those amenities for spatial equilibrium (Rosen 1974).  
The equilibrium value (denoted with an asterisk) for rail access is therefore: 
 𝑝𝑖
∗ =
𝑑𝜃𝑖
𝑑𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖
=
𝛹
1 − 𝛾
𝜃𝑖  (8) 
By calculating the hedonic price at another location 𝑗 and rearranging I reach a 
relation of hedonic prices between city locations 𝑖 and 𝑗: 
 
𝑝𝑖
∗
𝜃𝑖
=
𝑝𝑗
∗
𝜃𝑗
=
𝛹
1 − 𝛾
 (9) 
The hedonic prices divided by total price (i.e. the hedonic price in percentage 
terms) in different city locations should be equal. This is therefore a form of the 
                                                        
 
6 The 𝑚 amenities and their parameters can defined: 
a𝑖
′Ω = [a0,𝑖 … a𝑚,𝑖] [
Ω0
⋮
𝛺𝑚
] 
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law of one price in percentage terms. Notably, in order to empirically estimate 
the hedonic price in a log-linear model it is necessary to first take logs of the bid 
rent. This means that the estimates of the marginal price of rail access will 
already be in percentage terms and the test for LOP will simply be to test for 
stationarity of their price differences across neighbourhoods i.e. it is not 
necessary to make a further calculation of the percentage terms since the log-
linearisation removes this already. 
This subsection has shown that when preferences are homogenous and log-
linear in amenities then spatial equilibrium implies a LOP in percentage terms 
for hedonic prices. The basic intuition behind this empirical finding is that in the 
log-linear formulation, the individual contributions of each amenity to utility 
depend on the levels of the other arguments in the utility function. This is because 
the arguments are multiplicative rather than additive as in the linear form. Hence 
the marginal willingness to pay depends for any one amenity is a factor of the 
total price because this reflects all the utility-bearing attributes at that location. 
This further highlights that complementarities between amenities are important 
in modifying the version of the law of one price that applies. The log-linear 
formulation captures a certain type of complementarity but others may exist. 
Therefore in the empirical strategy I will develop ensure to pay careful attention 
to potential additional (not capture by log-linear form) complementarities 
generating interaction terms between amenities (both rail access and amenity 
controls).  
So far I have only analysed the case of homogenous preferences. This scenario 
most neatly fits the LOP interpretation of spatial equilibrium. This is the model I 
will test empirically and the findings will be subject to the reliability of this 
assumption. However, homogenous preferences are relatively unrealistic, given 
that individuals place different values on different amenities and have different 
incomes. Therefore at least an exploratory discussion of the case of 
heterogeneous preferences is desirable. I provide such a discussion in the next 
section; however, this is not necessary for understanding the remainder of the 
paper and can be safely skipped by the casual reader. Furthermore, since this 
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case is complex and not the focus of this paper, I provide only the intuition here 
and leave the detailed discussion for the appendix. 
 Discussion of heterogeneous preferences 
This section provides a brief discussion of the case of heterogeneous preferences 
in the linear case, demonstrating how it relates tangentially to Relative-LOP. The 
intuition begins with a linear model similar to that outlined in 3.3 but with only 
one amenity 𝑧1. Preferences are heterogeneous and described by an exogenous 
distribution across the population. There is also an exogenous distribution of the 
amenity across locations. Spatial equilibrium is characterised by individuals of 
different preferences sorting across locations such that the location with the 
highest amenity amount goes to the individual with the highest preferences for 
the amenity, the location with the next highest amount goes to the individual with 
the next highest preferences, and so on. In spatial equilibrium each individual 
pays a hedonic price equal to their marginal willingness to pay for the amenity.  
The amenity distribution therefore maps onto the preferences distribution via 
sorting across locations. Each location has an amenity level is associated with a 
particular preference level. The hedonic price is a function of the amenity amount 
in each location which gives the preferences of the individuals located there in 
equilibrium. Assuming the distributions of preferences and the amenity are fixed 
then the equilibrium hedonic price difference between locations is equal to a 
fixed constant. To take the example from the appendix, if the exogenous 
distribution of population across marginal rates of substitution (for the amenity 
𝑧1) is given according to the function 𝑓(𝜌) = 𝑏 𝑑𝜌 and the locations are 
distributed across amenity levels according to 𝑔(𝑧1) = 𝑘 𝑑𝑧1, where 𝑏 and 𝑘 are 
constants that describe the density of the distributions then the equilibrium 
hedonic price difference between locations 𝑖 and 𝑗 is given by equating supply 
and demand at each amenity level which gives7:  
                                                        
 
7 Derivation of this hedonic price difference is given in the appendix. 
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 𝑝1𝑖
∗ − 𝑝1𝑗
∗ =
𝑘
𝑏
(𝑧1𝑖 − 𝑧1𝑗) (10) 
In contrast to the homogenous preferences case, this is not zero. But if the 
distributions are fixed then this is equal to a constant. Deviations from this fixed 
price difference should be met with adjustments since utility maximising 
consumers would stand to benefit by changing locations. Therefore, this is 
equivalent to Relative-LOP in the case of fixed distributions. 
However, in reality the most likely source of shocks to hedonic prices away from 
their equilibrium values is changes in the distributions themselves. For example 
a transport shock to location 𝑖 would alter both the overall distribution of the rail 
access amenity and the locations place in this distribution meaning convergence 
will be to an entirely different equilibrium hedonic price difference. For this 
reason, heterogeneous preferences, even with linear utility functions do not 
necessarily describe a case of LOP for hedonic prices. In the appendix I make the 
argument that the test for LOP may still be appropriate if the price deviations 
from equilibrium (due to shocks) are typically significant larger than the 
movements in the equilibrium they converge to (due to changes in the 
distributions). Furthermore, I argue that heterogeneous preferences may lead to 
committing a Type II error, where I fail to reject stationarity even though spatial 
equilibrium doesn’t hold but that it cannot lead to committing a Type I error 
where I reject spatial equilibrium even though it does hold. This entails that a 
confirmation of LOP will still provide evidence for spatial equilibrium, even if 
individuals are heterogeneous.  
 Summary 
To summarise this section, I have asked whether the LOP is expected to apply to 
hedonic prices of locational amenities in urban land markets. I have shown that 
whilst the process of spatial arbitrage is similar to traditional LOP, it is not 
identical. There are a number of reasons why hedonic prices might not be exactly 
equal even under spatial equilibrium. Heterogeneous preferences and 
complementarities between goods mean that the hedonic price for attributes in 
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different location may be different even in equilibrium. I have demonstrated how 
this depends on the assumed utility function for individuals. Under homogenous 
preferences, if utility is linear then Absolute-LOP should hold for hedonic 
preferences. Further, I developed a model specifically for the case of rail access 
that uses the commonly adopted log-linear utility function with homogenous 
preferences. This demonstrates that under these assumptions spatial 
equilibrium implies a LOP in percentage terms i.e. rail access should increase 
land prices by the same percentage in all locations. This is the model I will take to 
the data, which I present in the next section. The findings will be subject to the 
reliability of the assumptions regarding preferences.
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 Data: historical Berlin 
As I have mentioned, local shocks to amenities are a source of possible violations 
of spatial equilibrium. Therefore in order to test for the existence of potential 
adjustment processes it is helpful to examine a period in which I expect a lot of 
local shocks. I use a unique dataset that covers historical Berlin between 1890 
and 1914. This is a period characterised by significant change, including a 
population growth (almost doubled between 1880 and 1912), large transport 
infrastructure projects and large changes in the structure of land use. These 
dynamic factors mean that the utility of land at different locations will be subject 
to an almost continual battery of ‘shocks’ requiring constant adjustment in land 
values in order to maintain spatial equilibrium. This makes it a very appropriate 
case study with which to examine the existence and speed of convergence. 
 Land values 
Land values are the dependent variable in the first stage of the analysis and allow 
for the estimation of the hedonic prices of rail access. Land values are given at the 
plot level for Berlin for 6 time periods (approximately every 5 years) between 
1890 and 1914. This land value dataset was produced by the renowned 
technician Gustav Müller under the imperial valuation law or 
Reichsbewertungsgesetz of the German Reich. This law includes the strict 
direction to use capital values for assessing the pure value of land plots based on 
the fair market price. Müller’s values adjust for all structural building and garden 
characteristics as well as plot specificities such as soil properties, courtyards and 
whether it is a corner lot. The data were produced in order to serve as official 
guides to private and public investors into Berlin’s real estate market. 
The Berlin land values dataset can be compared to the Olcott’s Blue Book of Land 
Values for Chicago which is well known in the field of urban economics and has 
helped Chicago to become a unique laboratory for testing theories of urban 
economics (McDonald & McMillen, 1990; McMillen, 1996). The Berlin data, like 
the Olcott values, are available as highly detailed maps. They have also 
contributed to historical Berlin becoming somewhat of a laboratory of its own. 
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Previous research has used these data to estimate the changing land gradient 
(Ahlfeldt & Wendland, 2011), valuing transport innovations (Ahlfeldt et al., 2011; 
Ahlfeldt & Wendland, 2009) and exploring the role of agglomeration economies 
(Ahlfeldt & Wendland, 2013). Due to the rapid growth of the city over this period 
and restructuring of the patterns of land use, the land values are originally an 
unbalanced panel. From this I took the maximum possible balanced panel 
resulting in a dataset of 31,790 observations per time period that covers approx. 
75 km² of land area and 1,758 city blocks. Figure 2 shows these land values for a 
small section of Berlin in 1914 and Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of mean land 
value over the sample period. 
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Figure 2: Section of land values (1914) 
 
Figure 3: Land values (sample mean) 
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 Quasi-Neighbourhoods 
In order to estimate the hedonic price over time in each neighbourhood in the 
city I define a set of arbitrary grid-neighbourhoods called quasi-neighbourhoods. 
The reason I define arbitrary grids rather than using administrative unit is so that 
I can flexibly vary neighbourhood size (and therefore number) in order to vary 
the width of the resulting panel of hedonic price differences. A wider panel (more 
neighbourhoods) will increase the power of the panel unit root tests on these 
price differences. However, a wider panel requires reducing the size of 
neighbourhoods used to estimate the hedonic price of rail access leading to less 
precise estimates. In order to demonstrate robustness in the face of this trade-
off, I define quasi-neighbourhoods of different sizes.  
First I define an 8 × 16 grid to create 128 grids cells in abstract space. These grid 
cells are laid over the land value sample as illustrated in Figure 4. In the first 
neighbourhood definition, these grid cells are divided between two areas by a 
vertical line as illustrated in Figure 4 by the thick line labelled ‘2’. In this two-
neighbourhood definition, the 64 grid cells to the west of the dividing line make 
up Neighbourhood 1 and the 64 to the east are Neighbourhood 2. In order to 
generate the four-neighbourhood definition, I draw an additional (horizontal) 
line, marked by ‘4’ in Figure 4. The resulting definitions are shown in Figure 5(a) 
for two neighbourhoods (b) for four neighbourhoods. This procedure is repeated 
for 8, 16, 32 and 64 neighbourhoods. It is apparent however, that some of the 
neighbourhoods in some of these definitions will have very few observations or 
even none within their boundaries. This is problematic for the estimation of 
hedonic prices within these zones and the following solution is implemented. If 
the number of observations in one neighbourhood is less than a third of the mean 
number of observation across all neighbourhoods, then it is merged with an 
adjacent neighbourhood. An example of this is illustrated in Figure 6, where the 
first and second neighbourhoods have been merged into Neighbourhood 1. 
Therefore, what was initially Neighbourhood 3 now becomes Neighbourhood 2, 
and so on such that the original eight neighbourhoods collapse to seven. Due to 
this merging criterion the final neighbourhood definitions are characterised by 
2, 4, 7, 13, 26 and 47 neighbourhoods instead of 2, 4, 8, 16, 32 and 64 respectively. 
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Figure 4: Quasi-neighbourhood dividing lines 
 
Figure 5: Quasi-neighbourhoods with N = 2 and N = 4 
  
Figure 6: Quasi-neighbourhoods (merging example) 
(a) (b) 
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 Rail access 
Rail access is the variable of interest and the amenity for which I estimate the 
hedonic prices. I capture rail access by a measure of station density. The station 
locations are obtained from a combination of network plans and information on 
the historical development of the networks such as construction dates8. Thus, the 
urban rail network for Berlin was reconstructed historically for each of the 6 
observation time periods in order to compute the time-variant station density 
variable. 
The station density measure is a kernel density function generated in ArcGIS. The 
procedure involves fitting a smoothly curved surface a kernel around each point 
(station). The surface is at its highest where the station is located and moving 
away declines to height of zero at the specified search radius, which I define as 
the typically assumed maximum walking distance of 2km (Gibbons & Machin, 
2005). The precise formulation of the kernel used by ArcGIS is given by the 
quadratic function described by Silverman (1986a), p. 76, equation 4.5. The 
volume under the kernel for each station is equal to one. The kernel density is 
calculated for each land value observation as the sum of the individual kernel 
surfaces where they overlay that plot. Figure 7 shows transport network and the 
kernel density measures in relation to the land value plots for 1890 and 1914. 
Figure 8 shows the development over the period of the mean of station density 
across the land value observations. There is clearly a large development of the 
network over the period I study, particularly in the inner-city neighbourhoods. 
In fact the total number of stations in Greater Berlin increased from 65 to 155 
over this period. This point is also clear from the scale used to display station 
density in 1890 (from 0 to 0.68) compared with 1914 (from 0 to 2.45). 
                                                        
 
8 This information can be found at the following websites: www.bahnstrecken.de, 
berlineruntergrundbahn.de, www.stadtschnellbahn‐berlin.de, and 
www.berlinerverkehr.de. 
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Figure 7: Station kernel density in 1890 (top) and 1914 (bottom) 
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Figure 8: Station density (mean of observations) 
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 Control variables 
In order to gain estimates of the hedonic price of rail access that are as unbiased 
as possible I use control variables for other urban amenities. The control 
variables area as follows: distance to nearest green space, distance to nearest 
water body, distance to the central business district, distance to the secondary 
centre in west Berlin, Kurfürstendamm, and to capture the disamenity of noise, 
distance to overground track. These distance measures are calculated for each 
land value plot in ArcGIS. Distance to track is calculated for each observation 
period, whilst the other controls are time invariant measures. Table 1 provides 
summary statistics of all the variables discussed in this data section. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Land values (RM)           
Land value in 1890  31,790 128.9 177.4 3 2,000 
Land value in 1896 31,790 173.4 216.8 5 2,100 
Land value in 1900 31,790 212.5 250.0 5 2,120 
Land value in 1904 31,790 246.3 276.1 3 2,150 
Land value in 1910 31,790 300.5 333.9 3 2,250 
Land value in 1914 31,790 300.1 332.5 21 2,750 
Station density (kernel)     
Station density in 1890 31,790 0.24 0.16 0 0.66 
Station density in 1896 31,790 0.29 0.15 0 0.66 
Station density in 1900 31,790 0.31 0.15 0 0.66 
Station density in 1904 31,790 0.51 0.29 0 1.47 
Station density in 1910 31,790 0.66 0.37 0 1.65 
Station density in 1914 31,790 0.82 0.43 0 1.77 
Distance controls (km) – no time variation    
Distance to Green space 31,790 0.25 0.17 0 1.07 
Distance to Water 31,790 0.81 0.62 0 3.01 
Distance to CBD 31,790 3.60 1.63 0 8.34 
Distance to Kurfürstendamm 31,790 4.30 2.14 0 9.32 
Note: Max station density for land value plots differs from max station density for corresponding 
year in Figure 7 because the figure shows station density over space, where there may not be any 
plots.
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 Empirical Approach 
In this section I introduce my two-stage empirical strategy for testing spatial 
equilibrium. The first stage involves the estimation of the hedonic price of urban 
rail access. Using a dummy variable interaction model I estimate the hedonic 
price separately in each quasi-neighbourhood in each time period of the panel. 
This results in a 𝑁 × 𝑇 panel dataset of implicit prices, where 𝑁 is the number of 
neighbourhoods and 𝑇 the number of panel years. In the second stage of the 
analysis I examine, in the spirit of the law of one price (LOP), whether differences 
in hedonic prices between neighbourhoods exhibit mean reversion. Since I have 
6 time periods, I employ a panel unit test with good properties when testing short 
panels that also accounts for the possibility of AR(1) correlated error terms 
(Blander & Dhaene, 2012). A further discussion of panel unit root tests is also 
provided in the overview of the LOP literature in the appendix.  
 The first stage: estimating the hedonic price of rail access 
Stage one of my empirical strategy is to use the dataset to estimate hedonic prices 
of rail access that vary across neighbourhoods and time. I start by taking logs of 
equation (7) from the theory section 3.4. The bid-rent is then empirically 
represented by land values, the accessibility measure by station density and the 
amenities vector by a set of controls, as described above in section 4 on data. In 
order to gain estimates that vary across locations I use the quasi-neighbourhoods 
also described in section 4. Each land value observation 𝑖 belongs to a 
neighbourhood 𝑛 (1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 𝑁) and time period  (1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇), where there are 𝑁 
neighbourhoods and 𝑇 time periods in total. I define for each observation 𝑖 an 
𝑁 × 1 vector Q𝑖  in which the 𝑛-th element is a neighbourhood dummy variable 
that equals one if land value plot 𝑖 is observed within neighbourhood 𝑛 and equal 
to zero otherwise. I define a similar 𝑇 × 1 vector Y𝑖 for year dummies, where Y𝑖 =
1 if land value plot 𝑖 is observed within year 𝑡, and Y𝑖 = 0 otherwise. 
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I estimate the following: 
 ln 𝐿𝑉𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑄𝑖
′BY𝑖 𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑆 + X𝑖
′Φ+ 𝜀𝑖 (11)  
where B is a matrix of neighbourhood-year specific coefficients for the hedonic 
price of rail access to be estimated. To write this out for the case of four 
neighbourhoods (𝑁 = 4) and six time periods (𝑇 = 6) I estimate: 
ln 𝐿𝑉𝑖 = 𝛼 + [Q𝑖 1 Q𝑖 2 Q𝑖 3 Q𝑖 4] [
B11 B12 B13 B14 B15 B16
B21 B22 B23 B24 B25 B26
B31 B32 B33 B34 B35 B36
B41 B42 B43 B44 B45 B46
]
[
 
 
 
 
 
Y𝑖 1
Y𝑖 2
Y𝑖 3
Y𝑖 4
Y𝑖 5
Y𝑖 6]
 
 
 
 
 
𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑖 + a𝑖Φ+ 𝜀𝑖 (12)  
This matrix B with 𝑁 rows and 𝑇 columns gives us a panel dataset of hedonic 
prices of rail access that vary with neighbourhood and year where the matrix 
element B𝑛𝑡 gives us the hedonic price in neighbourhood 𝑛 and time period 𝑡. 
Following the convention in the LOP literature I generate price differences from 
a reference location i.e. 𝑞𝑛𝑡 = B𝑛𝑡 − B𝑟𝑒𝑓,𝑡. Normally I would take log differences 
but since the hedonic prices are already in logs due to the transformation applied 
to land values this step is not necessary. If I were to choose the first 
neighbourhood (𝑛 = 1) as the reference location I define the relative prices for 
the remaining three neighbourhoods as: 
q = [
B21 − B11 B22 − B11 B23 − B11 B24 − B11 B25 − B11 B26 − B11
B31 − B11 B32 − B11 B33 − B11 B34 − B11 B35 − B11 B36 − B11
B41 − B11 B42 − B11 B43 − B11 B44 − B11 B45 − B11 B46 − B11
] (13)  
In order to demonstrate robustness with respect to choice of base 
neighbourhoods, I will conduct the multiple unit roots test, changing the 
reference neighbourhood each time until all neighbourhoods have served as the 
reference.  
There may be some problems with this simple estimation approach. First, there 
may exist unobserved year and neighbourhood specific factors that affect land 
values. For year effects, these could be exogenous macroeconomic factors that 
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affect the whole of Berlin. For neighbourhood effects, these could be 
socioeconomic characteristics that affect the valuation of an area. These could 
potentially vary over time as neighbourhoods change with the development of 
the city. Therefore introduce neighbourhood-year indicators to capture these 
time-place specific effects. These are simply the uninteracted version of the 
dummy variables that were interacted with the station density measure in the 
last specification. 
Second, I have applied logs to the bid-rent function derived from the theoretical 
model in order to reach a linear regression model. Whilst this functional form 
captures a degree of complementarity between amenities, the actual 
complementarities may be structurally different. Therefore I attempt to 
generalise the model by adding interaction terms between rail access and the 
vector of all other amenities. I interact rail access with itself in the form of a 
squared interaction term. This captures potential further non-linearities not 
removed by the log-linearisation. The final model estimated is: 
ln 𝐿𝑉𝑖 = 𝑄𝑖
′𝐴Y𝑖 + 𝑄𝑖
′BY𝑖 𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛿 𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑖² + X𝑖
′𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑖𝛱 + X𝑖
′𝑄𝑖
′ΘY𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (14)  
where A is a matrix of neighbourhood-year specific constants to be estimated, 𝛿 
is a parameter for the station density squared term, 𝛱 is a vector of parameters 
for the interaction terms of station density with each amenity and Θ is a matrix 
of neighbourhood-year specific parameters for amenities. In total I have (𝑚 +
2)𝑁𝑇 +  1 +  𝑚 coefficients to estimate. In the specification with the smallest 
and most numerous neighbourhoods definition (N=47) and the total number of 
parameters is 1,980.  
It is important to note that only the parameters for the uninteracted station 
density are the focus of the unit root testing in the next stage. The interacted 
versions including the squared term are conceptualised are introduced with the 
intention of removing non-linearities and complementarities from the hedonic 
price of rail access. What is left is only the linear component of the overall hedonic 
price. This may be conceptualised as the interacted and uninteracted amenities 
each capturing something of distinct amenity value. In this sense they represent 
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individual amenities with their own hedonic prices. As discussed in the theory 
section it is the linear hedonic price that is expected to most closely adhere to the 
law of one price and this is what is taken forward to the next stage. 
 The second stage: panel unit root test 
In the second stage of I proceed to test the estimated matrix of hedonic prices for 
compliance with LOP. To do this I test the matrix of estimated price differences q̂ 
as in equation (13) for stationarity using the unit root test described by Blander 
and Dhaene (2012): 
 
 ?̂?𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼𝑛 + 𝜑?̂?𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝜌∆?̂?𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑛𝑡  (15)  
where the null hypothesis is 𝜑 = 1, that the price differences have a unit root and 
that LOP does not hold. A rejection of this null hypothesis implies that 𝑞𝑛𝑡 exhibits 
convergence and that LOP holds. If the constant terms 𝛼𝑛 are zero then absolute 
LOP holds and if they are positive and significant then relative LOP holds. This 
test also incorporates a single lagged difference (with parameter 𝜌) and is hence 
the panel equivalent of an ADF(1) test. This allows for AR(1) error terms. The 
Blander-Dhaene test exhibits strong properties for short panels and is therefore 
suitable for a dataset with only 6 time periods. A general discussion of panel unit 
root tests is provided in the review of the LOP literature in the appendix. The 
authors also note that results using panel unit root tests are sensitive to the 
choice of reference location when calculating price differences. Therefore I will 
conduct the analysis using every location as a reference location once. 
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 Results 
In this section I indicate the results of the two-step empirical strategy and 
interpret them in the context of the LOP. 
 Stage one: hedonic price estimates 
In column (1) of Table 2 I present the results of estimating equation (11) for a 
single neighbourhood (i.e. 𝑁 = 1) and without controls. Station density is 
interacted with year effects and the corresponding coefficients indicate the 
hedonic price evolution for the whole of Berlin. It is apparent that there is a 
positive amenity value to station density, which in the initial period (1890) has a 
coefficient of 1.23 and is significant at the 1% level. The interactions with year 
effect indicate that the hedonic price is higher in every period than in the initial 
period. Since the dependent variable is the log of land values, the coefficient can 
be interpreted as a percentage effect9. A one unit increase in station density is 
therefore associated with a 242% increase in land value in 1890. The size of this 
coefficient is not entirely surprising considering that one unit increase in station 
density represents a very large increase. A one unit increase in station density 
can only be achieved when there are many new stations close to the location. It 
is natural therefore that it should be associated with a very large response. 
Next, in column (2) I introduce the full set of control variables as in equation (14) 
and this only slightly changes to the coefficient for station density to 1.27 (or 
256%) in 1890 but it is in lower in every year after compared with the model 
without controls. Figure 9(a) plots the hedonic price evolution over time as 
estimated using this model specification for one neighbourhood. The coefficient 
for distance to CBD is -0.53, which is interpreted as a 70% decrease in land values 
per km further from the CBD. Whilst this seems fairly steep it is roughly in line 
with other estimates of CBD gradients in historical contexts (Ahlfeldt & 
                                                        
 
9 The formula used to calculate the percentage effect of a coefficient 𝛽 is (𝑒𝛽 − 1) ×
100. 
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Wendland, 2011 provide a summary). The distance to Kurfürstendamm 
(Ku’damm for short) captures the amenity effect associated with proximity to the 
Berlin’s most important sub-centre. The coefficient of 0.05 is equivalent to a 5% 
per km increase with distance from the secondary centre. This is the opposite 
sign to what is expected and probably due to significant non-linearities in the 
effect. Distance to green space (-0.65, or 92% per km) and distance to water 
bodies (-0.20, or 22% per km) are also found to be amenities that capitalise into 
land values. Finally, distance to track, which is intended to capture the disamenity 
of rail noise, is associated with a coefficient of 0.05 (5% per km). This suggests 
that distance to rail indeed captures some negative aspect of rail such as train 
noise.  
Table 2: Hedonic estimates of price of transport accessibility 
 (1) (2) (3) 
   n=1 n=2 
Station density 1.231*** 1.271*** 2.373*** -0.877*** 
 (0.021) (0.040) (0.059) (0.069) 
Station density ×1896 0.861*** 0.503*** 0.775*** -1.186*** 
 (0.023) (0.044) (0.084) (0.103) 
Station density ×1900 1.235*** 0.224*** -1.839*** 1.644*** 
 (0.023) (0.044) (0.076) (0.096) 
Station density ×1904 0.693*** -0.652*** -1.540*** 0.154** 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.060) (0.073) 
Station density ×1910 0.518*** -0.497*** -1.305*** 0.163** 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.059) (0.070) 
Station density ×1914 0.234*** -0.448*** -1.466*** 0.481*** 
 (0.020) (0.036) (0.061) (0.071) 
Station dens. × Station dens.   -0.195*** -0.118*** 
  (0.017) (0.018) 
Distance to Track  0.045*** 0.017 
  (0.008) (0.012) 
Distance to CBD  -0.530*** -0.474*** 
  (0.002) (0.004) 
Distance to Ku’damm  0.047*** 0.119*** 
  (0.002) (0.004) 
Distance to Green  -0.653*** -0.628*** 
  (0.019) (0.027) 
Distance to Water  -0.200*** -0.443*** 
  (0.006) (0.011) 
N 190,740 190,740 190,740 
Adjusted R² 0.32 0.76 0.78 
Dependent variable is ln land value. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Next I estimate hedonic prices of rail access that vary by neighbourhoods. I begin 
with the neighbourhood definition that comprises two neighbourhoods (𝑁 = 2). 
The results of this specification are presented in column (3). The station density 
estimates are divided into two columns where the coefficients in column (3: n=1) 
represent estimates for Neighbourhood 1 and (3: n=2) for Neighbourhood 2. The 
coefficients in (3: n=2) are all relative to the coefficients in the same row in (3: 
n=1) i.e. they are the coefficients on the variables in the left hand column 
interacted with the indicator variable Neighbourhood 2 (the baseline and 
omitted category in Neighbourhood1). For example, Neighbourhood 1 has a 
coefficient of 2.37 in 1890 and Neighbourhood 2 has a coefficient of -0.88 (relative 
to Neighbourhood 1). This means that Neighbourhood 2 has a hedonic price of 1.50 
(calculated as 2.373 − 0.877). The evolution of these two estimated hedonic price 
series over time is illustrated in Figure 9(b) below. I then estimate the model in a 
similar fashion for more numerous neighbourhoods. In order to save space the 
hedonic prices for versions with numerous neighbourhoods are not reported as 
tables. Instead, the estimates for 1, 2, 4 and 7 neighbourhoods are displayed in 
Figure 9. These plots illustrate the panel of hedonic prices. Similar panels were 
created for 13, 26 and 47 neighbourhoods but would be too crowded to display 
as line plots. These panel of the hedonic price of rail access across time in 
neighbourhoods of varying size are used in the next step to test for the law of one 
price. 
 
Figure 9: Estimates of the hedonic price of rail access (N=1, 2, 4 and 7) 
  
  
(c) 
(a) 
(d) 
(b) 
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 Stage two: unit root test of hedonic price differences 
I estimate Blander and Dhaene’s unit root test for price differences according to 
equation (15). The results of these tests for various neighbourhood sizes are 
illustrated in Figure 10 and Figure 11. Figure 10 illustrates the estimates for the 
unit root parameter 𝜑 and whether the null hypothesis (𝜑 = 1) can be rejected 
at the 1% level. In each figure, the first unit root parameter is for the hedonic 
price series itself (not price differences) and this is always shown to be non-
stationary10. The remaining estimates are based on the panel unit root test of 
price differences, but in each case changing the reference neighbourhood. This 
ensures that the results are not artefact of the choice of reference neighbourhood. 
For example, with 𝑁 = 4, Figure 10(a) shows that in each case the null of non-
stationarity is rejected in favour of convergence to LOP. This is indicated by the 
fact that the top of the bar (2% confidence band) around the point (phi estimate) 
falls underneath the dotted line at 𝜑 = 1. This represents a rejection of the null 
at the 1% level since it is a one-tailed test (𝐻2: 𝜑 < 1). The remaining charts of 
Figure 10 indicate that, on the whole, the unit root is rejected for all 
neighbourhood sizes. In some cases, there is dependence on the choice of base 
neighbourhood. In Figure 10(b) (𝑁 = 7) I fail to reject a unit root when 
Neighbourhood 3 is chosen as the base neighbourhood and in Figure 10(c) (𝑁 =
13) I fail when Neighbourhood 5 is the base neighbourhood. However these are 
the only two cases across all specifications where the null is accepted and 
therefore the majority of the evidence is in favour of convergence to LOP. A half-
life can be computed from the phi estimate to give an idea of the speed of 
convergence11. If I average the phi estimates from models with different 
reference neighbourhoods then the half-life is calculated to be 1.36 years when 
there are four neighbourhoods, 1.39 years for 𝑁 = 7, 1.20 years for N=13 and 
                                                        
 
10 This result is not of particular relevance to the questions posed by this paper, 
however, it is interesting that hedonic prices share the property of non-stationarity 
that is typically the case with market prices. This result also rules out the possibility 
of testing LOP in the short run as explained in Section 2. 
11 This is calculated as 
1
2
log (0.5) log(𝜑)⁄ . 
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1.97 years for N=26. Overall, there appears to be no clear relationship between 
neighbourhood size and speed of convergence. However, notably, the longest 
convergence speed is measured for the smallest neighbourhood size definition. 
This could either reflect the fact that the neighbourhood in this definition rarely 
share a border and are can therefore be considered more spatially separated 
from one another than the larger definitions. It could also be simply that the 
smaller neighbourhood are more imprecise in a way that obscures the real 
convergence speed. 
Finally I aim to distinguish between the absolute and relative versions by 
examining the individual fixed effects. Again I aim to obtain robust results by 
reporting results for every possible base location. Therefore there are 𝑁 − 1 fixed 
effects for each specification and a total of 𝑁 specifications12. The fixed effects 
coefficients are displayed in Figure 11. The x-axis indicates which neighbourhood 
is used the reference neighbourhood for the price differences and the y-axis 
indicates the neighbourhood that the reported fixed effect is for. For example in 
Figure 11(a), the first column of coefficients reports the individual fixed effects 
estimated in the unit root test of price differences when Neighbourhood 1 is used 
as the reference. The coefficient for Neighbourhood 2 indicates that there is a 
constant -1.4 difference in the hedonic price between this neighbourhood and the 
reference neighbourhood (1). Significant coefficients are displayed with a black 
bar and insignificant with grey. So whilst there are reported differences between 
hedonic prices across neighbourhoods, they all statistically insignificant in the 
case of 𝑁 = 4. This is evidence in support of the absolute version of LOP.  
For the other neighbourhood sizes there are instances of significant fixed effects 
indicating the relative version holds in some cases. In total, however, these 
                                                        
 
12 Note that the diagonal indicates the fixed effect for Neighbourhood 𝑛 when 
Neighbourhood 𝑛 is the reference and is therefore always zero since price 
differences from itself are always zero. All fixed effect above the diagonal mirror 
those below, in that they are equal and of opposite sign. 
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represent only 7.7% of the cases across all specifications13. As discussed in the 
theory, I do not necessarily expect price difference to converge to zero. There 
may be persistent differences in price as a result of differences in the marginal 
willingness to pay of individuals sorted across locations. Hence this result could 
merely reflect the fact that some locations have significantly different hedonic 
prices for rail access. On the other hand, the individual fixed effect are estimated 
using only a single series of price differences of only 6 time periods, hence, there 
is little power to reject the null of a zero coefficient. This means that in reality 
there may be far more instances of price differences between locations than I 
show statistically. 
In summary, the results demonstrate that price differences are stationary in the 
vast majority of cases. The few instances when this is not true may be explained 
by poorly estimated hedonic prices, perhaps due to particular neighbourhood 
specific biases. It could also be that the neighbourhoods that do not exhibit 
convergence are somehow in reality different to the other locations. Perhaps they 
are subject to some regulations or rent control that means they are not adjusting 
flexibly to shocks to amenity levels. Overall, though, the majority of the evidence 
is in favour of convergence. 
                                                        
 
13 In total there are 33 significant constants from a possible 430 estimated across all 
specifications. For N=4 there are no significant individual constants. For N=7, there 
is 1 significant from 21 parameters. For N=13, there are 8 from 78. For N=26, there 
are 24 from 325. 
Figure 10: Unit root parameter estimates (Blander-Dhaene) for hedonic price of rail access 
  
  
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
 Figure 11: Individual constants from unit root test (Blander-Dhaene) 
  
  
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
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 Summary and conclusions 
This paper has asked whether the law of one price holds for hedonic prices. The 
literature on LOP has been reviewed for different interpretations of the law and 
appropriate methods and for testing whether it holds. I have highlighted that the 
LOP literature does not strictly require prices to be equal across location and 
identified the panel unit root test as the appropriate method for testing whether 
price differences converge across locations and for distinguishing between the 
relative and absolute versions of the law. I demonstrated Absolute-LOP should 
hold for hedonic prices only when utility functions are linear or log-linear and 
individuals are identical. In this specific case, spatial equilibrium is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for Absolute-LOP to hold. I have also explored the case of 
heterogeneous preferences arguing that LOP may still hold in this case but that it 
may more closely resemble Relative-LOP. 
Using a panel dataset for Berlin (1890-1914) I found that differences in the 
hedonic price of rail access across different city locations converges to the law of 
one price (in percentage terms). This finding means that hedonic prices across 
locations are tied together in a long run equilibrium relationship. A secondary 
finding was that the individuals fixed effects from the panel unit root tests are 
insignificant in the majority of cases. This indicates that there is no persistent 
difference in hedonic prices of rail access across locations. This provides 
evidence for the absolute over the relative version of LOP. The key finding of this 
paper is that hedonic price differences across locations exhibit convergence. This 
is theoretically consistent with the existence of spatial equilibrium, providing 
some support to the assumption and results that rely on it.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II 
 Introduction 
This appendix complements the main chapter and is not designed to stand alone 
or as a replacement. Each section provides additional material on the section 
from the main chapter with the same section number. Section 2 provides 
additional detail on the review of literature on the law of one price. Section 3 
complements the theoretical discussion in the main chapter on whether hedonic 
prices should conform to the law of one price by looking at the case of 
heterogeneous preferences. 
 The Law of one price 
This section complements the main chapter by providing a more detailed 
overview of the law of one price (LOP) and its alternative versions. This may be 
useful for readers interested in the broader literature or for clarification of 
anything not clear in the main text. 
 The international context 
The law of one price in international markets implies that the price of goods sold 
in different countries must be equal when expressed in the same currency:  
 𝑃 = 𝑃∗𝐸 (1)  
where 𝑃 is the price of a product in the domestic country, 𝑃∗ is the price of the 
product in the foreign country and 𝐸 is the (exogenous) exchange rate expressed 
as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency.  
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 Transport costs  
If I assume that the flow of goods is only in one direction (from the foreign to the 
domestic country) then LOP can be adapted to account for the costs of moving 
goods between locations: 
 𝑃 = 𝑃∗𝐸 + 𝑇 (2)  
The price 𝑃 (at the receiving location) is determined exactly by the price 𝑃∗𝐸 
(where the good is produced) plus the cost 𝑇 of transportation between the 
locations. If the price difference (𝑃 − 𝑃∗𝐸) was above the transportation costs 
then more goods would be shipped, increasing the supply and bringing the price 
back down. In the opposite case where the price difference is below the 
transportation costs, rational agents would stop shipping goods until the 𝑃 
increased again. If I now allow for goods to flow both ways then the above 
relation becomes an inequality that applies in both locations: 
 𝑃 < 𝑃∗𝐸 + 𝑇 (3)  
 𝑃∗𝐸 < 𝑃 + 𝑇 (4)  
The price differences in either direction must not be greater than the 
transportation cost. This means is a range of values within which price 
differences can fluctuate but if the price difference goes outside this band it 
triggers arbitrage bringing prices back together. Clearly then, the lower the 
transport/transaction costs, the more closely tied together the prices will be 
across locations.  
 Early empirical tests 
This section cover the early empirical literature on LOP, which was focussed on 
testing the strong (short run) version. The short run version interprets the law 
literally, stating that prices across locations should be equal at all times. Price 
differences are not allowed to exist – since these would trigger arbitrage. (This is 
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in contrast to the long-run version of LOP, covered in the next section, which 
allows price differences to exist but states they will be eliminated in the long run). 
Taking logarithms of equation (1) gives 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡
∗ + 𝑒𝑡, where non-capitalised 
letters indicates logs of the capitalised letters. This can be empirically examined 
by estimating: 
 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽0𝑝𝑡
∗ + 𝛽1𝑒𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (5)  
with the null hypothesis that 𝑎 = 0 and 𝛽0 = 𝛽1 = 1. Failure to reject this joint 
null means that LOP holds in the short run. This is a strict interpretation of LOP 
that implies that prices between countries are always equal such that deviations 
from this relationship are eliminated in the short run. This implies empirically 
that violations of the law are simply equal to a random error. 
Using this form of examination, Richardson (1978) studies aggregated price 
indices for product groups (SIC classifications) traded between the US and 
Canada finding only weak evidence in support of commodity arbitrage. Isard 
(1977) examines price data for some highly traded export goods from the US, 
Japan, Canada and Germany finding violations of the LOP are large and persistent. 
Protopapadakis and Stoll (1983) find that LOP holds on average for a selection of 
countries over 1973-1980 but that there are some commodity-specific violations 
of the law. Frenkel (1980) employs a similar type of specification to test for LOP 
applied all goods – i.e. purchasing power parity (PPP) – finding that it performs 
badly in industrialised countries in the 1970s. Krugman (1978) also rejects the 
null hypothesis using an instrumental variables approach to account for 
endogeneity in price levels. Overall, the evidence from the early literature can be 
summarised as providing weak support for the law. 
 Long run LOP 
The empirical failures of LOP and PPP raised concerns over their validity as a 
short run conditions. In particular, several explanations have been cited for why 
these conditions might not apply in the short run. Some authors have argued that 
LOP may not hold because in many cases the key requirements required for it to 
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hold are not fulfilled. Spreen et al. (2007) argue that in many cases goods that 
appear homogenous actually exhibit systematic differences. For example 
agricultural goods sold in different countries may be different in terms of size, 
shape and taste even if belonging to the same product grade. Some things may 
differ that do not show up in the data such as package costs. Other authors argue 
that the assumption of an integrated market is often violated in studies of LOP. 
Both distance between markets and the existence of borders have been shown to 
have a significant impact on convergence rates (Engel & Rogers, 1994; Parsley & 
Wei, 1996, 2001). This can be explained transport costs, formal barriers to trade 
such as tariffs and quotas and informal barriers such as language or currency 
differences. In addition, there exist many real world factors that might make 
arbitrage more difficult than is hypothesised. If information is imperfect or if 
there are risks to arbitrage, rational actors may only begin to exploit violations 
of LOP where they are large and appear persistent. For these reasons it is thought 
that short-run LOP is unrealistic and that LOP is more likely to hold in the long 
run. 
In addition to these theoretical concerns, the empirical approaches used in the 
early literature have been criticised for failing to take into account the time-series 
properties of the price data. Specifically, the prices series may be non-stationary. 
Engels and Granger (1987) demonstrate that linear regressions using non-
stationary data can produce spurious regressions. Ardeni (1989) argues that 
even when the equations such as equation (5) are estimated in differences it does 
not fully deal with the problem of potential non-stationarity of the price series. 
Thus, the evidence from the early wave of empirical literature should be treated 
with caution. Confronted with these theoretical and empirical doubts, the 
literature began to use different empirical approaches that were based on a 
weaker (long run) interpretation of LOP. In these tests LOP is interpreted as an 
attractor equilibrium and price difference are tested for mean-reversion using a 
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unit root test14. This version of the LOP is more realistic since it allows for 
possible short-run price deviations, plus it takes into account the non-
stationarity of the data by taking differences across location.  
Using this method of testing for mean-reversion, Rogers and Jenkins (1993) 
examine relative prices of 54 goods between the US and Canada. They look for 
the presence of a unit root using an ADF test. They cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit for non-traded goods (e.g. haircuts) but there is more success 
for traded goods (e.g. potatoes). In PPP literature evidence of non-stationarity is 
fairly rare (Hakkio, 1984). Froot and Rogoff (1996) cite the main problem with 
these tests as being their low power to reject the null of a unit root against near-
unit root alternatives. Frankel (1986) argues that failure to find evidence in 
support of PPP can be attributed to the to the fact that previously used datasets 
do not cover a long enough time periods to reject the null hypothesis of a random 
walk. He attempts to address this problem by using longer time series (1869-
1984 dollar/pound exchange rate) and was able to reject the random walk 
hypothesis.  
 Panel unit root tests 
In the most recent empirical literature, authors use panel data and associated 
methods in order to increase the power of the tests. Panel data tests are based on 
generating a panel of relative prices 𝑞𝑖𝑡 for each location 𝑖: 
 𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝0𝑡 − 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (6)  
where 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the log of the exchange rate between location 𝑖 and the reference 
location at time 𝑡, 𝑝0𝑡 is the log price a product in the reference location at time 𝑡, 
and  𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the log price in location 𝑖 at time 𝑡. This results in a panel dataset of 
relative prices over 𝑁 − 1 locations and 𝑇 time periods. This panel dataset of 
                                                        
 
14 The methods of co-integration and error-correction have also been used in the LOP 
literature but are less common. See Froot and Rogoff (1996) for a detailed 
comparison of the different methods 
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relative prices is then tested together for the presence of a unit root via a panel 
unit root test, of which there is a great variety available. Most of these tests start 
by estimating an ADF-type test on the panel of price differences. 
Further auxiliary regressions and transformations are implemented in order to 
make full-use of the information contained within the panel data. Depending on 
the steps implemented the different tests have different asymptotic behaviour of 
the time-series and the cross-sectional dimensions. For example the Levin-Lin-
Chu (LLC) test performs well when N is between 10 and 250 and T is between 5 
and 250. As well as asymptotic properties the tests also differ in other ways such 
as the assumptions used regarding the existence of cross-sectional dependence 
and the heterogeneity of the coefficients. These points can be illustrated by 
comparing two of the most popular panel unit root tests, the LLC and the Im-
Pesaran-Shin (IPS)15. The LLC test imposes a homogenous autoregressive 
parameter such that the null hypothesis of 𝜑 = 1 implies that a unit root exists in 
all the series in the panel. This null hypothesis is very restrictive. Furthermore it 
relies heavily on the assumption of cross-sectional independence. The IPS test, 
on the other hand, allows for individual autoregressive parameters and tests the 
null hypothesis 𝜑𝑖 = 1 for every series such that a rejection of the null can come 
from the rejection of a unit root in any of the series. 
In addition, the estimation of ADF-like models (with individual constants) are 
subject to a bias first identified by Nickell (1981). The Nickell bias is a well-known 
effect that occurs when using small-T time-series data that means the lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the error term. The Arellano and Bond 
(1991) estimator and others have been proposed to deal with this bias when 
panel data is stationary. However, this requirement of stationarity clearly rules 
out the Arellano-Bond estimator as a solution that can be applied to unit root 
tests since the aim of a unit root  test whether a series is stationary or not. 
                                                        
 
15 These tests are suggested by Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003). 
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Therefore panel unit root tests must apply an adjustment factor to correct for this 
bias. 
It is noted that whilst the panel cointegration methods are sometimes used in the 
literature (Jenkins & Snaith, 2005) they are of less popularity. Funke and Koske 
(2008) consider unit root tests to be stronger than cointegration tests since 
homogeneity and proportionality are directly imposed in the former. Further, 
when using panel data the cointegration approach is complicated where the 
existence of potential cross-sectional cointegration is considered (Banerjee et al., 
2004; Breitung & Pesaran, 2005). 
Parsley and Wei (1996) estimate ADF-type panel unit root tests for 51 goods and 
services across 48 cities. They do not include constant or trend terms and are 
able to reject the random walk null for the majority of products. They generate 
relative prices using New Orleans as the reference location but do not find the 
results differ much when using New York instead. (Goldberg and Verboven 
(2004), 2005)) find strong evidence for price convergence in the EU car market 
using the LLC and the IPS panel unit root tests. They find a half-life of convergence 
to be around one and a half years. In their 2004 and 2005 papers they choose the 
Netherlands and Belgium, respectively, as reference countries for the relative 
prices. In both papers, they state that conclusions are robust with respect to 
choice of base country. Funke and Koske (2008) employ panel unit root tests to 
examine the validity of LOP in EU countries. They employ the LLC, the IPS and the 
Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root tests testing 90 different product groups 
from 25 countries. They find the law holds better for the first 15 member 
countries than when the sample in increased to include the 10 members that 
joined in 2004. Blander and Dhaene (2012) also examine the EU16 car market as 
                                                        
 
16 Factors such as trade barriers, exchange rate volatility and transportation costs and 
are often cited as causes for the failure of LOP. Therefore it is common to test for LOP 
across European Union (EU) countries where these problems should be mostly 
mitigated due to the integration of the market, the common currency and the 
relatively limited geographical extent. All these factors should make arbitrage easier 
and hence more likely that LOP holds. 
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a case study for their new unit root test. Like the Harris and Tzavalis (1998) test, 
their test has particularly good properties for short panels. They adapt the 
Harris-Tzavalis test to allow for an AR(1) structure. Blander and Dhaene (2012) 
find evidence in support of convergence to the LOP in EU car markets with a 
reported half-life for convergence of 0.898 years. 
This section has examined the literature on LOP and its equivalents such as PPP. 
Three interpretations of LOP have been identified in the empirical literature: 
strong, weak-absolute and weak-relative. It is important to note that the 
empirical literature is not directed towards demonstrating categorically that 
prices are equal across locations. As such the empirical approach has developed 
to test whether prices exhibit convergence that is consistent with the operation 
of arbitrage processes. Therefore, the empirical tests outlined here may remain 
relevant to the case of hedonic prices even though they are not necessarily equal 
across urban locations. I will make use of the last panel unit root test mentioned 
above (the Blander-Dhaene test) since it is suitable for short panels. 
 Should hedonic prices adhere to the law of one 
price? 
This section complements the main chapter by giving a more detailed overview 
of Rosen (1974) theoretical framework of equilibrium hedonic prices and by 
giving a more detailed discussion of the case of heterogeneous preferences. 
 Hedonic price determination 
Hedonic theory is based on the idea that the market price of a composite good 
such as housing or a car, reflect the value of the attributes they embody. For 
example the value of a house might reflect attributes such as the number of 
bathrooms, the architectural design or its proximity to shops. And the value of a 
car might reflect the number of doors, its top speed and its overall design. 
Hedonic prices of attributes are therefore interpreted as their contributory value 
to the overall price of the composite good. Rosen (1974) provides the theoretical 
framework for the determination of hedonic prices in spatial equilibrium. 
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Consider a vector 𝑧 that describes a bundle of 𝑁 utility-bearing amenities of land 
at a location: 
 𝑧 = (𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑁) (7)  
I depart from Rosen (1974) by assuming, for simplicity, that individuals consume 
land directly. This bypasses the housing supply side of the model and entails that 
locational amenities are given exogenously. Plots of land are characterised by a 
vector of amenities 𝑧 = 𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑛. The hedonic price function gives the price of 
land as a function of these amenities: 
 𝑝(𝑧) = 𝑝(𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑁) (8)  
The partial derivatives with respect to each amenity, denoted 𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑁, are 
the hedonic prices of those amenities. The hedonic price function may be linear 
or non-linear and include complementarities between characteristics. 
Econometrically, hedonic prices can be estimated via hedonic regression which 
involves the regression of the price on characteristics. Individuals may discover 
this hedonic price function by comparing the prices and amenity levels of land 
observed in the market place.  
Individual utility is a function of consumption good 𝑥, the price of which is the 
numeraire, and amenities 𝑧. Individuals have a budget constraint 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑝(𝑧), 
where 𝑦 is their exogenous income. Individuals’ utility is a function of 
consumption good 𝑥 and the amenities 𝑧:  
 𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑧) = 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑁) (9)  
They maximise utility by choosing a location (i.e. a bundle 𝑧). Individual bid 
functions 𝜃 describe the maximum amount they are willing to pay for land with 
given attribute levels in order that they achieve given utility level 𝑢: 
 𝑈(𝑦 − 𝜃, 𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑁) = 𝑢 (10)  
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The bid function is therefore given by 𝜃(𝑧; 𝑢, 𝑦). Individuals take the hedonic 
prices 𝑝(𝑧) to be exogenous to their consumption decision. The optimal choice is 
determined by the first order conditions, which for the 𝑛-th amenity is: 
 
𝑑𝑝(𝑧𝑛)
𝑑𝑧𝑛
= 𝑝𝑛 = 𝜌𝑛 =
𝑈𝑧𝑛
𝑈𝑥
, 𝑛 = 1, 2, … ,𝑁 
(11)  
This means that individuals choose a location where the hedonic prices of each 
attribute 𝑛 are equal to their marginal rates of substitution 𝜌𝑛 for those 
attributes. This means that individuals are located on their highest possible 
indifference curve when their own bid function is tangential to the hedonic price 
function for each attribute. Solving the maximising decision for each individual 
gives us the demand at each attribute level for any given set of hedonic prices. If 
there is a build-up of demand for a particular attribute level then that level is 
under-priced and the hedonic prices must rise until the demand matches the 
available supply. Spatial equilibrium, therefore, is given by the set of hedonic 
prices that that equalise demand with the exogenously given supply at each 
attribute level. 
 Heterogeneous preferences 
This section quite closely follows the analysis laid out by Rosen (1974). I depart 
from Rosen (1974) only by assuming land is consumed directly i.e. that there is 
no housing supply sector and that the supply of amenities is therefore given 
exogenously. Utility functions are linear in amenities and the consumption good 
and there is only a single amenity: 
 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑧1) = 𝑥 + 𝜌1𝑧1 (12)  
Maximisation occurs when individuals choose a location (i.e. an amenity level 𝑧1) 
where the hedonic price for the amenity is equal to the marginal rate of 
substitution 𝑝1 = 𝜌1.  
Following Rosen (1974), I make some assumptions about the distribution of 
preferences and amenity amounts available in the market. The following function 
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𝑓 gives the exogenous distribution of population across marginal rates of 
substitution (for the amenity 𝑧1): 
 𝑓(𝜌) = 𝑏 𝑑𝜌       𝜌𝑠 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ 𝜌𝑙  (13)  
where 𝜌𝑠 and 𝜌𝑙  give the smallest and largest marginal rates of substitution in the 
population and 𝑏 is a constant. This implies that there is an equal distribution of 
the preferences between the smallest and the largest marginal rates of 
substitution. Combining the distribution of preferences and the maximisation 
condition gives the quantity demanded for each amount of the amenity: 
𝑄𝑑(𝑧) 𝑑𝑧1 = 𝑏
𝑑2𝑝(𝑧1)
𝑑𝑧12
 𝑑𝑧1.  Next I define an exogenous distribution 𝑔 of locations 
at each levels of amenity 𝑧1 to be: 
 𝑔(𝑧1) = 𝑘 𝑑𝑧1       𝑧1𝑠 ≤ 𝑧1 ≤ 𝑧1𝑙  (14)  
where 𝑧1𝑠 and 𝑧1𝑙 give the smallest and largest levels of amenity 𝑧1 in the urban 
area and 𝑏 is a constant. This implies that there is an equal distribution of the 
amenity between the smallest and the largest amounts. The quantity supplied 
across amenity amounts is therefore: 𝑄𝑠(𝑧1) 𝑑𝑧1 = 𝑘 𝑑𝑧1.  Spatial equilibrium 
requires demand equals supply at every amenity level. Putting the quantity 
supplied equal to the quantity demand gives: 
 
𝑑2𝑝(𝑧1)
𝑑𝑧12
  𝑑𝑧1 =
𝑘
𝑏
 𝑑𝑧1 (15)  
I distinguish between two scenarios: firstly, homogenous preferences where 
𝜌1𝑠 = 𝜌1 = 𝜌1𝑙 = ?̅?1 and, secondly, heterogeneous preferences where 𝜌1𝑠 < ?̅?1 <
𝜌1𝑙 . The first scenario is outlined in the main chapter and the spatial equilibrium 
hedonic price is simply equal to 𝑝1
∗ = ?̅?1. In this case the hedonic price is equal to 
the common marginal rate of substitution at all locations since this price ensures 
individuals are indifferent between all locations. The hedonic price difference 
between locations 𝑖 and 𝑗 is of course zero: 
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 𝑝1𝑖
∗ − 𝑝1𝑗
∗ = ?̅?1 − ?̅?1 = 0 (16)  
This suggests that in the case of identical individuals and linear utility functions, 
spatial equilibrium is a necessary and sufficient condition for a law of one price 
for hedonic prices. In the second scenarios the spatial equilibrium hedonic price 
of amenity z is a more complicated due to sorting of individuals17: 
 𝑝1
∗  = 𝜌1𝑙 −
𝑘
𝑏
(𝑧1𝑙 − 𝑧1) (17)  
Here the hedonic price depends on the amount of the amenity and hence location. 
The hedonic price at the location with the largest amenity amount (where 𝑧1 =
𝑧1𝑙) is equal to the largest marginal rate of substitution of the population 𝑝1  =
𝜌1𝑙 . The hedonic price declines with decreases in the amount of the amenity (𝑧1 <
𝑧1𝑙) at a speed determined by the relative distributions of preferences and the 
amenity (
𝑘
𝑏
). This is because the relative distributions determine the particular 
pattern of sorting and therefore the particular preferences of the individuals 
associated with each amenity amount. The hedonic price difference between 
locations 𝑖 and 𝑗 is: 
 𝑝1𝑖
∗ − 𝑝1𝑗
∗ =
𝑘
𝑏
(𝑧1𝑖 − 𝑧1𝑗) (18)  
Therefore the difference in prices is equal is determined by the difference in 
amenity amounts and the entire distributions of preferences and of the amenity. 
Holding these distributions fixed the hedonic price differences across location 
                                                        
 
17 These results require use of the boundary conditions from Rosen (1974). In 
particular, the upper boundary condition states that the highest amenity level is 
consumed by individuals with the highest marginal rate of substitution, or 𝑝1
∗(𝑧1𝑙) =
𝜌1𝑙. The lower boundary can be described by three alternative conditions, of which I 
use the third since there always exists some positive amount of the amenity. This 
condition states that the hedonic price at the minimum level of the amenity 
individuals must ensure individuals are indifferent between consuming that level 
and not consuming at all, or [𝑦 − 𝑝(𝑧1𝑠)]/ 𝑧1𝑠 = 𝑝1
∗(𝑧1𝑠). 
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can be compared to the law of one price in relative terms. Deviations from this 
fixed difference in price should be met with adjustments. But, as discussed, an 
important source of deviations is local shocks to amenity levels. These may lead 
to temporary disequilibrium but would also impact on the condition stated 
above, altering the new equilibrium relationship. This means that it is not clear 
whether observed movements in price differences are movements around the 
equilibrium or simply movements in the equilibrium itself. The degree to which 
this will obscure convergence behaviour depend on the relative volatility 
equilibrium relationship itself compared with movements towards and away 
from the relationship. This is discussed in detail in the next section.  
 Relevance of LOP tests under heterogeneous preferences 
Given the model of linear utility functions and heterogeneous individuals 
presented above, it may be difficult to distinguish movements in prices around 
the equilibrium from movements in the equilibrium itself. The set of diagrams in 
Figure 1 below illustrates some different possibilities. The three columns 
indicate scenarios for movements in the equilibrium relationship; either the 
equilibrium is (1) relatively steady over time (non-volatile), or it is volatile and 
either (2) stationary or (3) non-stationary. The equilibrium is shown by the 
dotted line on all charts. The rows correspond with different degree of spatial 
equilibrium in reality. In row (a) spatial equilibrium hold in the short run, 
therefore, price differences are equal to equilibrium relationship (the dotted 
line). In row (b) equilibrium holds in the long and the observed price differences 
(the solid black line) converge to the equilibrium over time. In row (c) there is no 
spatial equilibrium and the price difference are a random walk that bear no 
relation to the equilibrium. 
The can be used to illustrate scenarios when the stationarity of the price 
differences is misleading with respect to the type of spatial equilibrium that holds 
in reality. When spatial equilibrium hold in the short run, I will find price 
differences to be stationary in 2 cases but not when the equilibrium is non-
stationary. This will lead to a Type I error. When SE holds in the long run prices 
may be found to be stationary, if the equilibrium is very volatile and/or non-
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stationary. This is also a potential Type II error. Where spatial equilibrium does 
not hold, the type of movements in the equilibrium do not affect the price 
differences, therefore it cannot drive stationarity. The instability of the 
equilibrium cannot drive a Type II error since if there is no spatial competition 
then price differences are unrelated to their equilibrium level. 
If the equilibrium relationship itself is very unstable relative to the process of 
shocks and convergence then there is a high likelihood of committing a Type I 
error and rejecting SE even though it does hold. However, there does not appear 
to be a scenario in which changes to the equilibrium level could lead to a Type II 
error, where I fail to reject stationarity even though SE doesn’t hold. 
Figure 1: Illustration of adjustments to equilibrium and shifts in the equilibrium 
 1. Equilibrium not volatile 2. Equilibrium volatile: stationary 
case 
3. Equilibrium volatile: non-stationary 
case 
(a)  
Short
-run 
   
(b) 
Long  
-run 
   
(c) 
None 
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CHAPTER III 
GENTRIFICATION AND 
DISPLACEMENT IN ENGLISH CITIES
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 Introduction 
Gentrification is the phenomenon of a large and relatively sudden in-migration 
of wealthy or middle class residents into a previously poor or working class 
neighbourhood. Following the suburbanisation of previous decades, 
gentrification marks the most recent major trend in the history of cities in 
industrialised countries. Gentrification is also a very controversial topic. For 
example, Lees et al. (2013) refer to the phenomenon as a “battleground in urban 
geography”. The proponents of gentrification refer to it as urban revitalisation 
and consider it the reversal of ‘white flight’ and urban decay. In support of this 
view is a literature on neighbourhood effects that suggests economic outcomes 
of households may be improved by living in neighbourhoods with overall better 
outcomes (e.g. Buck, 2001). As such, certain types of policy attempt to actively 
gentrify neighbourhoods, sometimes by making physical improvements to the 
dwelling stock (e.g. Housing Market Renewal in the UK). The opponents of 
gentrification, however, suggest that if the original residents are displaced then 
they are not able to benefit from any neighbourhood effects that do exist18. 
Displacement itself  represents a huge cost to the displaced households (Slater, 
2009) and original residents that remain in the neighbourhood may feel 
alienated by the changes to neighbourhood’s character (Lees et al., 2010). 
The issue of displacement is central to the debate, and whether gentrification 
displaces original residents drastically changes how the phenomenon should be 
viewed and dealt with by policy. If residents are displaced then it becomes 
                                                        
 
 I thank all participants at the SERC Annual Conference 2013 in London and the UEA 
meeting at ERSA Congress 2014 in St. Petersburg. Special thanks go to Gabriel 
Ahlfeldt, Steve Gibbons, Christian Hilber, Henry Overman and Felix Weinhardt for 
helpful comments and suggestions.  
18 In fact, the emerging evidence from field experiments that shows households do not 
benefit from living in wealthier neighbourhoods (Ludwig et al., 2013; Oreopoulos, 
2003). 
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difficult to motivate policies that actively gentrify neighbourhoods with the 
suggestion that they are beneficial for original residents. Furthermore if the 
negative consequences of gentrification are to be avoided then policies should 
aim to provide more social protection for incumbent residents.  
Whilst gentrification is an important recent trend, whether it actually causes 
displacement remains an open question. In fact, research on the effects of 
gentrification is characterised by a theoretical-empirical divide. The theoretical 
literature in urban economics describes gentrification as a process of outbidding 
(Brueckner & Rosenthal, 2009; Brueckner et al., 1999). An increase in amenities 
or preferences of a rich group for an urban neighbourhood leads to a shift in the 
bid rent to above what the poor group are willing and able to pay. The poor group 
are outbid and must relocate to the periphery in a large scale displacement. 
However, the (small) empirical evidence to date finds no evidence of 
displacement (Freeman, 2005; Freeman & Braconi, 2004; McKinnish et al., 2010; 
Vigdor et al., 2002). By examining exit rates in gentrifying neighbourhoods 
compared with non-gentrifying neighbourhoods this literature finds that low-
status households are not more likely to exit under gentrification. 
This paper provides new evidence on the question of whether gentrification 
leads to displacement. I use the British Household Panel Survey (1991-2008) and 
the UK Census (1991, 2001 and 2011) to examine the association between 
gentrification and displacement in English cities. I use the change in degree share 
to capture different speeds of gentrification and interact this with the initial 
degree share to capture effects at different stages of gentrification. I relate this 
measure of gentrification to neighbourhood exits at the household level. I argue 
that previous estimates of displacement deal unsatisfactorily with differences 
natural mobility rates due to the sorting of households across different 
neighbourhoods. My empirical strategy takes several steps to deal with these 
unobserved differences, including the estimation of a neighbourhood fixed 
effects model and the interaction of the gentrification treatment with household 
characteristics that indicate vulnerability to displacement. In particular I 
compare renters with homeowners and private renters with social renters. These 
interactions help compare exit rates of affected with unaffected groups to isolate 
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the displacement effect. The findings indicate that gentrification is associated 
with significant displacement of low income renters especially in the early stages 
of the process. The displacement effect is shown to be greatest for private renters.  
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. The estimates 
presented here are the first robust evidence on displacement for English cities 
and the first to estimate displacement effects at different stages of gentrification 
and at different income levels. The empirical strategy makes several 
improvements over the existing literature. Finally, the evidence presented here 
is contradictory to the prevailing evidence on displacement and is more 
consistent with the theoretical understanding of gentrification as process of 
outbidding (e.g. Brueckner & Rosenthal 2009).  
This research is relevant to a number of areas of the literature. It contributes 
directly to the literature that estimates the displacement effect of gentrification 
(Freeman, 2005; Freeman & Braconi, 2004; McKinnish et al., 2010; O'Sullivan, 
2005; Vigdor et al., 2002) and that on broader empirical issues related to 
gentrification (e.g. Ahlfeldt, 2011a; Bostic & Martin, 2003; Ellen & O'Regan, 2008; 
Helms, 2003; Vigdor, 2010). It also relates to the theoretical literature that 
describes gentrification (e.g. Brueckner & Rosenthal, 2009; Brueckner et al., 
1999; Guerrieri et al., 2013; O'Sullivan, 2005; Rosenthal, 2008) and patterns of 
residential income segregation (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2008; LeRoy & Sonstelie, 1983; 
Tivadar, 2010; Wheaton, 1977). Finally it contributes, particularly from a policy 
standpoint, to the literature that evaluates physical regeneration efforts (e.g. 
Collins & Shester, 2013; Richter et al., 2013). The paper structure is as follows. 
Section 2 reviews the existing empirical literature on the displacement question, 
highlighting key empirical challenges and results. Section 3 outlines the BHPS 
and UK census data used in this analysis. In section 4 I construct the empirical 
strategy with a focus on addressing mobility differences. Section 5 presents the 
results and section 6 concludes with some policy recommendations.
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 Empirical Literature 
Empirical studies on whether gentrification is associated with displacement 
typically define gentrification based on increases in neighbourhood income or 
educational attainment. It is then examined whether there is a statistical 
relationship between this measure and the mobility rates of existing residents. 
Freeman (2005) points out that earlier studies tended to suffer from 
methodological flaws such as failing to include in the analysis a counterfactual 
group of neighbourhoods that did not gentrify i.e. examining only time variation 
for neighbourhoods that did gentrify. This means that it is impossible to tell 
whether the observed displacement rates in gentrifying neighbourhoods is in fact 
any higher than the rate in non-gentrifying neighbourhoods. Freeman (2005) and 
Vigdor et al. (2002) both provide good reviews of these early empirical studies. 
In this literature review I focus on four of the most recent studies that are the 
most methodologically robust. These are Vigdor et al. (2002), Freeman and 
Braconi (2004), Freeman (2005) and McKinnish et al. (2010). From this review I 
will identify both key results, particularly regarding whether gentrification leads 
to displacement, and key empirical issues such as important control variables 
and identification strategies. 
Typically, studies into gentrification and displacement make use of two data 
sources. One for households that gives a dependent variable relating to exit or 
mobility rates, and one for neighbourhoods that allow for characterising 
gentrification, usually in terms of income growth or educational attainment 
growth. Vigdor et al. (2002), for example, make use of the American Housing 
Survey (AHS) for 1985-89 and 1989-93 and the Public Use Microdata Sample 
(PUMS) for the Census (1980-1990). The dependent variable is whether a 
housing unit from the AHS still holds the same household at the end of the period 
that is did in the beginning. Gentrification is then defined as neighbourhoods that 
experience an increase in the share of population that hold a degree of more than 
50% above the average for the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). 
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The mobility variable is then regressed on the gentrification variable usually in 
either a logit or a probit model. This empirical strategy19 is intended to address 
the difficulty involved with showing actual displacement rather than simply 
mobility. If it can be shown that the mobility rates are higher in the gentrifying 
neighbourhoods than in the other neighbourhoods, and that the higher rates can 
be attributed directly to the gentrification, then this can be taken as evidence for 
displacement. The important caveat is that it must be shown that the higher rates 
are due to the gentrification and not to other factors that may be different 
between neighbourhoods. Neighbourhoods that gentrify are likely to be different 
from neighbourhoods that do not gentrify, for example, they may have fewer 
social housing units. Social housing units have different characteristics to other 
units that will directly affect the exit rates of the households that live in them. 
Also, different housing characteristics will attract different types of individuals 
who have different baseline mobility rates. Therefore a lower exit rate in a non-
gentrifying tract may not be directly related to the fact that the neighbourhood 
in not gentrifying but to something else entirely, such as the proportion of social 
housing in that neighbourhood.  
Important controls for differences in householder characteristics are things such 
as age, education, income, tenure, number of years at current residence, ethnicity, 
nationality, marital status and employment status. Household and 
neighbourhood characteristics that have been shown to be important factors 
related to mobility are household size (particularly in relation to number of 
rooms), maintenance deficiencies, rent subsidies, rent control, public housing 
complexes and vacancy rates (Vigdor et al. 2002, Freeman and Braconi 2004, 
Freeman 2005). Vigdor et al. (2002) also controlled for the householder’s own 
rating of the neighbourhood and particular housing unit they live in.  
                                                        
 
19 Vigdor et al. (2002) was one of the first empirical studies on gentrification and 
displacement to compare mobility rates in gentrifying neighbourhoods to a 
counterfactual group of non-gentrifying neighbourhoods. 
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Another important empirical issue is to compare gentrifying neighbourhoods to 
similar neighbourhoods that did not gentrify. Vigdor et al. (2002) and Freeman 
and Braconi (2004) control for various household characteristics, but they 
compare mobility in gentrifying neighbourhoods to mobility in all other 
neighbourhoods. On the other hand, Freeman (2005) and McKinnish et al (2010) 
provide more plausible counterfactuals by first selecting a sample of 
neighbourhoods that might have potentially undergone gentrification and then 
comparing the ones that did to the ones that didn’t. For Freeman (2005) the 
neighbourhoods must be central city areas, with a comparatively (compared to 
MSA median) low median income and a comparatively low share of housing built 
in the last 20 years. The gentrifying neighbourhoods are then the ones that 
experienced a comparatively large increase in educational attainment and an 
increase in real housing prices. For McKinnish at al. (2010) the potential 
neighbourhoods must be both urban and in the bottom quintile in terms of 
median household income. The gentrifying ones are defined as those that 
experience at least a $10,000 dollar increase in mean household income.  
A further issue is that unit of analysis. If households are observed, as in Freeman 
(2005), it is possible to examine whether they exit the neighbourhood that is 
gentrifying. However, if housing units are observed (Vigdor et al. 2002, Freeman 
and Braconi, 2004) then it is only possible to say if the household left the unit and 
nothing about how far it went. This makes it impossible to tell whether the 
household actually exited the area that is gentrifying. Hence, the claim that 
empirical analysis is testing the relationship between gentrification and 
displacement is made weaker by this fact. Finally, McKinnish at al. (2010) only 
use one data source (confidential US Census data) to characterise both exits and 
gentrification. As a result they are neither able to say where households move to, 
or in fact, whether any specific household has moved at all. Instead they use a less 
reliable cohort analysis that looks at the populations and characteristics of 
individuals who report to have stayed in the neighbourhood for at least ten year 
compared to groups from the previous census with similar characteristics who 
are ten years younger, with the intention that they are the sample people. Thus 
when they find that the income of a particular group tends to increase more in 
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gentrifying neighbourhoods than in non-gentrifying neighbourhoods they are 
not able to say whether this is because the households toward the lower income 
distribution in this group left the area or because there has been a general 
increase in income across all the households of this group. 
Also important is the size of the areas used to classify gentrification.  In the two 
earlier papers by Vigdor et al. (2002) and Freeman and Braconi (2004), the areas 
used are too large to be referred to as neighbourhoods. Vigdor et al. (2002) look 
at AHS Zones in Boston, which are of around 100,000-200,000 people in size. The 
city of Boston itself is made up of only 5 zones. Freeman and Braconi (2004), in 
their study of New York also use areas of around 100,000 in population. These 
large areas are problematic for several reasons. Gentrification is an urban 
phenomenon but since there were only 5 areas for the city of Boston, Vigdor et 
al. (2002) are forced to expand his analysis to the surrounding suburbs and 
county in order to make sufficient sample size. Even including these, the spatial 
variation in the gentrification variable is rather coarse. In Vigdor et al.’s (2002) 
‘exclusive’ definition, only one area is defined as gentrifying and in his ‘inclusive’ 
definition there are only a few more. Freeman and Braconi (2004) have only 
seven gentrifying areas (selected using anecdotal evidence) from a total of 55 
areas. Since gentrification is a highly localised phenomenon, using large areas 
means that for any household the gentrification indicator for their area may not 
be a very reliable reflection of whether they are in a gentrifying neighbourhood 
or not. Also, these aggregate areas has important implications for the standard 
errors of the estimates that should be clustered at the area level (this was 
correctly implemented only by McKinnish et al. 2010). Finally, using smaller 
areas allows for a more precise indication of whether a household move actually 
exits the area that is gentrifying (if one is using a household survey). Freeman 
(2005) and McKinnish et al (2010) both use much smaller Census tracts of 
around 1,000-8,000 people and their samples also cover the whole of the US. 
Before turning to review the results of these papers, I examine one last empirical 
issue that is the conditioning of the gentrification effect on other factors. It is not 
sufficient to add as controls the factors that are thought to have a significant 
effect on the relationship between gentrification and displacement. For example 
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in gentrifying areas, particular groups such as renters or the low income may be 
more susceptible to being displaced than other groups. Homeowners are 
protected from the escalation of rent prices that accompanies gentrification and 
an increase in the price of their home brings no extra costs until the point of 
sale20, where the costs will only represent a fraction of the overall benefits 
associated with selling at a higher price. Hence the gentrification variable can be 
interacted with various household characteristics to reveal conditional effects. 
Vigdor et al. (2002) look at the effect conditional on educational attainment (high 
school diploma) of the head of household. Freeman and Braconi (2004) do not 
estimate an interacting variable but restrict their sample to either low income or 
low education householders. Freeman (2005) looks at the effect for a group 
defined as ‘poor renters’, who have both a low income and are renters.  
The results of the papers I examine here generally find no evidence of 
displacement as a result of gentrification. Vigdor et al. (2002), in fact, find after 
introducing controls that households are more likely to stay say in their housing 
unit if they live in gentrifying areas in Boston. In another specification they finds 
this to be true only for low educated householders. There is no evidence found 
for displacement for any group. Freeman and Braconi (2004) for New York in the 
1990s also find slower residential turnover for poor and less educated 
households in areas that are undergoing a process of gentrification compared to 
other areas. Freeman (2005) is the only paper in this review that does find 
evidence for displacement, but not a significantly higher effect for the poor renter 
group. Finally, McKinnish et al. (2010) do not claim to find evidence for 
displacement although admit that there is some ambiguity in the interpretation 
of their results due to the methods used. The overall empirical evidence is not in 
favour of gentrification being associated with displacement. However, the 
analyses do have a lot of empirical problems and therefore something new may 
                                                        
 
20 In the UK, a tax called stamp duty is applied at the point of sale and represents a 
percentage of the transaction price. There are no increased costs in terms of tax 
assessment associated with owning a property of a higher value; therefore, there is 
no displacement pressure on low income homeowners in gentrifying areas.  
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be learned from an analysis that improves in the highlighted areas. Also, the 
paper that appear to suffer the least from methodological issues, Freeman 
(2005), does find some evidence for displacement suggesting that there may 
indeed be an effect. 
Table 1 below also provides a summary of the literature I have reviewed here in 
terms of all the important aspect identified. I will now recap the important issues 
learnt from the review of the literature and therein lay out the criteria that this 
paper should meet. Firstly, the analysis must include appropriate household and 
neighbourhood control variables. This paper therefore matches the controls used 
in all the previous paper and adds some further controls. The identification 
strategy in general will be improved by implementing ward fixed effects. This 
specification will eliminate the unobservable bias due to fixed difference in 
wards by estimating the displacement using only time variation in gentrification 
in each ward. Secondly, the areal unit must be sufficiently small. Hence I will work 
with Census wards, which have a population of around 6,000-7,000 and are 
roughly comparable to smallest neighbourhoods used in previous analyses. 
Thirdly, it is best to work with household data. Hence I use the BHPS to identify 
household exits from neighbourhoods over the period 1991-2008. Fourthly, it is 
important to identify an appropriate control group of potentially gentrifying 
neighbourhoods. I intend to build on this further by introducing a flexible 
definition of gentrification that compares the effect of increases in degree share 
conditional on the initial level of degree share. This is advantageous in that it 
measures the effect with respect to the magnitude of the gentrification (rather 
than a binary variable) and also conditions the effect on how gentrified the 
neighbourhood is already. Fifthly, further interacting relationship may yield 
interesting insights and help control for unrelated differences in mobility rates. I 
therefore intend to interact the main relationship with both tenure and income 
as well and tenure interacted with income. In the next section I examine the data 
that will be used in the analysis.  
 Table 1: Review of literature 
  Vigdor (2002) Freeman and Braconi 
(2004) 
Freeman (2005) McKinnish et al. 
(2010) 
Case Boston (1985-93) New York City (1991-
1999) 
U.S. (1986-1998) U.S. (1990-2000) 
Regression type Probit Logit Logit Logit 
Households data 1. American Housing 
Survey (AHS) 
1. NYC Housing and 
Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS) 
1. Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics 
(PSID) 
(Cohort analysis) 
Neighbourhoods data 2. Public Use Microdata 
Sample (PUMS) 
(Gentrifying areas selected 
anecdotally) 
2. U.S. Census 2. U.S. Census 
Unit of observation Housing unit Housing unit Heads of households Synthetic cohorts 
Dependent variable Binary variable: Binary variable: Two alternatives 
(binary): 
Two alternatives: 
 Same household in unit 
at end of period 
Same household in unit at 
end of period 
Displaced Population change 
   Exits Income change 
Neighbourhoods AHS Zone (100,000-
200,000 people) 
Community Board Districts 
(46,000 people) 
Census Tracts (1,000-
8,000 people) 
Census Tracts 
(1,000-8,000 
people) 
Neighbourhood sample All areas All areas Must be all of: Must be all of: 
   1. Central City 1. Urban 
   2. Low income 2. Low income 
   3. Old housing  
Gentrification variable Two alternatives 
(binary): 
Binary variable chosen Two alternatives 
(binary): 
Binary variable: 
 1. 'Exclusive' - from 
Wyly and Hammel 
(1990) 
based on familiarity with 
areas 
1. increase in 
education  
$10,000 increase in 
household income 
  2. 'Inclusive' - increase 
in education 
  2. increase in real 
house prices 
  
  
Table 1: Review of literature (continued) 
Conditional relationships High school diploma Poor and Non-college grad 
(restricted samples) 
Poor renters Ethnicity x 
Education x Age 
Controls Age Age Age CSMA fixed effects 
 High school diploma Education Assisted Housing Lag of tract income 
 Income Employment Education Marital status 
 Own house rating Ethnicity Employment Marital status x race 
 Own neigh rating Income Ethnicity Immigrant 
 Owner Maintenance deficiencies Household 
composition 
Immigrant x race 
 Public complex Marital Immigrant race 
 Rent control Native Income  
 Subsidized Neighbourhood rating Marital status  
  Other regulation Region /Year  
  Overcrowded Renter  
  Rent-controlled Sex  
  Rent-stabilised Unit crowded  
  Sex Vacancy rate  
  Year Years in residence  
    Years in residence     
Main findings Less educated 
householders more 
likely to stay in unit if 
in gentrifying areas. 
Low income and less 
educated are less likely to 
exit gentrifying areas than 
other areas. 
Displacement occurs 
but not at a higher 
rate for poor renters. 
No evidence for 
displacement. 
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 Data 
The data used in this study come from two sources; the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) and the UK Census (1991, 2001 and 2011). The UK Census is 
conducted decennially for the entire UK population. The Census is used in this 
study to characterise the extent of gentrification in neighbourhoods using 10-
year changes in the share of individuals in a census ward that hold degree 
certificate or higher. Further, the UK Census will provide some of the ward level 
control variables for the analysis. The BHPS is a longitudinal survey of 
households that was conducted annually for 18 waves (1991-2008). It provides 
home location identifiers as well as a very rich set of household characteristics. 
Head of household-years are the unit of analysis for this paper and whether or 
not they exit their neighbourhood is the outcome variable. Household heads must 
be observed one period ahead in order to know if they exited their 
neighbourhood or not. Because of this, exits cannot be observed in the last wave 
of the BHPS (2008). The BHPS household-years will be merged with the census 
data at the neighbourhood (CAS Ward) level, with BHPS observations from 1991-
2000 being merged with changes over the intercensal period 1991-2001 and 
BHPS observations from 2001-2007 with the intercensal period 2001-2011.  
 Gentrifying neighbourhoods (UK Census) 
In order to characterise neighbourhoods in terms of their gentrification status I 
use the share of population that holds a degree, provided by the UK Census. 
Educational status has been used in previous literature to measure gentrification, 
along with measures of income. However, educational attainment is a more 
stable personal characteristic than income and therefore serves as a more 
reliable measure of inflow of different demographic group rather than simply 
changes in the characteristics of existing groups. The degree share variable was 
obtained from the 1991, 2001 and 2011 Censuses at the ward level. The exact 
ward definitions differ from census to census and so the figures were converted 
to comparable geographical units using conversion tables. The resulting data are 
defined according to the 2001 Census Area Statistics (CAS) Wards for which there 
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are 7,969 covering England. These wards have an average population of 6,669 
individuals and an average size of 16.7km². These are more suitable for an 
analysis at the neighbourhood level than the more aggregated areas (over 
100,000 people) used in similar studies (Vigdor 2002, Freeman and Braconi 
2004). They are comparable to more recent studies that make uses of non-public 
census data for the US (McKinnish et al. 2010 and Freeman 2005). 
Table 2: Wards by initial degree share quintiles (1991-2001) 
Quintile N Mean Min Max 
1st 1,593 0.256 0.203 0.599 
2nd 1,594 0.178 0.155 0.203 
3rd 1,594 0.134 0.114 0.155 
4th 1,594 0.096 0.076 0.114 
5th 1,594 0.052 0.005 0.076 
Total 7,969 0.143 0.005 0.599 
 
Table 3: Wards by initial degree share quintiles (2001-2011) 
Quintile N Mean Min Max 
1st 1,594 0.344 0.271 0.725 
2nd 1,594 0.239 0.211 0.271 
3rd 1,594 0.186 0.163 0.211 
4th 1,593 0.139 0.114 0.163 
5th 1,594 0.088 0.031 0.114 
Total 7,969 0.199 0.031 0.725 
 
Table 4: Wards by change in degree share quintiles (1991-2001) 
Quintile N Mean Min Max 
1st 1,593 0.127 0.084 0.590 
2nd 1,594 0.069 0.056 0.084 
3rd 1,594 0.047 0.039 0.056 
4th 1,594 0.031 0.023 0.039 
5th 1,594 0.005 -0.358 0.023 
Total 7968 0.056 -0.358 0.590 
 
Table 5: Wards by change in degree share quintiles (2001-2011) 
Quintile N Mean Min Max 
1st 1,594 0.114 0.100 0.227 
2nd 1,594 0.092 0.085 0.100 
3rd 1,594 0.079 0.072 0.085 
4th 1,593 0.065 0.057 0.072 
5th 1,594 0.041 -0.118 0.057 
Total 7969 0.078 -0.118 0.227 
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Gentrifying wards are those that have a low initial degree share followed by a 
large over the intercensal period (1991-2001 or 2001-2011). Table 2 and Table 
3 illustrate the initial degree share variable by quintiles for the two intercensal 
periods. The initial degree share for 2001-2011 has a higher mean, min and max 
in every quintile and in total than for 1991-2001. This is consistent with a general 
‘upgrading’ of human capital in England over the period 1991-2011. Further the 
tables illustrate that degree shares in 1991 range from 0.5% to 59.9% with a 
mean of 14.3% and in 2001 range from 3.1% to 72.5% with a mean of 19.9%. The 
intercensal change in degree share is given in Table 4 and Table 5. Again, 2001-
2011 has the highest mean (a 7.8% increase compared with a 5.6% increase over 
1991-2001) but it does not have the highest max (only 22.7% compared with 
59.0%). There are some wards in both periods that experienced large decreases 
in degree shares. An urban/rural indicator, introduced in 2004 by the Rural 
Evidence Research Centre at Birkbeck College (RERC), was obtained at the ward 
level for England. Urban wards were then selected as those that belong to a 
settlement with a population of over 10,000.  
Next I examine how the change in degree share varies across wards with different 
initial degree shares. Figure 1 shows more highly educated wards tend to have 
larger increases in degree share than less educated wards. This correlation is 
stronger in the second decade than in the first. The variance in change in degree 
share is also much larger for the more educated wards. 
Finally, Figure 2 below illustrates the wards for England and whether they are 
urban, low education or gentrifying. The categories used in this map are based 
on the quintiles and are therefore fairly arbitrary. The map is merely intended to 
give a general overview of the spatial pattern of gentrification in England and a 
more flexible definition will be used in the empirical analysis. The map shows a 
few things. Firstly, the low income neighbourhoods are more concentrated in the 
centre of each urban area with London being a significant exception. Secondly, 
gentrification begins (in the 90s) in the most central of these low income 
neighbourhoods and then (in the 00s) spreads out to the next most central low 
income neighbourhoods. Thirdly, there are very few wards that gentrify in both 
periods. This is because, due to the way gentrification has been defined here, if a 
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ward gentrifies in the first period it is highly likely to be a non-low education 
ward and so cannot gentrify again in the second period. The observed pattern of 
concentric waves of gentrification spreading out from the urban centres is 
consistent with the model proposed by Brueckner and Rosenthal (2009). This 
pattern can also explain why there are no low education wards in the centre of 
London, if it is that gentrification started long before the 90s in central London. 
Figure 1: Kernel density plots of degree change by initial degree group 
 
 The households (BHPS) 
The BHPS is an annual survey of a representative sample of more than 5,000 
British households. Interviews are conducted with heads of households and with 
all other household members over the age of 16. Heads of household are re-
interviewed in subsequent waves. If the heads split from their previous 
household then all the members of their new households are also interviewed. In 
this study, each survey entry for a head of household in any wave represents a 
single observation. By merging together the heads of households across waves it 
is possible to see if a head of household observed in a particular year lives in a 
different ward in the next year. This feature will help construct the dependent 
variable of household exits that will be used to identify displacement. 
Previous literature has highlighted the importance that measures of 
displacement look at forced moves rather than due to normal reasons such as 
employment changes. A different variable in the BHPS asks individuals whether 
they lived at the same address last year and if they report “no” then it asks a 
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follow question relating to the reason for the move. The reasons given in the 
BHPS for moves are wide ranging and often unspecific such as “felt like a change”. 
Unfortunately, there exists no category for movements due to rising housing 
costs. Responses that cite “move to larger” or “move to smaller” accommodation 
do not help too much because it may be that displaced households move from a 
small property with escalating rents to a larger home somewhere far cheaper. 
The only category that appeals to displacement are directly is “evicted, or 
repossessed”. However this represents too few observations to be of much use 
(80 evictions across all observations). The categories “moved for employment 
reasons” and “split from partner”, however, cannot plausibly be linked to 
displacement. Therefore the dependent variable for a head of household-year 𝑖 is 
coded as 1 if the head resides in a different ward in the next year and if the move 
was not for employment reasons or a split from partner. The variable is coded as 
0 if the head lives in the same ward or if the exit was for employment reasons or 
a split from partner. If the head is not observed again in any later waves the 
variable is coded as missing. 
After coding exits I then dropped all observations where exits were unknown 
because the head of household is not observed again in the sample (6.6% of 
observations). This means dropping all observations for heads in the last year 
that they are observed and all observations from the last wave (2008) of the 
BHPS.
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Figure 2: Gentrification map of England (1991-2011) 
 
Notes: Urban is defined as a ward that belongs to a settlement of over 10,000 in population. Low 
education is a ward that is in the 5th quintile for initial degree share in either period. Gentrification 
is if the change in degree share in in the 1st quintile for that period.
CHAPTER III 106 
 
 Since gentrification is an urban phenomenon all observations were dropped 
where the ward is not categorised as urban (21.7% of the observations). I also 
dropped all observation not in England. The resulting dataset is 39,170 
observations, which is around 53.9% of the original sample of 72,739 
observations. I obtained Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA) identifiers for 
household location under a Special Licence Access from the Economic and Social 
Data Service (ESDS). I aggregated these to CAS Wards, which are described in the 
previous section, and merged the households data with neighbourhood 
characteristics from the UK Census, in particular degree share variable described 
above. 
The BHPS also provides a very rich set of household characteristics. Household 
income is important since this study aims to examine the effect in particular for 
low income households. I reflated household income to 2011 prices and then 
calculated the median household income for each Travel To Work Area (TTWA). 
These TTWAs resemble economic zones in which most people live and work 
within their boundaries. They are designed such that as few commutes as 
possible cross their boundaries. Since poverty is a relative measure, these 
economic zones represent a good benchmark for regional variations in 
household income. Other control variables used are the age of head of household, 
the tenure status, whether renters receive housing benefit and whether landlords 
are private. Renters with private landlords are those that do not live in social 
housing or let housing from friends, employers or any type of housing 
association. 
Table 6 provides summary statistics of the variables and control variable that will 
be used in the regression analysis. The table includes mean values or percentage 
shares for the categorical variables. It also provides exit rates for the categorical 
variables. These can be compared with the baseline exit rate of 7.3%. Household 
head types with striking differences from the baseline include Pensioners (at 
2.6%), homeowners (at 4.8%) and renters with private landlords (at 28.4%). The 
lower rates for pensioners, higher rates for renters, and higher still for private 
rents are consistent with previous literature (e.g. Freeman 2005). 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics for variables used in regressions 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Exit 
rate 
Change in degree share 0.064 0.041 -0.115 0.308   
Lag degree share 0.146 0.088 0.005 0.655  
Homeowner dummy 0.625 0.484 0 1 0.048 
Household income (TTWA-adj.) 0.773 0.426 0 103  
Decade dummy: 90s 0.584 0.493 0 1 0.071 
Holds a degree 0.082 0.274 0 1 0.127 
Private landlord 0.081 0.274 0 1 0.284 
Housing benefit 0.094 0.291 0 1 0.057 
Number of children 0.503 0.945 0 8  
People per room 0.516 0.266 0 5  
- Unknown/missing 0.027 0.161 0 1 0.168 
Male 0.525 0.499 0 1 0.070 
Age of household head 50.9 20.01 0 98  
Head > 65 years age 0.313 0.464 0 1 0.026 
Self-employed 0.064 0.245 0 1 0.063 
Employed 0.414 0.493 0 1 0.086 
Unemployed 0.041 0.199 0 1 0.104 
Born outside UK 0.033 0.178 0 1 0.070 
Married 0.422 0.494 0 1 0.045 
Divorced 0.165 0.371 0 1 0.070 
Widowed 0.163 0.370 0 1 0.029 
Health score: 1 Excellent - 5 
Very Poor 1.98 1.195 1 5  
- Unknown/missing 0.137 0.344 0 1 0.068 
Likes neighbourhood 0.865 0.342 0 1 0.066 
Years living at address 11.8 13.6 0 86  
- Unknown/missing 0.062 0.241 0 1 0.038 
Satisfied with house: 1 -7 3.22 2.86 1 7  
- Unknown/missing 0.396 0.489 0 1 0.069 
House needs maintenance 0.170 0.376 0 1 0.094 
Lag vacancy rate 0.040 0.024 0 0.331  
Lag population density 3,523 2,609 48 25,013  
Employment potentiality 1.10E+06 1.60E+06 3021 1.20E+07  
Ward size (km²) 5.45 8.65 0.41 153.7  
Distance (km) to TTWA centroid 9.50 4.93 0.27 26.9   
Notes: The Mean column gives shares for categorical variables and means for non-categorical 
variables. Categorical variables are also given an exit rate in the final column. Exit rate refers to 
exit from neighbourhood not for employment reasons. The baseline exit rate is 0.073. 
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 Empirical strategy 
The strategy outlined here aims to deal with the empirical problems posed by the 
fact that gentrification may be associated higher exit rates for reasons other than 
displacement. This is fundamentally a problem caused by sorting. I first highlight 
the issues, and then implement empirical steps to address them. 
 The sorting problem 
Households of different types sort into neighbourhoods with different 
characteristics. As shown in the BHPS data, households with different observed 
characteristics have different mobility rates. Therefore, some neighbourhood 
types may have higher ‘natural' mobility rates than others. If these 
neighbourhoods are also gentrifying neighbourhoods then it may appear to be 
displacement when it is simply higher natural mobility. This can only partly dealt 
with by controlling for observable households characteristics because 
households also differ unobservably. There are two main reasons why 
neighbourhoods with high natural mobility rates may be identified as gentrifying 
neighbourhoods. 
Firstly, it may be that high mobility neighbourhoods are the same type of 
neighbourhoods that typically gentrify. For instance, if neighbourhoods with 
good rail access are (a) more likely to gentrify (as shown by Helms, 2003) and (b) 
traditionally home to residents with high mobility rates. This could be the case if 
double-job households have higher mobility rates and are attracted to 
neighbourhoods with good rail access21. Secondly, it may be that high mobility in 
neighbourhoods leads mechanically to increases in degree share. There is a 
general increasing trend in degree share over the sample period so 
                                                        
 
21 Conversely it may be that double-job households have lower mobility rates since 
they do not typically wish to move once they have found a neighbourhood with good 
accessibility to both jobs. In this case actual displaced may be concealed by their 
lower initial mobility rates. 
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neighbourhoods with higher turnover, may experience faster degree share 
changes where new highly educated generations simply move in to any free 
housing unit. To sum up these empirical concerns, both are caused by differences 
in mobility across different types of neighbourhood due to sorting. The first 
occurs when high mobility neighbourhood attract gentrification due to the same 
characteristics. The second occurs when high mobility neighbourhood 
mechanically gentrify.  
 Approach 
The follow empirical steps aim to address the problems caused by sorting. Firstly, 
in addition to household controls, I add neighbourhood controls like population 
density and employment accessibility. These controls aim to capture 
neighbourhood characteristics that may be associated with higher mobility rates 
(and gentrification). However, this does not help with unobserved 
neighbourhood differences. Therefore, secondly, I implement a fixed effects 
model that controls for any differences in mobility rates associated with fixed 
unobservable differences in neighbourhoods. This is helpful to the extent that the 
neighbourhood factors associated with different mobility rates are fixed over 
time. The factors that are typically thought to lead to gentrification such as 
centrality, rail access and housing stock are relatively fixed. 
However, time-variant unobserved neighbourhood characteristics remain a 
problem. To help with this, thirdly, I eliminate from the sample all residents who 
have been in the neighbourhood for 5 year or less. This helps ensure I do not 
identify from new residents arriving with different mobility rates in gentrifying 
periods22. It does not help, though, if the old residents were already different in a 
way correlated with future changes in neighbourhood unobservables. Further, it 
does not help if neighbourhood changes directly lead to exits. This may be the 
case if, for example, a factory employing low income workers closes. Fourthly 
                                                        
 
22 It also ensures I am really looking at ‘original residents’ which stays closer to the idea 
of displacement. 
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then, I interact the gentrification variable with household income, a renter 
dummy and the interaction of the renter dummy with household income23. The 
specification ensures that any general differences in mobility rates in gentrifying 
periods that are not to do with displacement are absorbed by the uninteracted 
gentrification variable. It also ensures that differences in mobility across income 
or homeownership (but not related to displacement) are absorbed by the income 
and renter interactions. Finally, the renter-income interaction captures 
displacement by estimating how exit rates of renters under gentrification 
changes with income compared with homeowners. Renters become less 
vulnerable as their incomes increase, whereas, homeowners do not since they 
are not susceptible to displacement at any income level. Such an empirical 
strategy would not have been possible in the U.S. literature that has preceded 
this, since homeowners in the U.S. may be displaced as a result of home price 
increases since their tax liabilities increase. 
 Renter displacement 
Following the above steps I estimate this OLS24 model for households living in the 
neighbourhood for more than 5 years: 
 where 𝐸𝑖𝑤𝑡 is the neighbourhood exit indicator for household 𝑖 living in ward 𝑤 
observed in intercensal period 𝑡, 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑤𝑡 is a gentrification variable described 
                                                        
 
23 Interactions are not new to the displacement literature. However, typically only one 
indication of low status is used, such as low education. The use of both renter and 
income as separate and combined interactions is novel. So is the use of continuous 
income rather than a ‘low income’ dummy variable. And is the use of private renters, 
as defined further down. 
24 Binary outcome variable is usually estimated using logit or probit models, but an OLS 
estimation is also feasible. A logit specification is presented in the appendix and the 
results remain qualitatively similar. 
 𝐸𝑖𝑤𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑤𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖) + 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑤𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 ×𝐻𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖)
+ 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑏𝐼𝑛𝑐(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖) + 𝑋𝑖𝛹 +𝑊𝑤𝑡𝛺 + 𝑌𝑦
+ 𝑓𝑤 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(1) 
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further down, 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 is a dummy variable for renter households, 𝐻𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖 is 
household income normalised to 1 = Travel to Work Area (TTWA) median, 𝑋𝑖 is 
a vector of household control variables, 𝑊𝑤𝑡 are ward controls, 𝑌𝑦 is a set of year 
effects, and 𝑓𝑤 are the ward fixed effects. The parameters to be estimated are the 
constant term 𝛼, the gentrification parameters 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝐻𝑖𝑛𝑐, 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑏 and 
𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑏𝐼𝑛𝑐 , the vector of household control parameters 𝛹, the ward control 
parameters 𝛺 and the year and ward effects.  
This empirical model implements all four steps discussed so far and should 
eliminate a large proportion of non-displacement mobility differences associated 
with gentrification. The fixed effects and ward controls eliminate all but 
unobservable time-variant differences neighbourhoods. Time-variant 
neighbourhood unobservables may attract higher mobility residents but these 
households are dropped from the analysis. Finally, the interaction terms capture 
remaining differences in natural mobility of original residents that are general 
(𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑏) or related to income (𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑏𝐼𝑛𝑐) or homeownership (𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡). The 
mechanical relationship between mobility and gentrification discussed above 
will also be captured by these parameters. Therefore, the parameter 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝 should 
capture just displacement. It tells us how household income changes the 
relationship between under gentrification and household exits for renters 
compared with homeowners. If displacement occurs then 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝 is expected to be 
negative. This tells us that as income goes up the exit rates of renters under 
gentrification goes down compared with homeowners.  
Finally, going back to the 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡 parameter, as well as absorbing the non-
displacement differences between renters and homeowners under 
gentrification, this will include the displacement effect for renter households 
evaluated for an income of zero. Therefore, to the extent that homeowners act as 
decent controls for renters, this is expected to positive.  
 Private renter displacement 
The above specification essentially uses homeowners of different incomes as a 
control for renters of different incomes. This may not be appropriate where e.g. 
low income homeowners react in significantly differently to changes in 
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neighbourhood characteristics to low income renters. Therefore, I propose an 
alternative model private renters become the vulnerable group with social 
renters as the control. I estimate the following model dropping homeowners 
from the sample: 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 indicates if the renter rents from a private individual or 
corporation. The omitted category is social renter, where the household live in 
social housing, rents from a housing association, or rents from family, friends, or 
employer. Since renters of different types should be more similar to each other 
than renters and homeowners, this represents a stronger counterfactual 
strengthening the likelihood that 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝 captures displacement. It also makes it 
more likely that 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣 (rather than 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡 above) captures the displacement 
effect evaluated at an income of zero. However, the drawback is that there is a 
smaller sample of households and the estimates may therefore be less precise. 
4.4.1 Income bands 
In a final specification the gentrification effect is estimated across five income 
bands: 0-0.4, 0.4-0.8, 0.8-1.2, 1.2-1.6 and 1.6-2 times the TTWA median 
household income. I estimate the following model for both the renter and private 
renter models25: 
                                                        
 
25 Only the renter model is indicated in equation (3). The private renter model replaces 
the renter variable with the private variable and drops all homeowners from the 
sample. 
 𝐸𝑖𝑤𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑤𝑡 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) + 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑤𝑡 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 × 𝐻𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖)
+ 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑏𝐼𝑛𝑐(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖) + 𝑋𝑖𝛹 +𝑊𝑤𝑡𝛺 + 𝑌𝑦
+ 𝑓𝑤 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
 𝐸𝑖𝑤𝑡 = 𝛼 +∑ 𝛽𝑏,𝐷𝑖𝑠(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑤𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 × 𝐻𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑏,𝑖)
𝑏
+∑𝛽𝑏,𝑀𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑏,𝑖)
𝑏
+ 𝑋𝑖𝛹 +𝑊𝑤𝑡𝛺 + 𝑌𝑦 + 𝑓𝑤 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
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where 𝐻𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑏,𝑖  is coded to one if a household 𝑖 falls into income band 𝑏.  For this 
model I drop all households with an income above 2.4 times the TTWA median 
which leaves a residual income band of 2-2.4 TTWA-medians. This is upper band 
is close enough to the other bands such that households should be 
(unobservably) similar. Nevertheless the income level is high enough such that 
renters should be particularly vulnerable to displacement. Thus the differential 
effect at this income level should capture purely the difference in mobility level 
between the two groups associated with gentrification but not due to 
displacement. The parameters 𝛽𝑑,𝐷𝑖𝑠 in this model are interpreted as the 
displacement effect at income band 𝑏 since they are net of the constant difference 
in mobility rates between renters and homeowners under gentrification. Thus 
wealthy renters serve as a control for low income renters. This specification is 
also estimated using the private renter model. 
4.4.2 The gentrification variable 
I acknowledge that gentrification occurs at different speeds and is at different 
stages of development in different neighbourhoods. Therefore, I use the actual 
change in degree share to capture the pace of gentrification and interaction of 
change in degree share with initial degree to capture the stage of development26. 
The 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 variable in the above estimation equations is replaced with two 
separate variables each with their own parameter to be estimated: 
𝛽𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽1∆𝐷𝑤𝑡 + 𝛽2(∆𝐷𝑤𝑡 × 𝐷𝑤𝑡−1) 
where ∆𝐷𝑤𝑡 is the change in degree share in ward 𝑤 over intercensal period 
ending in 𝑡 and 𝐷𝑤𝑡−1 is the initial degree share. The parameter 𝛽 represents the 
original parameter for gentrification (interacted or uninteracted versions) which 
is replaced by two new parameters in each case. The 𝛽1 parameter is interpreted 
as the impact on exit rates of changes in degree share where the initial degree 
share is zero. Hence this is the constant term for the gentrification effect by stage 
                                                        
 
26 This has the drawback of identifying from negative changes, but since only 2% of the 
degree share changes are negative, this is not considered a significant issue. 
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of development. Then 𝛽2 gives how this gentrification effect varies with respect 
to the initial degree share or, put another way, how gentrified the neighbourhood 
is to begin with. Finally, I also add the un-interacted lagged degree share as a 
ward control27. This could be interpreted partly as the lagged effect of earlier 
waves of gentrification but here I simply interpret it as a control. 
 Consideration of an IV approach 
The empirical strategy presented above attempts to deal with differences in 
mobility due to the sorting of different households across neighbourhoods of 
different types. However, it remains a possibility that the groups highlighted as 
potentially vulnerable to displacement (low income renter, particularly private 
renters) have exit higher exit rates under gentrification for reasons unrelated to 
displacement. The only full solution to this problem would be to instrument for 
gentrification. However, good instruments are notoriously difficult to find in 
most scenarios. Given that gentrification and displacement are so tightly 
interlinked it seems implausible that an exogenous instrument may be found. 
Specifically, most factors that predict gentrification (e.g. rail access) are likely to 
also determine the mobility rates of original residents. Further, if the 
neighbourhood were subject to some sort of random amenity shock that lead to 
gentrification, there is no guarantee that the same amenity shock does not lead 
directly to elevated exit rates of original residents (violating the exclusionary 
restriction). Overall, since both the explanatory variable (gentrification) and the 
dependent variable (neighbourhood exits) represent locations decisions of 
households, I am unable to think of an instrument that affect one but not the 
other. Therefore, the empirical approach taken in this paper is to remove as much 
unobserved heterogeneity as possible through the use of fixed effects and 
                                                        
 
27 The initial share controls for the precise level of education in the neighbourhood 
rather than a fairly wide band. Initial degree share is likely to be correlated with 
various unobserved neighbourhood and household characteristics that can also 
effect exit rates. Simply restricting to the lowest quintile is problematic if, for 
example, within the low education band, the neighbourhoods that gentrify are 
typically toward the top end and therefore different types of neighbourhood. 
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interaction terms that capture treatment intensity. The aim being to demonstrate 
an association between gentrification and elevated exit rates in a way that is 
consistent with displacement activity across a variety of alternative 
specifications.  The results are presented in the next section. 
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 Results 
Table 7 reports the results for the OLS estimation of equation (1) which compares 
renters with homeowners. This table only reports coefficients of the variables 
interacted with the change in degree share. The full table of coefficients is 
reported in the appendix. Column (1) includes just a basic set of control 
variables28 and year effects 𝑌𝑦 . Column (2) introduces ward level controls, 
column (3) household controls and column (4) is the fixed effect specification. 
The first four rows’ coefficients report mobility differences under gentrification 
in the early stages (i.e. at a zero initial share). The next four rows describe how 
these mobility differences change with the advancement of gentrification.  
The second row coefficient 𝛽1,𝐷𝑖𝑠 gives the displacement parameter for the early 
stages of gentrification (zero initial degree share). The coefficient is negative (but 
not always significant) across all models and is significant at the 5% level in the 
strongest, fixed effects, specification. A negative finding indicates the existence of 
displacement since relationship between gentrification and neighbourhood exits 
decreases with income for renters (compared with homeowners). In column (4), 
an increase in household income by the Travel To Work Area median reduces the 
effect of a one point increase degree share on probability of exit by 0.637 points. 
To put this into context, the displacement effect can be computed for a 
neighbourhood (with a zero initial degree share) that experiences a top quintile 
increase in degree share of about 0.12. A household with 0.5 compared with 1.5 
times the TTWA median would have an increased exit rate of (0.12 × 0.637 =) 
0.076 for renters over homeowners. Given the baseline exit rate is around 0.073 
this represents a large effect.  
The positive and significant coefficient for the interaction with initial degree 
share (𝛽2,𝐷𝑖𝑠 = 2.794) suggests that the displacement effect disappears as 
gentrification progresses. In fact it reaches zero at a degree share of 0.14 
                                                        
 
28 Basic controls are included to maintain the hierarchy of interaction terms. 
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(approximately the mean in 1991). Together these findings indicate that 
displacement is significant in the early stages of gentrification but disappears 
once the neighbourhood becomes significantly gentrified. This could be 
explained by considering that the households most unobservably vulnerable to 
displacement are displaced early on the gentrification process. But by the time 
that the ward has a high degree share, those households that remain are probably 
more capable of resisting displacement in ways not captured by observed income 
i.e. if they have savings or financial help from family.  
Table 7: Renter displacement regression (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Dep. Var.: Household exits 
Change in degree share × Renter  𝛽1,𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡  0.371 
(0.235) 
0.389 
(0.236) 
0.431* 
(0.233) 
0.666** 
(0.262) 
Change in degree share × Renter  
× Household income (TTWA-adj.)  
𝛽1,𝐷𝑖𝑠  -0.321 
(0.221) 
-0.356 
(0.223) 
-0.415* 
(0.214) 
-0.637** 
(0.262) 
Change in degree share 𝛽1,𝑀𝑜𝑏  0.076 
(0.117) 
0.050 
(0.118) 
0.035 
(0.125) 
0.390* 
(0.226) 
Change in degree share  
× Household income (TTWA-adj.) 
𝛽1,𝑀𝑜𝑏𝐼𝑛𝑐  0.059 
(0.074) 
0.068 
(0.074) 
0.098 
(0.076) 
0.170* 
(0.097) 
Change in degree share × Lag degree 
share × Renter 
𝛽2,𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡  -0.774 
(1.235) 
-0.878 
(1.247) 
-0.859 
(1.249) 
-1.979 
(1.433) 
Change in degree share × Lag degree 
share × Renter × Household income 
(TTWA-adj.) 
𝛽2,𝐷𝑖𝑠  1.018 
(1.145) 
1.245 
(1.156) 
1.377 
(1.106) 
2.794** 
(1.388) 
Change in degree share × Lag degree 
share 
𝛽2,𝑀𝑜𝑏  -0.514 
(0.577) 
-0.461 
(0.581) 
-0.381 
(0.610) 
-1.376 
(0.911) 
Change in degree share × Lag degree 
share × Household income  
(TTWA-adj.) 
𝛽2,𝑀𝑜𝑏𝐼𝑛𝑐  -0.227 
(0.321) 
-0.256 
(0.324) 
-0.395 
(0.334) 
-0.809 
(0.495) 
Basic controls (Incl. Year effects)  YES YES YES YES 
Ward controls   YES YES YES 
Household controls    YES YES 
Ward fixed effects     YES 
R²  0.002 0.003 0.023 0.017 
AIC  -17738.5 -17756.4 -18290.0 -21201.4 
Observations  28,460 28,460 28,460 28,460 
Notes: Basic controls are all remaining possible combinations of interaction terms for the reported 
interacted variables plus year effects. The full table in the appendix reports all coefficients. Standard 
errors in parentheses clustered on wards in all models. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The mobility coefficients also allow for interesting interpretations. The 
coefficient on the change in degree share interacted with renters in the first row 
(𝛽1,𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡) tells us that a one point increase in degree share is associated with a 
0.666 point increase is the exit rates evaluated for a renter household with an 
income of zero (in a neighbourhood with a zero initial degree share). This is 
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consistent with displacement. However, as discussed in the empirical strategy, 
the coefficient also captured any difference natural mobility levels between 
renters and homeowners under gentrification. The other mobility terms, tell us 
that exit rates for homeowners (the comparison group) are higher under 
gentrification (𝛽1,𝑀𝑜𝑏 = 0.390) and that higher income increases probability of 
exit under gentrification (𝛽1,𝑀𝑜𝑏𝐼𝑛𝑐 = 0.170). The income interaction is small, 
positive and barely significant suggesting income does not impact too greatly on 
mobility rates under gentrification in general. This provides reassurance that the 
strong negative coefficient for the income-renter interaction is due to 
displacement, not natural mobility differences. 
Table 8 presents the results for the private renter model of equation (2). Here, 
the counterfactual is improved since renters of different types are likely to be 
more similar in characteristics than homeowners of different types. However, the 
sample size is significantly reduced and the estimates may be less precise. In this 
model the displacement parameter (𝛽1,𝐷𝑖𝑠) is much larger and significant across 
all specifications. It remains 5% significant in the fixed effects model. Whilst the 
variation change across income for private renters is very large (𝛽1,𝐷𝑖𝑠 = −4.222) 
the change across income in general (i.e. for social renters) is insignificant. This 
suggests that all the effect observed in the above renter vs. homeowner model 
comes from private renters that make up only 9% of head of household-years in 
the sample of 5.990. Furthermore, the intercept mobility differences for private 
renters (𝛽1,𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣) is positive and significant in all models (although at only 10% 
level in the fixed effect specification). As discussed in the empirical strategy is 
stronger evidence for displacement (at zero income) than the equivalent 
parameter in the renter vs. homeowner model.  
The interactions with lagged degree share show again that these effects decrease 
with the stage of gentrification. The 𝛽2,𝐷𝑖𝑠 parameter shows the displacement 
effect becomes zero at a degree share of around 0.20, which is in the 2nd quintile 
across both decades. Therefore, the private renter model highlights a much larger 
displacement effect which also persists longer through the stages of 
gentrification.  
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Table 8: Private renter displacement regression (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Dep. Var.: Household exits 
Change in degree share × Private  𝛽1,𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣  6.155*** 
(1.787) 
6.218*** 
(1.789) 
5.879*** 
(1.664) 
3.791* 
(1.930) 
Change in degree share × Private  
× Household income (TTWA-adj.)  
𝛽1,𝐷𝑖𝑠  -4.930*** 
(1.426) 
-5.007*** 
(1.464) 
-4.883*** 
(1.369) 
-4.222** 
(2.103) 
Change in degree share 𝛽1,𝑀𝑜𝑏  0.125 
(0.210) 
0.107 
(0.212) 
0.144 
(0.207) 
0.698 
(0.439) 
Change in degree share  
× Household income (TTWA-adj.) 
𝛽1,𝑀𝑜𝑏𝐼𝑛𝑐  -0.066 
(0.235) 
-0.075 
(0.237) 
-0.069 
(0.233) 
-0.011 
(0.256) 
Change in degree share × Lag degree 
share × Private 
𝛽2,𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣  -27.391*** 
(8.260) 
-27.921*** 
(8.318) 
-26.981*** 
(7.818) 
-15.633* 
(9.008) 
Change in degree share × Lag degree 
share × Private × Household income 
(TTWA-adj.) 
𝛽2,𝐷𝑖𝑠  24.428*** 
(7.421) 
25.002*** 
(7.621) 
25.250*** 
(7.259) 
21.150* 
(10.968
) 
Change in degree share × Lag degree 
share 
𝛽2,𝑀𝑜𝑏  0.120 
(1.155) 
0.138 
(1.164) 
0.214 
(1.191) 
-1.468 
(1.732) 
Change in degree share × Lag degree 
share × Household income  
(TTWA-adj.) 
𝛽2,𝑀𝑜𝑏𝐼𝑛𝑐  0.032 
(1.182) 
0.126 
(1.199) 
-0.156 
(1.192) 
-0.200 
(1.261) 
Basic controls  YES YES YES YES 
Ward controls   YES YES YES 
Household controls    YES YES 
Ward fixed effects     YES 
R²  0.019 0.021 0.050 0.038 
AIC  -3282.6 -3283.9 -3415.5 -4785.9 
Observations  5,990 5,990 5,990 5,990 
Notes: Basic controls are all remaining possible combinations of interaction terms for the reported 
interacted variables plus year effects. Standard errors in parentheses clustered on wards in all models. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The next specification breaks the effect down by income bands. Table 9 and Table 
10 show the results of the estimation of equation (3) for renters and private 
renters, respectively.  Concentrating on strongest results in column (4), the first 
five rows of Table 9 show evidence of displacement of renters in low income 
bands in the early stages of gentrification. These coefficients reveal that the 
difference in exit rates under gentrification between renters and homeowners is 
far higher in lower income bands than in the wealthy omitted group (2.0 ≤ 
Income < 2.4). The general trend is downwards as income increase, with the only 
exception being a spike at an income of 1.2-1.6 TTWA medians. This fourth band 
and the first two bands (0-0.4 and 0.4-0.8 TTWA medians) are statistically 
significant at least at the 5% level. The next five rows describe how these 
displacement effects decline with the stage of gentrification. They suggest the 
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effect becomes zero across all income bands at an initial share again of around 
0.2, i.e. the 2nd quintile. 
Table 9: Renter displacement effect by income bins (OLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dep. Var.: Household exits 
Degree change × Renter     
× (0.0 ≤ Income < 0.4) 1.784** 
(0.734) 
1.751** 
(0.745) 
2.033** 
(0.790) 
2.088*** 
(0.725) 
× (0.4 ≤ Income < 0.8) 1.248* 
(0.670) 
1.238* 
(0.675) 
1.426** 
(0.713) 
1.579** 
(0.666) 
× (0.8 ≤ Income < 1.2) 0.551 
(0.712) 
0.532 
(0.709) 
0.877 
(0.744) 
0.834 
(0.691) 
× (1.2 ≤ Income < 1.6) 1.869* 
(0.961) 
1.809* 
(0.973) 
2.154** 
(0.994) 
1.750** 
(0.886) 
× (1.6 ≤ Income < 2.0) 0.385 
(0.925) 
0.329 
(0.922) 
0.366 
(0.918) 
0.116 
(0.736) 
Degree Change × Lag degree × Renter     
× (0.0 ≤ Income < 0.4) -6.650* 
(3.818) 
-6.872* 
(3.951) 
-8.585** 
(4.342) 
-10.591** 
(4.116) 
× (0.4 ≤ Income < 0.8) -4.848 
(3.515) 
-5.150 
(3.581) 
-6.253 
(3.887) 
-8.802** 
(3.715) 
× (0.8 ≤ Income < 1.2) -1.633 
(3.679) 
-1.972 
(3.716) 
-3.758 
(4.010) 
-5.336 
(3.793) 
× (1.2 ≤ Income < 1.6) -7.356 
(5.015) 
-7.424 
(5.131) 
-9.356* 
(5.408) 
-9.087* 
(4.790) 
× (1.6 ≤ Income < 2.0) -3.206 
(5.568) 
-3.300 
(5.569) 
-4.039 
(5.543) 
-3.569 
(4.212) 
Basic controls (Incl. Year effects) YES YES YES YES 
Ward controls  YES YES YES 
Household controls   YES YES 
Ward fixed effects    YES 
R² 0.004 0.005 0.025 0.020 
AIC -16526.2 -16540.8 -17014.1 -19695.8 
Observations 25,759 25,759 25,759 25,759 
Notes: Basic controls are all remaining possible combinations of interaction terms for the reported 
interacted variables plus year effects. Income is household income normalized to 1=TTWA median. 
Omitted income category is 2.0 ≤ Income < 2.4. Standard errors in parentheses clustered on wards 
in all models. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 10 gives the result for the comparison between private renters and social 
renters. Again, for private renters the effect sizes are very much larger. A 1 point 
increase in degree share is associated with a 21.6 point increase in the probability 
of exit for household with lowest income compared with their TTWA median. To 
put this into perspective, for a ward with an initial degree share of zero, even a 
very small 5th quintile increase in degree share (0.016) would be associated with 
an increase in exit probability by 0.342. Private renters already have some of the 
highest exit rates, with a mean of 0.284, but this would still represent a more than 
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doubling of the exit rate. Since an exit probability of 1 indicates guaranteed exit 
within the year, it is clear that large increases in degree share, as are typical for 
gentrification, will be associated with almost guaranteed exit of low income 
private renters. The first three income bands are positive and significant 
suggesting displacement occurs up to an income of 1.2 times the TTWA median. 
Since these coefficients are approximately ten times the size of their Table 9 
equivalents and private renters make up 10%, of total renters, this is again 
suggestive that the effects seen for all renters are essentially just the diluted 
effects of private renters. 
Table 10: Private displacement effect by income bins (OLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dep. Var.: Household exits 
Degree change × Private     
× (0.0 ≤ Income < 0.4) 22.076** 
(10.408) 
21.583** 
(10.302) 
19.347* 
(10.420) 
21.576** 
(9.734) 
× (0.4 ≤ Income < 0.8) 15.537 
(10.229) 
14.977 
(10.133) 
13.461 
(10.305) 
17.440* 
(9.682) 
× (0.8 ≤ Income < 1.2) 21.523** 
(10.333) 
21.204** 
(10.250) 
18.934* 
(10.436) 
23.896** 
(9.878) 
× (1.2 ≤ Income < 1.6) 14.212 
(10.507) 
13.576 
(10.430) 
11.500 
(10.603) 
11.047 
(10.285) 
× (1.6 ≤ Income < 2.0) 7.620 
(10.847) 
6.934 
(10.753) 
5.713 
(10.775) 
10.781 
(10.234) 
Degree Change × Lag degree × Private     
× (0.0 ≤ Income < 0.4) -53.158 
(46.146) 
-52.055 
(45.583) 
-46.052 
(45.945) 
-55.534 
(42.677) 
× (0.4 ≤ Income < 0.8) -32.079 
(45.070) 
-30.292 
(44.528) 
-27.646 
(45.128) 
-45.146 
(42.416) 
× (0.8 ≤ Income < 1.2) -49.631 
(44.737) 
-49.420 
(44.311) 
-43.089 
(45.041) 
-65.634 
(42.358) 
× (1.2 ≤ Income < 1.6) -23.880 
(49.583) 
-21.523 
(49.172) 
-14.257 
(49.910) 
10.297 
(49.620) 
× (1.6 ≤ Income < 2.0) 21.579 
(47.921) 
24.282 
(47.343) 
25.237 
(47.069) 
-3.075 
(48.894) 
Basic controls (Incl. Year effects) YES YES YES YES 
Ward controls  YES YES YES 
Household controls   YES YES 
Ward fixed effects    YES 
R² 0.035 0.037 0.064 0.054 
AIC -3197.9 -3198.5 -3320.4 -4710.3 
Observations 5,912 5,912 5,912 5,912 
Notes: Basic controls are all remaining possible combinations of interaction terms for the reported 
interacted variables plus year effects. Income is household income normalized to 1 = TTWA median. 
Omitted income category is 2.0 ≤ H. Income < 2.4. Standard errors in parentheses clustered on 
wards in all models. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Finally in Figure 3, I plot the displacement effects by income band at different 
initial degree shares. The left column of charts shows the effects for renters over 
homeowners, and the right column shows the effects of private renters over 
social renters. Histograms of the sample distributions across income for renters 
and private renters are also shown light grey in the chart backgrounds. Since 
graphical illustration allows for the display of more coefficients, I have used finer 
income bands of 0.2 TTWA medians in width. The omitted band remains 2-2.4 
TTWA median incomes. 
The first row of charts shows the effect in the early stages of gentrification (5th 
quintile of initial degree share). These show displacement is statistically 
significant up to around 0.6 times the median income for renters, but all the way 
up to 1.8 for private renters. There is a clear downwards slope across income in 
both types of comparisons. In the next row (4th quintile) the effects are illustrated 
for the not-so-early stages of gentrification. Across both models, the size of 
displacement decrease and the change with respect to income flattens slightly. 
Once we look at the middle stages of gentrification in the third row (3rd quintile) 
the effects are insignificant at all incomes for the renter model. The private renter 
model, however, continue to illustrate displacement activity significant up to 1.6 
times the TTWA median income. The fourth row charts illustrate much the same 
as the third. Only in the fifth row, in the most gentrified of neighbourhoods, does 
the displacement effect disappear even for private renters (except for the spike 
at 1.2-1.4 times the TTWA income)29. Together the right column of charts 
suggests very pronounced displacement of private renter households, even 
where they have an income above the TTWA-median. This makes sense if 
household up to 1.6 times the median income are not so wealthy as to be 
invulnerable to rising housing costs. Further, if these households spend 
approximately the same share of their income on housing as lower income 
                                                        
 
29 The sample distribution for the private renter models indicates only around 25 
observations or fewer in each income band beyond 1.2 times the TTWA median. 
Therefore the spike at 1.2-1.4 is most likely due to imprecision in the estimates at 
high incomes. 
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families, or that they are generally households of larger sizes then proportional 
increases in rents could easily lead to financial difficulties. 
To summarise the results, both the renter and private renter models have 
indicated significant displacement of low income households in the early stages 
of gentrification. However, the private renter displacement is a much larger effect 
that persists longer through the latter stages of stages of gentrification. The effect 
size indicates that private renters are very quickly displaced from gentrifying 
neighbourhoods. The results suggest that the effect observed for all renters may 
be simply the diluted effect for private renters. This makes sense if social housing 
and housing association rents are not at all linked to market rates. 
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of change in degree share on exit 
 
 
 
Note: Charts of coefficients based on OLS estimation of equation (3) using ten income bands of 0.2 times TTWA 
median. Depicted are (a) the marginal effects (solid black lines, left axis) with 5% confidence intervals (dashed lines) 
and (b) the sample distribution (grey bars, left axis) for renters (left charts) and private renters (right charts).  
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Figure 3 (continued): Marginal effect of change in degree share on exit 
 
 
Note: Charts of coefficients based on OLS estimation of equation (3) using ten income bands of 0.2 times TTWA 
median. Depicted are (a) the marginal effects (solid black lines, left axis) with 5% confidence intervals (dashed lines) 
and (b) the sample distribution (grey bars, left axis) for renters (left charts) and private renters (right charts).  
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 Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper has investigated whether gentrification is associated with 
displacement of pre-existing residents and in particular of low-income (private) 
renters. It has made methodological advancements over previous literature in 
terms of controlling for unobservables and investigating interactive effects. In 
contrast to much of the earlier literature it finds strong evidence for a 
displacement effect associated with gentrification, measured by change in degree 
share. Gentrification has been found to be positively associated with higher exit 
rates of renter households and private renters in particular. A further result is 
that the effect decreases substantially at more advanced stages of gentrification. 
This is reassuring because it adds meaning to the definition of gentrification as 
an inflow of middle class households into a previously working class or poor 
neighbourhood, setting it apart in consequences from a simple increase in degree 
share. A potential explanation for finding is that the most vulnerable households 
have already been displaced from neighbourhoods in the later stages of the 
gentrification process.  
This finding has two important implications for policy. Firstly, policymakers 
wishing to improve the outcomes for low income households should implement 
measures to reduce the impact of gentrification on displacement. This may be 
achieved, for example, by following policies from Germany that prevent the rent 
eviction of tenants for up to 7 years after newly purchasing a property. The 
second implication is that more general policies that aim to improve outcomes 
for the poor may be mistargeted as a result of displacement process. For example, 
spatially-targeted policies to help the poor miss their target if improvements in 
local amenities are followed by an in-migration of wealthier households and 
displacement of pre-existing residents. Furthermore policies aimed at mixing 
neighbourhoods may be misguided if they too lead to displacement. Policy-
makers wishing to improve outcomes for low-income households they may be 
better off directly targeting incomes and sources of poverty or by combining 
neighbourhood improvement policies with incentive for low-income renters to 
become homeowners. 
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 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III 
 Introduction 
This appendix complements the main paper and is not designed to stand alone 
or as a replacement. Section 5, the only section to this appendix, complements 
the results section of the main paper by providing alternative tables. 
 Results 
This section presents results not shown in the main paper. The logit version of 
the main renter displacement regression is discussed, as well as the full table of 
coefficients for the OLS regression. 
 Logit regression 
Table 1 presents the results of the logit estimation of equation (1). The results 
are qualitatively similar to the equivalent results presented in Table 7 in the main 
paper. Focusing on the fixed effect model in column (4), the displacement effect 
(2nd row) is negative and significant, indicating the occurrence of displacement. 
The positive final row coefficient shows that this displacement effect reduces 
with initial degree share. However, the effect remains until an initial degree share 
of 0.285, which is a more persistent displacement effect than shown in the OLS 
model. Nevertheless, the broad pattern of effect is similar.  
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Table 1: Renter displacement regression (Logit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Household exits neighbourhood 
Change in degree share × Renter 8.362 
(5.999) 
9.068 
(5.808) 
11.404* 
(6.272) 
24.049*** 
(7.327) 
Change in degree share × Renter  
× Household income (TTWA-adj.)  
-8.080 
(6.005) 
-9.122 
(5.924) 
-10.798* 
(5.794) 
-21.620** 
(9.626) 
Change in degree share × Lag degree 
share × Renter 
-14.984 
(32.541) 
-19.440 
(30.688) 
-19.713 
(33.606) 
-75.909** 
(37.466) 
Change in degree share × Lag degree × 
Renter × Household income (TTWA-adj. 
26.416 
(30.215) 
33.060 
(28.530) 
36.568 
(28.856) 
87.152** 
(41.938) 
Basic controls (incl. Year effects) YES YES YES YES 
Ward controls  YES YES YES 
Household controls   YES YES 
Ward fixed effects    YES 
Pseudo R² 0.003 0.006 0.065 0.065 
AIC 8154.4 8137.4 7707.9 5470.1 
Observations 28,460 28,460 28,460 22,226 
Notes: Basic controls are all remaining possible combinations of interaction terms for the reported 
interacted variables plus year effects. Standard errors in parentheses clustered on wards in all 
models. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 Full results of OLS model 
In Table 2 below I report and discuss the full set of coefficient for the OLS 
estimation of equation (1) from the main paper. Column (1) includes just the 
basic set of controls, which are remaining possible combinations of interaction 
terms for the reported interacted variables plus year effects. In this column, the 
gentrification effects are of the same signs as in the other models but 
insignificant. The only significant coefficients are for the year effects for 1995 and 
1996, which are positive, and the constant. 
In column (2) I introduce ward controls. The main gentrification variables are 
approximately unchanged in magnitude and significance. The ward controls are 
typically significant, though. The two measures of centrality, population density 
and distance to TTWA centroid are both associated with higher exit rates30, 
whereas access to employment is associated with lower exit rates. Together this 
                                                        
 
30 Although distance to TTWA centroid is insignificant, perhaps because population 
density better captures centrality. 
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implies that central wards may be associated with a generally higher pace of life 
that includes more frequent moves but that accessibility to employment is a 
valued amenity that households do not want to move away from. Ward size is 
negative and significant suggesting as expected that moves are more likely to exit 
a ward if the ward is smaller is size. An alternative interpretation that smaller 
wards are denser is made less likely due to the inclusion of population density as 
a control. 
In column (3) I introduce household controls. The gentrification effects increase 
in size and become marginally significant. In particular the displacement 
parameter (2nd row) is significant at the 10% level. The household characteristics 
are also shown to be important. The exit rates are 0.008 higher for households 
where the head holds a degree certificate or higher (10% significant). Exits are 
0.051 higher for renters with a private landlord. The effect of whether the 
household receives housing benefit is negative but insignificant. Exits are 0.004 
lower for each dependent child, but the effect is insignificant for each person per 
room. The gender of the head of household is insignificant. The age, age² and 
pension coefficients suggest a non-linear relationship between exits and age of 
the head of household. Exit rates decrease age but at a decreasing rate. They 
experience a significant downwards discontinuity above the pensionable age of 
65. The employed, self-employed and unemployed have significantly lower exit 
rates (-0.014, -0.009, and -0.016 respectively) than economic non-participants. 
Those born outside of the UK also have lower exit rates by 0.041. Marital status 
of heads of households has no effect on exit rates apart from widowed status 
which has higher exit rates (10% significant). The coefficient on self-reported 
health status suggests no effect on exit rates. Only where this variable is missing 
are there significant differences in exits of -0.053. It is unclear whether this 
parameter measures an effect to do with their health status or to do with the 
characteristics of non-responders. Heads who like their neighbourhood are less 
likely to move away from it (-0.041). Households who have been a long time in 
the neighbourhood are also less likely to move away, by 0.001 per year at current 
address. Those satisfied with their house are less likely to move away (-0.010 per 
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point). The households with this variable missing are less likely to move away (-
0.060). This is reasonably consistent with the mean score where known of 5.33. 
Finally, whether the house needs some maintenance work has no effect on exits.  
 
Table 2: Renter displacement regression full (OLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Household exits neighbourhood 
Displacement Effects     
Change in degree share × Renter 0.371 
(0.235) 
0.389 
(0.236) 
0.431* 
(0.233) 
0.666** 
(0.262) 
Change in degree share × Renter  
× Household income (TTWA-adj.)  
-0.321 
(0.221) 
-0.356 
(0.223) 
-0.415* 
(0.214) 
-0.637** 
(0.262) 
Change in degree share × Lag degree share  
× Renter 
-0.774 
(1.235) 
-0.878 
(1.247) 
-0.859 
(1.249) 
-1.979 
(1.433) 
Change in degree share × Lag degree share  
× Renter × Household income (TTWA-adj.) 
1.018 
(1.145) 
1.245 
(1.156) 
1.377 
(1.106) 
2.794** 
(1.388) 
 
Basic Controls 
    
Change in degree share 0.076 
(0.117) 
0.050 
(0.118) 
0.035 
(0.125) 
0.390* 
(0.226) 
Change in degree share × Household 
income (TTWA-adj.) 
0.059 
(0.074) 
0.068 
(0.074) 
0.098 
(0.076) 
0.170* 
(0.097) 
Change in degree share × Lag degree share -0.514 
(0.577) 
-0.461 
(0.581) 
-0.381 
(0.610) 
-1.376 
(0.911) 
Change in degree share × Lag degree share  
× Household income (TTWA-adj.) 
-0.227 
(0.321) 
-0.256 
(0.324) 
-0.395 
(0.334) 
-0.809 
(0.495) 
Lag degree share 0.060 
(0.049) 
0.069 
(0.050) 
0.070 
(0.052) 
0.320* 
(0.168) 
Renter -0.006 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.016) 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
Household income (TTWA-adj.) 0.002 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
Lag degree share × Renter -0.005 
(0.097) 
-0.000 
(0.097) 
-0.028 
(0.099) 
0.042 
(0.115) 
Household income (TTWA-adj.) × Renter 0.008 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.015) 
0.016 
(0.018) 
Lag degree share × Household income 
(TTWA-adj.) 
0.003 
(0.029) 
0.004 
(0.029) 
0.016 
(0.031) 
0.046 
(0.046) 
Lag degree share × Renter × Household 
income (TTWA-adj.) 
-0.015 
(0.084) 
-0.031 
(0.084) 
-0.023 
(0.084) 
-0.110 
(0.111) 
Year: 1992 0.002 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.052*** 
(0.011) 
-0.040*** 
(0.012) 
Year: 1993 0.008 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.047*** 
(0.011) 
-0.035*** 
(0.012) 
Year: 1994 0.005 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.051*** 
(0.011) 
-0.037*** 
(0.012) 
Year: 1995 0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.044*** 
(0.011) 
-0.031** 
(0.013) 
Year: 1996 0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
-0.044*** 
(0.013) 
-0.028** 
(0.014) 
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Table 2 (continued)     
Year: 1997 0.002 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.053*** 
(0.013) 
-0.036** 
(0.014) 
Year: 1998 0.003 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.052*** 
(0.013) 
-0.039*** 
(0.014) 
Year: 1999 0.009 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
Year: 2000 0.008 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.048*** 
(0.013) 
-0.048*** 
(0.017) 
Year: 2001 0.001 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.051*** 
(0.012) 
-0.054*** 
(0.016) 
Year: 2002 0.003 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.053*** 
(0.013) 
-0.053*** 
(0.017) 
Year: 2003 0.000 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.054*** 
(0.013) 
-0.055*** 
(0.018) 
Year: 2004 -0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.058*** 
(0.013) 
-0.057*** 
(0.017) 
Year: 2005 -0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.060*** 
(0.013) 
-0.057*** 
(0.018) 
Year: 2006 0.010 
(0.006) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.051*** 
(0.013) 
-0.045** 
(0.017) 
Year: 2007 -0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.067*** 
(0.013) 
-0.056*** 
(0.018) 
 
Ward Controls 
    
Lag vacancy rate  
 
0.117* 
(0.060) 
0.047 
(0.059) 
0.009 
(0.124) 
Lag population density  
 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Employment potentiality  
 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Ward size (km²)  
 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Distance (km) to TTWA centroid  
 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
Household Controls 
    
Holds a degree  
 
 
 
0.008* 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
Private landlord  
 
 
 
0.051*** 
(0.013) 
0.037*** 
(0.014) 
Housing benefit  
 
 
 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
Number of children  
 
 
 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
People per room  
 
 
 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
 - Unknown/missing  
 
 
 
0.013 
(0.012) 
0.016 
(0.013) 
Male  
 
 
 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
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Table 2 (continued)     
Age of household head  
 
 
 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Age² of household head  
 
 
 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Head > 65 years age  
 
 
 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
Self-employed  
 
 
 
-0.009** 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
Employed  
 
 
 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
Unemployed  
 
 
 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.014* 
(0.007) 
Born outside UK  
 
 
 
-0.041*** 
(0.007) 
-0.043*** 
(0.008) 
Married  
 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
Divorced  
 
 
 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
Widowed  
 
 
 
0.008* 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
Health score (1-5)  
 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
 - Unknown/missing  
 
 
 
-0.053*** 
(0.010) 
-0.040*** 
(0.011) 
Likes neighbourhood  
 
 
 
-0.041*** 
(0.006) 
-0.042*** 
(0.006) 
Years living at address  
 
 
 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
If satisfied with house  
 
 
 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
 - Unknown/missing  
 
 
 
-0.060*** 
(0.011) 
-0.058*** 
(0.011) 
House needs maintenance  
 
 
 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
Constant 0.015* 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
0.290*** 
(0.026) 
0.207*** 
(0.040) 
Observations 28460 28460 28460 28460 
R2 0.002 0.003 0.023 0.017 
AIC -17738.5 -17756.4 -18290.0 -21201.4 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered on wards in all models. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
GAME OF ZONES:  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
CONSERVATION AREAS
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 Introduction 
One of the key motivations for a variety of spatial planning policies is how to solve 
coordination problems inherent to free markets. Among such policies historic 
preservation occupies a leading position in terms of the rigidity of the related 
regulations as well as the complexity of related social and private costs and 
benefits. These policies restrict individual property rights in order to protect 
buildings with a particular aesthetic, cultural or historic value. In doing so the 
policy may overcome a coordination problem by ensuring that owners can no 
longer “freeride” on the character of nearby buildings while making 
inappropriate changes to their own properties. In other words it may help to 
solve a so-called prisoner’s dilemma (Holman & Ahlfeldt, 2012). A welfare 
maximizing preservation policy must take into account social costs and benefits 
of preservation incurred by the wider society and even future generations. It is 
therefore unlikely that designation decisions that are considered socially optimal 
are also in the interest of local homeowners. In this paper we ask the question 
whether owners are able to ‘game the system’ to their advantage i.e. whether the 
designation status of each zone in a neighbourhood is determined by the 
preferences of the homeowners residing there. We answer this question by 
deriving a model of the designation process in which a planner acts as an agent 
of local homeowners and then empirically testing its predictions. 
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Our theory distinguishes between a heritage effect, which can be internal or 
external, i.e., the effect of the appearance of a historic building on the perceived 
value of the house itself (internal) or nearby houses (external), and a policy effect, 
which results from the legal treatment of the designation policy. We argue that 
with positive heritage effects, the policy benefits the owners by removing 
uncertainty regarding the future of the neighbourhood, i.e., the presence of the 
heritage effect. These benefits are opposed by the costs of regulation (in the form 
of development restrictions and maintenance obligations) so that the net effect 
of the policy effect is ambiguous. Our theoretical framework predicts positive, 
but diminishing returns to designation. Taking on the assumption that the 
planner acts in the interests of local homeowners we can derive a condition for 
the (political) equilibrium level of designation. This condition generates two 
empirically testable hypotheses. Firstly, new designations will result from 
increases in the local preferences for heritage. Secondly, in equilibrium, the 
marginal costs and benefits of designation will offset each other, resulting in a 
zero impact of new designations on house prices. At all other locations in a 
neighbourhood the effect will be positive. 
We test these implications using two different empirical approaches. Firstly, we 
estimate the effect of changes in neighbourhood composition, what we define as 
gentrification, on the likelihood of designations using a tobit IV approach. 
Secondly, we use a hybrid difference-in-differences (DD) and regression 
discontinuity design (RDD) identification strategy to estimate the effect of new 
designations on the market value of properties. Our analysis is based on the 
whole of England, making use of 1 million property transactions from 1995 to 
2010 and of about 8,000 designated conservation areas, of which 915 have been 
designated in the same observation period. We also make use of ward level 
education data from the UK census for 1991, 2001, and 2011 in order to analyse 
the effect of changing neighbourhood characteristics on the designation status. 
Previewing our results we find that an increase in the local share of residents 
holding a university or college degree leads to an expansion of the designated 
area. The property price effect inside newly designated conservation areas turns 
out not to be statistically distinguishable from zero. We find evidence that the 
effect just outside the conservation area boundary is positive and significant. 
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These results are in line with the political equilibrium policy level suggesting that 
the planner adheres to local homeowner interests. 
Our analysis of the conservation area designation process adds to a growing body 
of literature on the political economy of housing markets, which implicitly or 
explicitly assumes that property owners are able to influence political outcomes 
in their own interest (e.g. Boes & Nüesch, 2011; Brunner & Sonstelie, 2003; 
Brunner et al., 2001; Cellini et al., 2010; Dehring et al., 2008; Fischel, 2001a, 
2001b; Hilber & Mayer, 2009; Oates, 1969). We also contribute to a literature that 
investigates policies related to spatial externalities (Hansen & Libecap, 2004; 
Libecap & Lueck, 2011; Rossi‐Hansberg et al., 2010), and a literature that 
investigates the costs and benefits of restrictive planning regimes (e.g. Cheshire 
& Hilber, 2008; Cheshire et al., 2011; Hilber & Vermeulen, 2010). Our results are 
also relevant to research that has looked into the value amenities add to 
neighbourhoods and cities more generally (e.g. Ahlfeldt et al., 2012; Bayer et al., 
2007; Brueckner et al., 1999; Chay & Greenstone, 2005; Cheshire & Sheppard, 
1995; Glaeser et al., 2001). Notably, there is also a growing body of literature that 
is investigating the property price effects of designation policies, mostly focused 
on the U.S. (e.g. Asabere et al., 1989; Asabere & Huffman, 1994; Asabere et al., 
1994; Coulson & Lahr, 2005; Coulson & Leichenko, 2001; Glaeser, 2011; 
Leichenko et al., 2001; Noonan, 2007; Noonan & Krupka, 2011; Schaeffer & 
Millerick, 1991).  
The key contribution of this study is to provide insights into the political economy 
of conservation area designation and to examine whether the outcome follows 
local homeowners interests. We also make a number of more specific, though still 
important contributions. Firstly, the theoretical framework we develop lends a 
structure to the designation process that helps to interpret the existing evidence 
that has typically been derived from ad-hoc empirical models. Secondly, our 
analysis of conservation area effects on property prices is one of the few rigorous 
analysis of this kind available for Europe (e.g. Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010; Koster 
et al., 2012; Lazrak et al., 2013) and the first to analyse England. It is unique in 
terms of the size and spatial detail of the data set and special in its focus on the 
spatial modelling of heritage externalities. Thirdly, our difference-in-differences 
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analysis of the designation effects on property prices is one of the few studies 
that uses a quasi-experimental research design to separate the policy effect of 
designation from correlated location effects (Koster et al., 2012; Noonan & 
Krupka, 2011). Fourthly, we make use of a novel combination of RDD and DD 
approaches to identify the policy effects on outcome trends and discontinuities 
from quasi-experimental variation, which could be applied more generally to 
program evaluations. Fifthly, we provide one of the few empirical analysis of the 
determinants of heritage designation (Maskey et al., 2009; Noonan & Krupka, 
2010, 2011). More generally, we establish a novel connection between the spatial 
outcome of a political bargaining process and one of the most striking 
contemporary urban phenomena: gentrification. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces our 
theoretical model of heritage designations and the institutional setting. Section 
three presents our empirical strategy. A presentation and discussion of our 
empirical results is in section 4. The last section concludes. 
 Theory and context 
 Theoretical Framework 
We assume that a linear neighbourhood exists along a spatial dimension 𝑥 on the 
interval [0,1]. At each point along 𝑥 there exists a small zone of housing which 
may be designated as a conservation area as a whole or not.31 Housing in each 
zone is endowed with units of internal heritage according to the function ℎ(𝑥), 
described below. The aggregate of the distribution of internal heritage across all 
                                                        
 
31  The planner can either designate the whole zone or none of the zone, consistent with 
the idea of conservation areas as ensembles of buildings that work together to 
produce a desirable local character. Protection of single buildings is covered by 
listed building status. Designating a zone is assumed to approximate a marginal 
increase in the level of designation for the whole neighbourhood. Essentially the 
zone represents an infinitely small part of the whole neighbourhood. 
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zones gives the heritage character (external heritage) 𝐻 of the whole 
neighbourhood at any point in time.  
Owners in each zone care about their initial endowment of internal heritage ℎ(𝑥), 
which is under their full control, and the long run external heritage, which may 
be damaged by their neighbours’ (in all zones) property (re)developments. Such 
redevelopments occur in the long run with a probability of (1 −  𝜋) where 0 ≤
𝜋 < 1 is the ‘preservation probability’ in the absence of conservation policies. 
The effect of designating a particular zone is to increase the preservation 
probability to 1 within that zone.32 Therefore, the long-run external heritage 
depends on both the internal heritage distribution and the level of designation. 
Within the neighbourhood, the initial internal heritage monotonically decreases 
in x. The theoretical argument does not depend on the functional form. For 
simplicity we assume h(x) to be a linear function of the heritage endowment of 
the zone at the neighbourhood’s centre (ℎ0): 
ℎ(𝑥) = ℎ0(1 − 𝑥) (1) 
One way to rationalize this distribution is to assume a neighbourhood that grew 
outwards from its historical centre (at 𝑥 = 0) until the neighbourhood limit (at 
𝑥 = 1) and an internal heritage that strictly increases in the age of the housing 
unit.33  
To protect the neighbourhood heritage, a planner can choose to designate all 
zones from the historical centre up to where 𝑥 = 𝐷 and hence, a share 0 ≤ 𝐷 ≤ 1 
of the neighbourhood. Since heritage is monotonically decreasing in 𝑥 it is always 
rational to start designating at 𝑥 = 0. By affecting the preservation probability, 
the designation share 𝐷 determines the external heritage amount to be expected 
                                                        
 
32  Our argument does not depend on the assumption of full preservation probability, 
only that preservation is more likely inside conservation areas. 
33  Alternatively, x can simply be interpreted as the rank of a zone in the heritage 
distribution. 
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in the long run. The expected long-run external heritage derived from 
undesignated zones (𝑥 > 𝐷) corresponds to the integral of the distribution of 
internal heritage multiplied by the preservation probability, ∫ 𝜋ℎ(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
1
𝐷
. This is 
added to the amount derived from designated zones (𝑥 ≤ 𝐷), which is simply the 
integral of the internal heritage as the preservation probability is equal to one, 
∫ ℎ(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
𝐷
0
. 
𝐸[𝐻|𝐷] =  ∫ ℎ(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
𝐷
0
+∫ 𝜋ℎ(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
1
𝐷
 
(2) 
𝐸[𝐻|𝐷] =  ℎ0 (1 −
𝐷
2
)𝐷 +
𝜋
2
ℎ0(1 − 𝐷)
2 
(3) 
The expected external heritage integral 𝐸[𝐻|𝐷] is indicated by the whole grey-
shaded area in Figure 1 below. The expected amount of external heritage saved 
by the preservation policy is illustrated as the black-dotted area ?̌? which denotes 
the difference in (expected) external heritage between a scenario with no 
designation and a scenario with a designation share 𝐷. This amount is: 
?̌? = ℎ0(1 − 𝜋) (1 −
𝐷
2
)𝐷 
(4) 
As evident from the partial derivatives, the amount of external heritage saved by 
the policy increases with the designation share but at a decreasing rate: 
𝜕?̌?
𝜕𝐷
=
𝜕𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝜕𝐷
= ℎ0(1 − 𝐷)(1 − 𝜋) > 0 
(5) 
𝜕²?̌?
𝜕𝐷²
=
𝜕2𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝜕𝐷2
= −ℎ0(1 − 𝜋) < 1 
(6) 
The partial derivatives of ?̌? (which are the same as of 𝐻) with respect to 𝐷 
establish a central stylized fact of our theory: There are diminishing returns to 
designation. 
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Figure 1: Expected heritage distribution with partial designation 
 
 
Notes: The function ℎ(𝑥) gives the internal heritage at each zone in the neighbourhood. The expected 
external heritage is equal to the grey-shaded area and is the integral of ℎ(𝑥) up to the designation share 
plus the integral of 𝜋 times this ℎ(𝑥) from the designation share until the neighbourhood limit at 𝑥 = 1. 
The stippled area marked ?̌? is the amount of expected external heritage preserved by the policy. 
To link the distribution of heritage in the neighbourhood to the utility 𝑈 of a 
representative individual residing in a zone at 𝑥 we define a utility function:  
𝑈(𝑥) = 𝐴(𝑥)𝑋𝛿𝐿1−𝛿  (7) 
where 𝑋 is a composite consumption good and 𝐿 is housing space. The Cobb-
Douglas form is motivated by the empirical observation that housing expenditure 
shares tend to be relatively constant across geographies and population groups 
(Davis & Ortalo-Magné, 2011). 𝐴(𝑥) is a composite amenities term: 
𝐴(𝑥) = 𝑎(𝑥)𝑒𝜑ℎ(𝑥)𝑒𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]𝑒−𝑐?̃?(𝑥) (8) 
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where 𝑎 is a further composite indicator of 𝑚 non-heritage amenities,34 ℎ(𝑥) is 
the internal heritage endowment (i.e., heritage character of the specific housing 
unit), 𝜑 is the internal heritage preference parameter, 𝐸[𝐻|𝐷] is the external 
heritage (i.e., expected heritage of surrounding units, which depends on the 
designation policy) and is conditional on the designation share as defined above, 
𝛾 is the external heritage preference parameter, and 𝑐 represents the costs of 
designation policies, which arise from the development restrictions imposed 
inside conservation areas. The cost to a representative individual is 𝑒−𝑐?̃?(𝑥) and 
depends on their zone’s designation status ?̃?(𝑥), a binary function of 𝑥, which 
takes the value of one if 𝑥 ≤ 𝐷 and zero otherwise. 
We assume that the designation of a single zone approximates a marginal change 
to the designation share of the neighbourhood as a whole. The positive utility 
effect of designating a single zone is therefore given by:  
𝑑𝑈(𝑥)
𝑑𝐷
=
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝜕𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝜕𝐷
= 𝛾𝑈(𝑥)ℎ0(1 − 𝐷)(1 − 𝜋) 
(9) 
The negative utility effect is incurred only by owners within the zone that 
changes designation status and is given by: 
𝑑𝑈(𝑥)
𝑑?̃?(𝑥)
=
𝜕𝑈
𝜕?̃?(𝑥)
= −𝑐𝑈(𝑥) 
(10) 
By setting these two equal we find 𝐷∗, which is the particular zone for which the 
net effect of designation will be zero: 
𝐷∗ = 1 −
𝑐
(1 − 𝜋)𝛾ℎ0
 (11) 
                                                        
 
34  Non-heritage amenities are given by: 𝑎 = 𝑏∏ a𝑚
𝜌𝑚
𝑚  where the different amenity 
levels are denoted a𝑚 and are given a collective scaling factor 𝑏 and individual 
parameters 𝜌𝑚. 
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The relevance of 𝐷∗to the planner can be explained in a context where the 
planner wishes to satisfy as many homeowners in the neighbourhood as possible. 
Simply put, the representative individual in all zones at x<𝐷∗ will want their zone 
to be designated because the benefits to them will outweigh the costs to them. 
However, in zones at x>D* the cost of being designated outweighs the benefit for 
the representative individual. This makes D* the equilibrium designation share 
for a planner that wishes to ensure that the representative homeowner in each 
zone is happy with their zones designation status.35 
Based on this condition we can derive some useful comparative statics (see also 
Figure 1 in the Appendix). The equilibrium designation share is greater when 
people have a greater taste for external heritage 𝛾 or where there is altogether 
more heritage (determined by the heritage endowment at the neighbourhood 
centre ℎ0, and implicitly the age of the neighbourhood): 
𝜕𝐷∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0 
(12) 
𝜕𝐷∗
𝜕ℎ0
> 0 
(13) 
The equilibrium level of designation decreases with the preservation 
probability 𝜋 and the cost of designation 𝑐:  
𝜕𝐷∗
𝜕𝜋
< 0 
(14) 
𝜕𝐷∗
𝜕𝑐
< 0 
(15) 
                                                        
 
35  It should be noted again here that this is not the optimal designation share in the 
sense of social welfare. The level D* may be below the optimal level because the 
externality benefit is incident on all other zones in the neighbourhood. Further, it 
may be above the optimal level because designation reduces housing supply. 
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These theoretical implications are in line with intuition and can in principle be 
transformed into empirically testable hypotheses. However, the heritage at the 
neighbourhood centre ℎ0, the preservation probability 𝜋 and the costs to owners 
of conservation policies 𝑐 are all difficult to observe in reality. For that reason we 
will concentrate on testing the first comparative statics implication about taste 
for heritage (proxied by the education level of the local population) in the 
empirical section.  
To develop a testable hypothesis on whether the equilibrium condition is 
fulfilled, i.e., the planner sets 𝐷 = 𝐷∗, we incorporate capitalization effects in the 
next step. We first assume that individuals maximize their utility defined above 
subject to a budget constraint: 𝑊 = 𝑋 + 𝜃(𝑥)𝐿, where 𝜃(𝑥) is a housing bid rent. 
Furthermore we assume spatial equilibrium such that all zones offer the same 
level of utility ?̅? which we set equal to one: 
𝑈(𝑥) = 𝐴(𝑥)[𝛿𝑊]𝛿[(1 − 𝛿)
𝑊
𝜃
]1−𝛿 = 𝑈 = 1 
(16) 
This can be rearranged to give the spatial equilibrium bid rents for a 
representative homeowner: 
𝜃(𝑥) = (1 − 𝛿)[𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑎(𝑥)𝑒𝜑ℎ(𝑥)𝑒𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]𝑒−𝑐?̃?(𝑥)]
1
1−𝛿 
(17) 
In keeping with intuition, the bid rent increases in the expected external heritage, 
which depends on the designation share 𝐷 and the internal heritage endowment 
ℎ(𝑥) and decreases in the designation cost, which is locally constrained to 𝑥 ≤ 𝐷 
as defined above. 
The spatial equilibrium condition can be used to derive the marginal effect of an 
increase in designation share on prices in the neighbourhood. In all zones in the 
neighbourhood a marginal increase in designation share 𝐷 triggers a positive 
effect on prices through an increase in the expected external heritage. In the 
marginal zone, in addition, the change in designation status ?̃? also creates a cost.  
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𝑑𝜃(𝑥)
𝑑𝐷
=
{
 
 
 
 𝜕𝜃(𝑥)
𝜕𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝜕𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝜕𝐷
+
𝜕𝜃(𝑥)
𝜕?̃?(𝑥)
𝑑?̃?(𝑥) 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = 𝐷
𝜕𝜃(𝑥)
𝜕𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝜕𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝜕𝐷
 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≠ 𝐷
 
(18) 
Substituting in the equilibrium designation share 𝐷 = 𝐷∗ derived above we get: 
𝑑𝜃(𝑥)
𝑑𝐷
=
{
 
 
 
 𝜃(𝑥)
1 − 𝛿
[𝛾ℎ0 (1 − 1 +
𝑐
(1 − 𝜋)𝛾ℎ0
) (1 − 𝜋) − 𝑐] = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = 𝐷
𝜃(𝑥)
1 − 𝛿
[𝛾ℎ0 (1 − 1 +
𝑐
(1 − 𝜋)𝛾ℎ0
) (1 − 𝜋) − 𝑐] =
𝜃(𝑥)
1 − 𝛿
 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≠ 𝐷
 
(19) 
The two conditions directly translate into two testable hypotheses. If the 
designation process is in equilibrium, we expect the marginal effect of 
designation on house prices to be zero in newly designated zones and to be 
positive at all other zones in the neighbourhood. Likewise, an excessive or 
restrictive designation policy will be associated with negative or positive 
marginal designation effects. 
Assuming that the preservation probability (if undesignated) and the 
preservation costs are held constant our theory predicts that, in equilibrium 
designations occur as a result of an increase in the benefits associated with 
(external) heritage. Such increases in benefits will occur mechanically over time 
if the internal (and thus the external) heritage depends on housing age. The 
effective benefits will also increase as a result of neighbourhood turnover, if the 
in-migrating residents have larger heritage preferences than the incumbents. 
Designation then becomes a collateral effect of ‘gentrification’. The older the 
conservation area, the greater the accrued benefits of designation may be.  
Contrary to the assumption in our theory there is evidence suggesting that 
heritage externalities (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010; Holman & Ahlfeldt, 
2012) or housing externalities more generally (Rossi‐Hansberg et al., 2010) 
decline quite steeply in distance. This means that there may not be a strong 
positive policy effect outside a newly designated conservation or it may at least 
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be very spatially confined. Further, since our ‘zones’ are supposed to be infinitely 
small it may be that some new conservation areas represent the designation of 
several zones all in one go. For example in the case of a less than marginal change 
in the taste for heritage. In this case it would be the last zone, or the outer edge 
of the newly designated conservation area where we would expect a zero effect. 
There may be positive effects towards the centre of a conservation area (under 
the existence of spatial decay) where the internal heritage density is greater. 
Whilst we justify our simplified theory on the grounds that most conservation 
areas are small in reality even compared to the narrow scope of housing 
externalities, in the empirical section we allow for more flexibility to test these 
caveats. 
 Institutional context 
In England, the designation of conservation areas started in 1967 and continues 
today under the provisions 69 and 70 of the Planning Act 1990 (Listed Buildings 
and Conservation Areas).36 Conservation areas are those that have been 
identified as having “special architectural or historic interest, the character or 
appearance of which is desirable to preserve or to enhance” (Section 69). The 
Planning Policy Guidance Note 15 (PPG15) states that a conservation area “may 
form groups of buildings, open spaces, trees, historic street patterns, village 
greens or features of historic or archaeological interest. It is the character of the 
areas rather than individual buildings that conservation areas seek to enhance.” 
Conservation areas are designated on the grounds of local and regional criteria. 
After the designation, the Local Authority has more control over minor 
developments and the demolition of buildings (Botrill, 2005). However, the 
                                                        
 
36 However, the first legislation to protect the historic environment was enacted in 1882 
when the Ancient Monuments Protection Act was passed to protect a small number of 
designated ancient monuments. More statutory measures came into force in the 
ensuing years, but it was the passage of the Ancient Monuments Consolidation and 
Amendment Act in 1913 that set out a more comprehensive legislative framework for 
the protection of ancient monuments. 
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protection an area receives when it is designated a conservation area is 
determined at the national level to reflect the wider interests of society. 
In 2011 there were around 9,800 conservation areas in England. Conservation 
areas vary in character and size. Many have strong historical links, for example 
an architectural style associated with a certain period. Besides these 
characteristics, designation is made based on softer benefits said to have 
emanated from conservation area designation including: the creation of a unique 
sense of place-based identity, encouraging community cohesion, and promoting 
regeneration (HM Government, 2010).37 This ‘instrumentalisation’ of 
conservation policy, which seeks to encompass heritage values, economic values, 
and public policy outcomes, has been identified as a key shift in the English policy 
context (Pendlebury, 2009; Strange, 2003). This is reflective of the notion of 
heritage not as a single definable entity, but as a political, social, cultural, and 
economic “bundle of processes” (Avrami, 2000cited in Pendlebury, 2009: 7). 
In combination with bottom-up schemes leading to designation (e.g., community-
led designation), the complex heritage preservation agenda which pursues a 
multitude of objectives and the institutional setting with responsibilities shared 
across several institutional layers creates significant scope for organized interest 
groups like property owners to influence the outcome of a political bargaining 
process. 
 Empirical Strategy 
  Designation process 
The first potentially testable implications of our theoretical model are the partial 
derivatives (12) to (15). As mentioned in the theory section it is difficult to find 
feasible proxies for the variables 𝜋, 𝑐 and ℎ0. We therefore concentrate on testing 
                                                        
 
37  See for details HM Government (2010): The Government’s Statement on the Historic 
Environment for England. London: DCMS. 
CHAPTER IV 149 
 
the first of these conditions, i.e., the ‘taste’ for heritage 𝛾 has a positive effect on 
optimal designation share 𝐷∗ in a neighbourhood. We adopt the common 
assertion that the demand for urban consumption amenities increases in 
education and income (Brueckner et al., 1999; Carlino & Saiz, 2008; Glaeser & 
Gottlieb, 2006; Shapiro, 2006; van Duijn & Rouwendal, 2013). In particular, we 
assume that the preference for heritage 𝛾𝑛 in a neighbourhood 𝑛 is related to the 
share of people in the neighbourhood who hold a higher education certificate 
(𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑖)38 with the following functional form: 
𝛾𝑛𝑡 = 𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑛𝑡
𝜗𝑒−𝜀𝑛𝑡 (20) 
where 𝜗 > 0 such that the relationship is positive. The selection of DEG as 
educational proxy is driven by data availability. It is perhaps notable that 
assuming 12 [16] years of education for non-degree [degree] holders a 100% 
increase in degree share is synonymous to an additional average year of 
education in a ward with an initial degree share of 25%. Since the purpose of our 
empirical exercise is to evaluate the causal impact of changes in heritage 
preferences on designation status – and not the causal impact of education on 
heritage preference – it is sufficient to assume that 𝜗 captures a correlation 
between education and heritage preferences. 𝜀𝑛𝑡 is a random disturbance term 
capturing determinants of heritage preferences that are not correlated with 
education. Rearranging the equilibrium designation share equation (11), 
substituting the education degree proxy relationship and taking logs we arrive at 
the following empirical specification: 
log(1 − 𝐷𝑛𝑡) = 𝛼 − 𝜗 log(𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑛𝑡) − 𝜔𝑛 + 𝜀𝑛𝑡 (21) 
where 𝛼 = log(1 − 𝜋) − log(𝑐) and  𝜔𝑛 = log(ℎ0𝑛) + 𝑙𝑛. (22) 
                                                        
 
38  We also use income as a proxy for a subsample of our data set – results are reported 
in the appendix. 
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The 𝑛 subscripts correspond to the individual ‘neighbourhoods’ of our 
theoretical model and we choose to represent these empirically as UK Census 
wards. Wards are the smallest geographical areas that are comparable between 
1991 and 2011 censuses. Subscript t stands for time periods for which we use 
the Census years of 1991 and 2011. All idiosyncratic time-invariant location 
components 𝑙𝑛 (location-specific determinants of designation not modelled in 
our theory) and the unobserved heritage endowment ℎ0𝑛 of a neighbourhood 𝑛 
as captured by 𝜔𝑛 as well as the preservation probability 𝜋 and the costs to 
owners of conservation policies are removed by taking first-differences: 
∆log(1 − 𝐷𝑛) = ∆𝛼 − 𝜗 ∆log(𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑛) + ∆𝜀𝑛 (23) 
Our estimation equation now depicts that a neighbourhood change reflected in a 
positive change in (log) educational degree share causes the (logged) share of 
non-designated land on the left-hand side to decrease. This is just another way of 
saying that a positive change in educational degree leads to a higher designation 
share, although the transformation is non-linear. Note that we implicitly assume 
that we are in equilibrium in the sense that all areas that should be designated at 
𝑡 are in fact designated. To support the case, we estimate our model using a long 
difference between 1991 and 2011, which is more than two decades after the 
start of the policy and the initial wave of designations. Results for the smaller 
differences between 1991–2001, and 2001–2011 respectively, are reported in 
the appendix. 
Equation (23) evidently follows from a stylized model world. In the empirical 
implementation we add a number of covariates to control for alternative 
determinants of designation. The on-going designation is then only determined 
by the local changes in preferences and the steady aging of buildings and the 
effects on heritage, which are differentiated out. To control for the contagion 
effects in designation we add the initial (1991) designation share which we 
instrument with the share in 1981 to avoid a mechanical relationship with the 
dependent variable. A number of variables are added to account for 
heterogeneity in the net benefits of designation and abilities to express 
(collective) opinions in a political bargaining that may influence the designation 
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decision. These include the initial (1991) degree share, the homeownership rate, 
the household size, the average population age, and the share of foreigners (both 
in initial shares and changes). We alter the baseline model in a number of 
robustness checks to account for institutional heterogeneity at the TTWA level, 
neighbourhood appreciation trends and, to the extent possible, the historic and 
physical quality of the housing stock.  
In practice, however, it is difficult to control for all determinants of designation 
that are external to our model. One particular concern is that areas can be 
designated if the heritage is threatened by poor maintenance in a declining 
neighbourhood. Such derelict is likely to be negatively correlated with our 
explanatory variable and is unlikely to be fully captured by the control variables 
we have at hand. At the same time, the policy itself could make it more likely that 
educated people are attracted to designated areas due to a different valuation of 
uncertainty (reverse causality). Since an OLS estimation of equation (23) can 
result in a significant bias in either direction we make use of instrumental 
variables 𝑧𝑛, which predict changes in education, 𝜌(𝑧𝑛, ∆log𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑛) ≠ 0, but must 
be conditionally uncorrelated with the differenced error term,  𝜌(𝑧𝑛, ∆𝜀𝑛𝑡) = 0. 
We argue that rail station (in London additionally Tube station) density as well 
as effective employment accessibility (both time-invariant in levels) are good 
predictors of neighbourhood gentrification (Florida, 2002a; Glaeser et al., 
2001).39 We also argue that it is unlikely that these level variables directly impact 
on the likelihood of designation conditional on the unobserved heritage 
endowment in the fixed effects 𝜔𝑛.  
                                                        
 
39  Our measure of effective employment accessibility aggregates employment in 
surrounding regions weighted by distance. We use exponential distance weights that 
are popular in the theoretical (Fujita & Ogawa, 1982; Rossi‐Hansberg et al., 2010) 
and the decay parameter estimate provided by Ahlfeldt (2013). Transport 
infrastructure is captured by a kernel density measure (Silverman, 1986a) with a 
radius of 2 km which is considered to be the maximum distance people are willing to 
walk (Gibbons & Machin, 2005). 
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Another empirical concern is that, theoretically, a decrease in preferences for 
heritage must provoke a reduction of the designated area. The abolishment of 
conservation areas, however, is extremely rare in England so our data is left-
censored (we do not observe increases in the share of non-designated land). 
Since we are interested in testing whether the mechanisms emphasized by the 
model are at work, and not simply the causal effect of changes in degree share on 
designation share, we take the model to the data using a tobit approach: 
𝑌𝑛
∗ = ∆𝛼 − 𝜗∆log(𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑛) + ∆𝜀𝑛,       ∆𝜀𝑛~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)   (24) 
where 𝑌𝑛
∗ = ∆log(1 − 𝐷𝑛) is a latent variable and the observed variable is defined 
as follows: 
𝑌𝑛 = {
𝑌𝑛
∗, 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑛
∗ = ∆log(1 − 𝐷𝑛)  < 0 
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑛
∗                                  ≥ 0
 
(25) 
  Equilibrium designation 
To test whether the designation share in practice is set at the equilibrium level 
(D*) we employ hedonic regression (Rosen, 1974) to estimate the effect of the 
event of designation on property prices within and surrounding conservation 
areas. In its essence our quasi-experimental methods are a derivative of the 
established difference-in-differences (DD) methodology (e.g. Bertrand et al., 
2004). We draw elements of the increasingly popular regression discontinuity 
designs (RDD) (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008), however, to relax the DD assumptions 
of homogeneous trends and a singular treatment date to separate smooth 
variation (e.g., externalities) and discontinuities (e.g., conservation area 
boundaries) in treatment effects from correlated unobservables.  
Difference-in-differences 
We define a group of 912 ‘treated’ conservation areas as those that were 
designated between the years 1996 and 2010 to ensure we observe property 
transactions both before and after the designation date. Our counterfactuals are 
established via various control groups of housing units that are similar to the 
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treated units but are themselves not treated. These control groups are discussed 
in more detail in the results section and in the appendix (Section A2.2). 
Our baseline DD model takes the following form: 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
𝐼𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐸𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐼𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐸𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + X𝑖
′μ + 𝑓𝑛
+ 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(26) 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the transaction price for property 𝑖 in time 
period 𝑡, 𝐼𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation is internal to a 
treated conservation area, 𝐸𝑖 indicates observations external to the treated CA. 
While our standard models use a buffer area of 500m we also experiment with 
various alternative spatial specifications. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the transaction year t is equal to or greater than the designation year, X𝑖 
is a vector of controls for property, neighbourhood and environmental 
characteristics, 𝑓𝑛 is a set of 𝑛 location fixed effects and 𝑌𝑡 are year effects. The 
𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 and 𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 parameters give the difference-in-differences estimates of the 
designation effect on the properties within and just outside a conservation area. 
We show in Appendix 2.2 that 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is equal to the net marginal policy 
(designation costs and benefits) effect while 𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 reflects the pure (albeit 
spatially discounted) policy benefit. 
Temporal regression discontinuity design of differences (RDD-DD) 
The standard DD specification (26) identifies the policy treatment effect under 
some arguably restrictive assumptions. Firstly, the treatment and control groups 
follow the same trend before and after the treatment. Secondly, the treatment 
occurs at a singular and a priori known date and affects the level (and not the 
trend) of the outcome variable. These assumptions are evidently violated if the 
outcome variable does not respond immediately to the treatment, e.g., because of 
costly arbitrage, or in anticipation of the treatment, for example because of an 
investment motive by buyers (Ahlfeldt & Kavetsos, 2013). In our case, a positive 
pre-trend can also be associated with the gentrification that causes designation 
according to our theoretical model, a reverse causality problem.  
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To address these limitations of the standard DD we refine the model to 
accommodate differences in trends across the treatment and the control group. 
We borrow the functional form from the RDD literature where a (temporal) 
treatment effect is identified as an instant adjustment – a discontinuity – 
conditional on higher order polynomial (pre- and post-) trends, which are 
assumed to be unrelated to the treatment (Bento et al., 2010). In our regression 
discontinuity design of differences (RDD-DD) we combine an RDD-type 
polynomial specification of trends with the control group-based counterfactual 
from the DD. It is therefore possible to attribute pre- and post-trends to the 
treatment as long as it is credible to assume that treatment and control groups 
would have followed the same trend in the absence of the treatment. It is notable 
that even if this assumption is violated the RDD-DD (unlike the standard RDD) 
will at least remove macro-economic shocks from the treatment effect by taking 
differences from the control group. This improves identification so long as the 
control group remains unaffected by the treatment. Our RDD-DD with linear 
trends takes the following form: 
where 𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡  is the number of years since the designation date, with the pre-
designation years having negative values. As in the RDD, the polynomial degree 
of the trend can be increased subject to sufficient degrees of freedom. We make 
use of a quadratic trend specification and evaluate the fit of the parametric 
polynomial function using a semi-parametric version of (27) that replaces the 
𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡  variables with full sets of years-since-designation effects (details in the 
appendix). 
A significant ‘dis-in-diff’ parameter (𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 or 𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) can be entirely attributed 
to the treatment even under the existence of complex relative trends that are 
unrelated to the treatment or may even have caused the treatment as the 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
𝐼𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐼𝑌𝐷(𝐼𝑖 × 𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
𝐸𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐸𝑌𝐷(𝐸𝑖 × 𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐼𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑌𝐷(𝐼𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐸𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑌𝐷(𝐸𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡) + X𝑖
′μ
+ 𝑓𝑛 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(27) 
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comparison is made just before and just after the treatment date. Under the 
assumption of homogeneous counterfactual trends the significant pre-trend 
parameters (𝛽𝐼𝑌𝐷 or 𝛽𝐸𝑌𝐷) describe the anticipation effects. Significant post-
trend parameters (𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑌𝐷 or 𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑌𝐷) then indicate changes in relative trends 
after the treatment. In conjunction, the ‘dis-in-diff’ and the pre- and post-trend 
parameters describe the full temporal structure of the treatment effect. As a 
program evaluation tool that is applicable to a variety of event studies, the RDD-
DD thus naturally comes with a stronger test (dis-in-diff) and a weaker test 
(trends) of whether there exists an effect of the treatment. 
Spatial regression discontinuity design of difference-in-differences (RDD-DD) 
In contrast to our theory, in reality there most likely exists a spatial decay to the 
heritage externalities. This decay implies that the external heritage effect should 
be stronger at the centre of the conservation area than at the boundaries. The 
policy benefit, which is a transformation of the external heritage effect, should 
also be greater at the centre of the newly designated conservation area. Likewise, 
the predicted positive policy effects just outside the boundary should be decaying 
in distance to the conservation area (CA) boundary. At the CA boundary there 
may be a discontinuity as the cost of the policy ends abruptly at the boundary, 
whereas potential externalities decay smoothly across it. The combination of 
trends and discontinuities potentially caused by the treatment resembles the 
temporal identification problem just described and will be addressed by a similar 
combination of RDD and DD tools. Essentially, we use the RDD tools to capture 
how the difference (before and after) in the differences (treatment vs. control) of 
property prices varies along the (internal and external) distances from the CA 
boundary. Unlike in the standard (spatial) RDD, unobserved time-invariant 
spatial effects can be held constant due to the availability of spatiotemporal 
variation.40 In our spatial RDD-DD model it is therefore possible to attribute 
spatial trends (with respect to distance to the CA boundary) as well as a 
                                                        
 
40  Dachis, Duranton, & Turner (2012) also make use of spatiotemporal variation in 
their RDD. Our specification additionally takes differences from a control group. 
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discontinuity (at the CA boundary) to the treatment provided that the spatial 
trends are uncorrelated with unobserved temporal trends.  
The spatial RDD-DD we estimate takes the following form:41 
where 𝐷𝑖  is the distance from the property to the conservation area boundary 
(internal distances are negative values), 𝑂𝑖 indicates properties outside a treated 
conservation area and 𝑇𝑖 indicates the conservation area that is nearest to a 
property that is treated at any point of the study period. In order to fully explore 
the extent of spatial externalities 𝑂𝑖 indicates a larger area outside CAs42 rather 
than just within 500m as indicated by 𝐸𝑖 in previous models. As with the temporal 
RDD-DD specification we also estimate an expanded model specification in which 
we allow for quadratic distance trends and semi-nonparametric specifications 
replacing the distance variable with some distance bin effects. 
The coefficient 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 gives the intercept of the internal effect (i.e., the internal 
effect at the boundary) and 𝛽𝐼𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 estimates how this changes with respect to 
internal distance. Jointly, these terms capture the net policy costs and benefits of 
designation for internal treated areas. A zero 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 coefficient would be 
reflective of a zero effect at the boundary and would be in line with the optimality 
condition derived in the theory section. A negative 𝛽𝐼𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 would be in line with 
the existence of policy benefits (due to increased preservation probability) that 
                                                        
 
41  In models with historical CAs as control groups the following terms are also included 
𝛽𝐶𝐷(𝐶𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖) + 𝛽
𝐸𝐶𝐸𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐸𝐶𝐷(𝐸𝐶𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖), where 𝐶𝑖 indicates internal to control CA 
and 𝐸𝐶𝑖 external to control CA. This ensures that spatial effects are estimated 
conditional on the spatial trends in control CA. 
42  Specifically, the empirical analysis uses properties within 1,400m of the treated 
conservation area.  
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
𝐼𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐼𝐷(𝑇𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖) + 𝛽
𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑇𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽𝐼𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑇𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽
𝑂𝐷(𝑂𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖)
+ 𝛽𝑂𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑂𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
𝑂𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑂𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + X𝑖
′μ
+ 𝑓𝑛 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(28) 
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spillover with decay. The parameters 𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 and 𝛽𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 allow for a spatial 
discontinuity treatment effect at the boundary and heterogeneity in spatial 
trends inside and outside the treated areas. As with 𝛽𝐼𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, a jointly negative 
𝛽𝐼𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 would be in line with the decaying policy benefits external to 
the conservation area. The discontinuity at the border is measured by the 
external intercept term 𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡. A statistically positive estimate would indicate a 
cost to the policy. A jointly positive effect of 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 would in turn indicate 
the existence of policy benefits.  
 Data 
We have compiled two distinct data sets for the two stages of the empirical 
analysis. Both data sets make use of data provided by English Heritage. These 
include a precise GIS map of 8,167 conservation areas in England, the 
Conservation Areas Survey containing information on community support and 
risk status (average condition, vulnerability and trajectory of a conservation) and 
a complete register of listed buildings. 
For the analysis of the determinants of designation we use UK census wards as a 
unit of analysis. Shares of designated land within each Census ward are computed 
in a Geographical Information Systems (GIS) environment. Various ward level 
data on educational level, age, ethnical background, average household size and 
homeownership status and vacancy rate were obtained from the UK Census. Any 
changes in ward boundaries between the years were corrected for using the 
online conversion tool GeoConvert.43 For robustness tests we also collected a 
measure of the ward’s average income (Experian). The instrumental variables 
station density and employment potential are regenerated data that stem from 
Nomis (workplace employment) and the Ordinance Survey (rail stations). The 
average turnover in housing is approximated as the number of properties 
                                                        
 
43  http://geoconvert.mimas.ac.uk/ 
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transacted per year in a ward as recorded in the Nationwide Building Society data 
set (see below). 
For the analysis of the capitalization effects of designation we use transactions 
data related to mortgages granted by the Nationwide Building Society (NBS) 
between 1995 and 2010. The data for England comprise 1,088,446 observations 
and include the price paid for individual housing units along with detailed 
property characteristics. These characteristics include floor space (m²), the type 
of property (detached, semi-detached, flat, bungalow or terraced), the date of 
construction, the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, garage or parking 
facilities and the type of heating. There is also some buyer information including 
the type of mortgage (freehold or leasehold) and whether they are a first-time 
buyer. Importantly, the transaction data includes the full UK postcode of the 
property sold allowing it to be assigned to grid-reference coordinates.  
With this information it is possible within GIS to calculate distances to 
conservation area borders and to determine whether the property lies inside or 
outside of these borders. Furthermore, it is possible to calculate distances and 
other spatial measures (e.g., densities) for the amenities and environmental 
characteristics such as National Parks, as well as natural features like lakes, rivers 
and coastline. The postcode reference also allows a merger of transactions and 
various household characteristics (median income and ethnic composition) from 
the UK census, natural land cover and land use, various amenities such as access 
to employment opportunities, cultural and entertainment establishments and 
school quality. A more detailed description of all the data used is in the appendix. 
 Results 
  Designation process 
Table 1 reports the results of our tobit model of the designation process defined 
in equation (24). The non-instrumented baseline model is in column (1). As 
predicted by our theory, increases in educational levels that are presumably 
correlated with heritage preferences are associated with reductions in the share 
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of non-designated land. More precisely, an increase in the degree share by 1% is 
associated with a 0.12% reduction in the share of non-designated land. This 
decrease corresponds to an 0.12% × (1 − ?̅?𝑡−1)/?̅?𝑡−1 = 2.61% increase in the 
share of designated land for a ward with the mean of the positive initial 
designation shares ?̅?𝑡−1 = 4.4%. The effect substantially increases once we 
instrument the change in degree share using rail station density and employment 
potential (column 2). This increase is in line with unobserved (positive) 
deterioration trends that a) increase the likelihood of designation and b) are 
negatively correlated with changes in degree share. Introducing the instruments, 
the effect of a 1% increase in degree share on the share of non-designated land 
increases to 0.88%, which for a ward with the mean initial designation share ?̅?𝑡−1 
corresponds to an increase in the designated land share of about 19%. While we 
have argued that our estimates are supposed to reflect a causal estimate of 
gentrification (proxied by degree shares) on designation probabilities and not 
necessarily a causal effect of degree share on designation share, a parameter 
estimate of ?̂? = 0.88 is at least indicative of heritage preferences increasing 
relatively steeply in education.  It is notable that increases in the share of 
designated land are also positively correlated with high initial levels of degree 
shares. 
The remaining columns in Table 1 provide variations of the benchmark model 
(2). We add TTWA effects to control for unobserved institutional heterogeneity 
in column (3). Column (4) adds several conservation area characteristics that 
capture historic quality (e.g. number of listed buildings), risk (e.g. various 
measures capturing vulnerability and trajectory) and development pressure (e.g. 
vacancy rate). The latter includes a measure of property price appreciation, 
which we obtain from ward-level regressions of log property prices on a time 
trend (and property controls, see the appendix for details). With this variable we 
control for a potentially positive correlation between owners’ risk aversion and 
the value of their properties – typically their largest assets. This is a potentially 
important control since a larger risk aversion increases the benefit from a policy 
that increases certainty regarding the future of the neighbourhood and, thus, 
potentially increases the optimal designation share. It is a demanding control 
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since positive price trends are potentially endogenous to changes in 
neighbourhood composition and may thus absorb some of the gentrification 
effect on designation. Specification (5) replicates the benchmark model on a 
reduced sample of predominantly residential to ensure that the results are not 
driven by commercial agents, which we don’t model in our theory.44  None of 
these model alterations changes the education effect substantially. Model (6) 
tests for an interaction effect between homeownership rate and degree share. We 
find that the (positive) impact of neighbourhood change on designations shares 
(interaction term) is particularly large in high homeownership areas (see column 
6). This is in line with a political economy literature that suggests that 
homeowners tend to form well-organized interest groups (e.g. Brunner & 
Sonstelie, 2003; Dehring et al., 2008; Fischel, 2001a). 
The results in Table 1 offer some further interesting insights on potential 
determinants of designation. We do not find evidence in support of contagion 
effects in designation, i.e., designated land shares do not tend to increase where 
shares were initially high. The likelihood of designation rises with ward 
population age, which could be related to a higher appreciation of heritage by the 
elderly. The likelihood declines in the share of foreigners, which, likewise, could 
reflect a lower appreciation among people with different cultural backgrounds. 
An alternative and potentially complementary explanation may be a lack of 
familiarity with the institutional context and, thus, a difficulty to `game the 
system’. 
                                                        
 
44 In the results reported we drop wards with more workers than inhabitants, which 
amount to about 7.4% of the total sample. The results do not change qualitatively 
even if we drop the top quintile according to the same metric. 
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Table 1: Designation process 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit 
 Δ log share non designated land (t) 
Δ log degree share (t) (𝜗) -0.112*** 
(0.022) 
-0.875*** 
(0.105) 
-0.754*** 
(0.136) 
-0.794*** 
(0.100) 
-0.874*** 
(0.100) 
-0.871*** 
(0.103) 
log degree share (t-1) -0.116*** 
(0.012) 
-0.426*** 
(0.043) 
-0.401*** 
(0.060) 
-0.394*** 
(0.042) 
-0.438*** 
(0.042) 
-0.403*** 
(0.041) 
log designation share (t-1) -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
Δ log homeownership (t) 0.207*** 
(0.034) 
0.618*** 
(0.067) 
0.563*** 
(0.082) 
0.582*** 
(0.073) 
0.658*** 
(0.070) 
0.530*** 
(0.061) 
log homeownership (t-1) 0.134*** 
(0.020) 
0.195*** 
(0.023) 
0.208*** 
(0.026) 
0.220*** 
(0.029) 
0.238*** 
(0.027) 
0.588*** 
(0.065) 
Δ log average household size (t) 0.037 
(0.050) 
-0.336*** 
(0.074) 
-0.205** 
(0.082) 
-0.346*** 
(0.076) 
-0.454*** 
(0.086) 
-0.121 
(0.074) 
log average household size (t-1) -0.027 
(0.058) 
-0.304*** 
(0.074) 
-0.289*** 
(0.082) 
-0.376*** 
(0.077) 
-0.229*** 
(0.078) 
-0.353*** 
(0.076) 
Δ log pop age (t) -0.014 
(0.068) 
-0.277*** 
(0.081) 
-0.214** 
(0.084) 
-0.332*** 
(0.091) 
-0.477*** 
(0.100) 
-0.078 
(0.084) 
log pop age (t-1) -0.109*** 
(0.055) 
-0.252*** 
(0.062) 
-0.275*** 
(0.068) 
-0.288*** 
(0.074) 
-0.232*** 
(0.066) 
-0.263*** 
(0.063) 
Δ log share of foreigners (t) 0.004 
(0.011) 
0.075*** 
(0.015) 
0.066*** 
(0.017) 
0.074*** 
(0.015) 
0.071*** 
(0.015) 
0.051*** 
(0.014) 
log of share of foreigners (t-1) -0.003 
(0.007) 
0.079*** 
(0.013) 
0.051*** 
(0.016) 
0.079*** 
(0.013) 
0.083*** 
(0.013) 
0.071*** 
(0.012) 
log price trend  
 
 
 
 
 
0.017 
(0.022) 
 
 
 
 
Δ log vacancy rate (t)  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
  
 
log vacancy rate (t-1)  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
  
 
log turnover in housing    -0.007 
(0.006) 
  
log listed buildings density  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
  
 
log of share of building from 
pre1945 
   -0.021*** 
(0.006) 
  
average condition score  
(1 best, 4 worst) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.069*** 
(0.020) 
  
 
average vulnerability score  
(1 low, 8 high) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.052*** 
(0.019) 
  
 
average trajectory score  
(-2 improving, +2 deteriorating) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.037 
(0.038) 
  
 
Δ log degree share (t)  
x homeownership (t-1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
-0.953*** 
(0.138) 
Constant 0.490** 
(0.235) 
1.470*** 
(0.286) 
1.565*** 
(0.323) 
1.801*** 
(0.360) 
1.351*** 
(0.300) 
1.724*** 
(0.299) 
TTWA Effects NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Residential wards only NO NO NO NO YES NO 
CHI2  328.334 617.186 491.909 312.116 332.841 
EXOG_P  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OVERID  0.001 . 0.435 5.805 0.242 
OVERIDP  0.981 . 0.509 0.016 0.623 
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7965 7379 7965 
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. IVs are station density, employment potential and 
degree share in 1981 in all models except model (1). Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
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Further robustness 
While our IVs comfortably pass the typical statistical tests, we have experimented 
with four alternative sets of IVs. We have also split up the 1991–2011 long 
difference into two shorter differences (1991–2001 and 2001–2011), used the 
change in income as a proxy for heritage preferences (for 2001–2011) and run 
the baseline model in OLS keeping only observations with positive changes in 
shares of designated land. The results are presented in the technical appendix 
and support those discussed here. 
  Equilibrium designation 
Difference-in-differences 
Table 1 shows the results from an estimation of the standard DD equation (26) 
for different selections of control groups and fixed effects. Each model includes 
controls for property, location, and neighbourhood characteristics, year effects 
and location fixed effects to hold unobserved time-invariant effects constant. 
Column (1) is a naive DD using the mean price trend of all properties located 
beyond 500m of a treated conservation area as a counterfactual. Columns (2) to 
(7) provide more credible counterfactuals by restricting the control group to 
properties that are presumably similar to the treated properties. Column (2), 
with ward fixed effects, and (3), with nearest CA fixed effects, provide a spatial 
matching by restricting the sample to properties within 2km of a treated CA, 
where many unobserved location characteristics are likely to be similar. In 
column (4) we impose the additional restriction that properties in the control 
group must fall within 500m of the boundaries of a historically designated 
conservation area (before 1996), which increases the likelihood of unobserved 
property characteristics being similar. While areas that are designated at any 
point in time are likely to share many similarities, the diminishing returns to 
designation in our theoretical framework also imply that heritage-richer areas 
should generally be designated first. To evaluate whether the designation date of 
the treated conservation areas, relative to those on the control group, influences 
the DD estimate, we define CA designated 1996–2002 as a treatment group and 
form control groups based on CAs designated just before (1987–1994) or right 
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after (2003–2010) in columns (5) and (6). In column (7), finally, we use 
environmental, property and neighbourhood characteristics to estimate the 
propensity of being in a treated (1996–2010) CA over a historical (<1996) CA. 
Then the treated CAs are matched to their ‘nearest-neighbour’, i.e., the most 
similar non-treated CA, based on the estimated propensity score (Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1983). A fixed effect is defined for each treated CA and its nearest-
neighbour control CA such that the treatment effect is estimated by the direct 
comparison between the treated CA and its nearest-neighbour. 
We anticipate that the strength of the counterfactual increases as we match the 
treatment and control group based on proximity (2 & 3), proximity and 
qualifying for designation (4, 5, & 6) and qualifying for designation and a 
combination of various observable characteristics (7). As the credibility of the 
counterfactual increases, the statistical significance of the treatment effect tends 
to decrease. Benchmarked against the nationwide property price trend both the 
internal effect (Inside × Post) and the external effect (Within 500m × Post) are 
significant at the 5% level. The magnitudes of these effects are of similar size, 
implying a 2.8% premium for houses inside newly designated conservation areas 
and a 2.3% premium outside. The spatial matching (2 & 3) renders the internal 
treatment effect insignificant (2 & 3). With further refinements in the matching 
procedure the external effect also becomes insignificant. Table 2 results, thus, 
suggest that designation does not lead to significant property price adjustments. 
Evidence is weak for positive (policy) spillovers to nearby areas. 
 Table 2: Conservation area premium – designation effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 log property transaction price 
Inside treated CA × Post 
designation 
0.028*** 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.024 
(0.070) 
-0.077 
(0.111) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
Within 500m buffer of 
treated CA × Post des. 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.027) 
-0.005 
(0.022) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
Inside treated CA -0.043*** 
(0.009) 
-0.038*** 
(0.009) 
-0.048*** 
(0.010) 
-0.037*** 
(0.012) 
-0.062 
(0.057) 
0.029 
(0.108) 
-0.024 
(0.021) 
Within 500m buffer of 
treated CA 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.030) 
0.006 
(0.023) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighbourhood cont. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ward effects YES YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Nearest treat. CA effects NO NO YES YES YES YES NO 
Matched CA effects NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Treatment group:  
CAs designated 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-2010 1996-2002 1996-2002 1996-
2010 
Control group Full 
England 
sample 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of CA 
designated 
before 
1996 & 
within 2km 
of treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of 
CA 
designated 
1987-1995 
& within 
4km of 
treated CA  
Within 
500m of 
CA 
designated 
2003-2010 
& within 
4km of 
treated CA 
Within 
500m of 
pre-
1996 CA 
matched 
on 
propensi
ty score 
R² 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.915 0.861 0.864 0.909 
AIC -587,375 -
156,426 
-
130,469 
-67,046 -5,408 -8,475 -41,184 
Observation 1,088k 302k 302k 178k 21k 32k 133k 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on location fixed effects. Conservation area control groups in 
columns (4)-(7) have separate fixed effects for the areas inside and outside a conservation area. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
Temporal RDD-DD 
Table 3 illustrates the results of the estimation of the (temporal) RDD-DD 
outlined in equation (27). We present the results of a variety of models that 
feature linear (1–5) and quadratic (6–10) trends and several of the control 
groups utilized in Table 2 One important finding across these specifications is 
that the external (Within 500m × Post) ‘dis-in-diff’ parameter estimate is 
significant in four of 10 specifications at the 5% level and in one half of the 
specifications at the 10% level, whereas, the internal (Inside × Post) parameter 
is only significant in one specification at the 10% level (column 8). This suggests 
primarily that there exists a significant treatment effect exactly at the treatment 
date only for the external area. This interpretation is in line with the predictions 
of our theoretical model. Another finding illustrated by Table 3 is the positive 
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change in the internal price trend after a CA has been designated (Inside treated 
CA × Post designation × Years designated). The change in trend, which is 
significant at the 5% level in seven of the 10 models, may be regarded as evidence 
for a cumulative internal effect of the designation policy. There is also a faster 
appreciation in the external area post-designation that is significant in four of the 
10 models. In short, the temporal RDD-DD has confirmed that designation policy 
causes no immediate effect inside the conservation area but shows instead that 
it increases the speed of price appreciation over time. The RDD-DD has also 
uncovered that areas external to the conservation area receive an immediate 
shift in prices at the designation date in line with our theoretical hypothesis.  
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the predicted effect of being in the 
treatment group over the control group against years-since-designation. A 
horizontal red line is drawn at the mean of the pre-treatment effects in order to 
illustrate the differences between the RDD-DD results and those of the standard 
DD. The positive impact of designation on (relative) price trends suggested by 
the RDD-DD (black lines) is supported by the functionally more flexible semi-
parametric estimates for the ‘years-since-designation bins’ (grey dots).45 
However, the post-treatment effects are never statistically distinguished from 
the pre-period mean, which is in line with the DD estimates. 
Figure 3 provides an analogical illustration for the external treatment effect, i.e., 
the spillovers onto areas adjacent to the designated CAs. Again, the post-period 
estimates do not deviate significantly from the pre-period mean. However, the 
top-left panel illustrates a large discontinuity at the treatment date that is 
statistically significant in Table 3. As with the internal effects, there is a positive 
trend shift post-designation.  
                                                        
 
45  Confidence bands for the semi-parametric ‘bins’ model are presented in the 
appendix. 
 Table 3: Regression discontinuity design of differences between treatment and control (RDD-DD) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 log property transaction price 
Inside treated CA × Post designation 0.015 
(0.015) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
0.024 
(0.015) 
0.027 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
0.023 
(0.023) 
0.033 
(0.021) 
0.038* 
(0.023) 
0.036 
(0.024) 
0.020 
(0.024) 
Within 500m buffer of treated CA  
× Post designation 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.020** 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.012) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.022** 
(0.009) 
0.017 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
Inside treated CA × Years designated 0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.016* 
(0.009) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
-0.020* 
(0.011) 
Inside treated CA × Years designated²  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
Inside treated CA × Post designation  
× Years designated 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.020 
(0.014) 
0.026** 
(0.012) 
0.032** 
(0.013) 
0.031** 
(0.013) 
0.031** 
(0.014) 
Inside treated CA × Post Designation  
× Years designated² 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Within 500m of treated CA  
× Years designated 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
Within 500m of treated CA  
× Years designated² 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Within 500m of treated CA  
× Post designation ×Years des. 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.010) 
Within 500m of treated CA  
× Post designation × Years des.² 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighbourhood controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ward effects YES YES NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO 
Nearest treated CA effects NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES YES NO 
Matched CA effects NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Control group as in Tab. 2, column (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) 
R² 0.920 0.921 0.912 0.914 0.907 0.920 0.921 0.912 0.914 0.907 
AIC -547,688 -147,818 -120,160 -64,425 -39,321 -548,078 -147,839 -120,191 -64,467 -39,329 
Observations 995k 277k 277k 164k 123k 995k 277k 277k 164k 123k 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the location fixed effects. Conservation area control groups in columns (4) -(7) have separate fixed effects for the areas 
inside and outside a conservation area. Observations dropped if years designated falls outside of range -10 years:+10 years. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 2: RDD-DD internal estimates 
Nearest treated CA (linear trends)  
Tab.3, column (4) 
 
Matched CA (linear trends) 
Tab. 3, column (5) 
 
Nearest treated CA (quadratic trends)  
Tab. 3, column (9) 
 
Matched CA (quadratic trends) 
Tab. 3, column (10) 
 
Note:  The solid lines are graphical illustrations of the parametric estimates presented in appendix 
Table 3 and estimated using equation (27). The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI which are 
calculated using standard errors of multiplicative interaction terms presented by Aiken and West 
(1991). The grey dots plot the point estimates of ‘years-since-designation bins’ effects obtained 
from separate regression described and presented in more detail in the appendix. The horizontal 
red line illustrates the mean of the pre-treatment estimates. 
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Figure 3: RDD-DD external estimates 
Pre-1996 CA within 2km (linear trends)  
Tab. 3, column (4) 
 
Matched pre-1996 CA (linear trends)  
Tab. 3, column (5) 
 
Pre-1996 CA within 2km (quadratic trends) 
Tab. 3, column (9) 
 
Matched pre-1996 CA (quadratic trends)  
Tab. 3, column (10) 
 
Notes:  The solid lines are graphical illustrations of the parametric estimates presented in Table 3 and 
estimated using equation (27). The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI which are calculated using 
standard errors of multiplicative interaction terms presented Aiken and West (1991). The grey 
dots plot the point estimates of ‘years-since-designation bins’ effects obtained from separate 
regression described and presented in more detail in the appendix. The horizontal red line 
illustrates the mean of the pre-treatment estimates. 
Spatial RDD-DD 
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of the (spatial) RDD-DD model 
outlined in equation (28). As with the temporal RDD-DD, we present the results 
of a variety of models that feature linear (1–5) and quadratic (6–10) trends and 
several of the control groups utilized in Table 2. One interesting and consistent 
feature of Table 4 is that the positive discontinuity coefficient (Outside × Post) 
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matches the expected (positive) sign under the existence of a policy cost inside. 
However, the parameter is statistically insignificant in all models.  
We have argued that the model predictions for capitalization effects under 
equilibrium designation policy and a spatial decay in heritage externalities hold 
at the conservation area boundary, i.e., we expect a zero effect just inside and a 
positive effect just outside the boundary. Figure 4 illustrates the joint effect of the 
parametric estimates reported in Table 4 at varying (internal and external) 
distances from the CA boundary. With the control group of historical CAs within 
2km of the treatment CA (left panels) we find a positive capitalization effect just 
inside and outside the boundary, which is in line with the baseline DD result in 
Table 2, column (4). Moreover, the treatment effect increases toward the centre 
for the CA and decreases in external distance to the boundary until it becomes 
zero at around 700m. This distance is in line with existing evidence on a relatively 
steep decay in heritage and housing externalities (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010; 
Lazrak et al., 2013; Rossi‐Hansberg et al., 2010). However, the effect is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero at almost all distances. The single 
exception is a significant (at 5% level) 1.6% effect just outside the CA in the 
quadratic model. While the effect is only significant within 100m of the CA, this is 
precisely where we expect a positive effect in a world with spatial decay in 
heritage (housing) externalities. In the context of the model the lower and not 
statistically significant effect just inside the CA indicates the presence of a cost 
that compensates for some of the benefits associated with designation.  
With the control group of matched CAs (right panels) the treatment effect just 
inside the CA boundary is remarkably close to zero. The joint effect just outside 
the boundary is positive, although not statistically significant. Briefly 
summarized, the spatial RDD-DD model suggests that across the treated CAs 
owners – at least on average – are not harmed by designation. There is some 
evidence that owners just outside a conservation area receive some benefit.  
  
Table 4: Spatial regression discontinuity design of difference-in-differences (RDD-DD) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 log property transaction price 
Within 1400m of treated CA × 
Post designation 
0.027*** 
(0.010) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
-0.005 
(0.015) 
Within 1400m of treated CA × 
Distance to boundary x Post des. 
-0.057 
(0.081) 
-0.032 
(0.075) 
-0.030 
(0.080) 
-0.029 
(0.077) 
-0.070 
(0.068) 
-0.096 
(0.156) 
-0.046 
(0.154) 
-0.040 
(0.162) 
-0.040 
(0.157) 
-0.118 
(0.143) 
Within 1400m of treated CA × 
Distance to boundary² × Post des. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.059 
(0.132) 
-0.017 
(0.131) 
-0.018 
(0.140) 
-0.017 
(0.136) 
-0.099 
(0.130) 
Outside treated CA × Post 
designation 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
Outside treated CA × Distance to 
boundary × Post des. 
0.039 
(0.081) 
0.016 
(0.075) 
0.013 
(0.080) 
0.011 
(0.078) 
0.046 
(0.069) 
0.064 
(0.157) 
0.014 
(0.155) 
0.013 
(0.163) 
0.004 
(0.159) 
0.080 
(0.145) 
Outside treated CA × Distance to 
boundary² × Post des. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.070 
(0.133) 
0.028 
(0.132) 
0.025 
(0.140) 
0.029 
(0.136) 
0.109 
(0.130) 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighbourhood controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ward effects YES YES NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO 
Nearest treated CA effects NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES YES NO 
Matched CA effects NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Control group Full 
England 
sample 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
1.4km of 
CA 
designate
d before 
1996 & 
within 
2km of 
treated CA 
Within 
1.4km of 
pre-
1996 CA 
matched 
on 
propensi
ty score 
Full 
England 
sample 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
1.4km of 
CA 
designate
d before 
1996 & 
within 
2km of 
treated CA 
Within 
1.4km of 
pre-
1996 CA 
matched 
on 
propensi
ty score 
R² 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.914 0.905 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.914 0.921 
AIC -587,538 -156,448 -130,478 -118,076 -101,076 -587,533 -156,444 -130,478 -118,074 -587,538 
Observation 1088k 302k 302k 281k 327k 1088k 302k 302k 281k 327k 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the location fixed effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 4: RDD-DD spatial treatment effects 
Pre-1996 CA within 2km (linear trends)  
Table 4, column (4) 
 
Matched pre-1996 CA (linear trends)  
Table 4, column (5) 
 
Pre-1996 CA within 2km (quadratic trends)  
Table 4, column (9) 
 
Matched pre-1996 CA (quadratic trends)  
Table 4, column (10) 
 
Notes:  The solid lines are graphical illustrations of the parametric estimates presented in Table 4 and 
estimated using equation (28). The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI which are calculated using 
standard errors of multiplicative interaction terms presented by Aiken and West (1991). 
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 Conclusion 
Historic preservation policies are among the most restrictive planning policies 
used to overcome coordination problems in the housing market internationally. 
These policies aim at increasing social welfare at the cost of constraining 
individual property rights. From the perspective of owners of properties in 
conservation areas, the policy may help to solve a collective action problem, 
preventing owners from freeriding on the heritage character of nearby buildings 
while inappropriately altering their own property. If property owners value the 
heritage character of nearby buildings and can influence the designation process 
they will seek out a (local) level of designation where the marginal costs of 
designation equate the marginal benefits. An increase in the marginal benefit of 
designation will lead to an increase in designation activity. If the planner acts on 
behalf of the local owners, additional designations in a neighbourhood will not 
lead to an adverse impact on those being designated.  
We provide evidence that is supportive of this scenario using two empirical 
approaches that follow from a simple model of equilibrium conservation area 
designation. First, we present a neighbourhood level IV tobit analysis that reveals 
a positive impact of an increase in degree share, which is presumably (positively) 
correlated with heritage preferences, on the share of designated land. 
Gentrification, by increasing the value of neighbourhood stability to local owners, 
can cause designation. Second, we combine the strengths of difference-in-
differences (DD) and regression discontinuity designs (RDD) to estimate the 
capitalization effect of designation on newly designated areas as well as 
spillovers to adjacent areas. This RDD-DD methodology qualifies more generally 
as a useful tool for program evaluations where a treatment is suspected to lead 
to an impact on (spatial or temporal) trends and discontinuities. Within newly 
designated conservation areas we find no significant short-run effects of 
designation and some evidence for positive capitalization effects in the long run. 
There is some evidence for positive spillovers onto properties just outside. 
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These results suggest that the policy is either deliberately adhering to the 
interests of local owners or, as suggested in the literature on the political 
economy of housing markets, homeowners are able to successfully influence the 
outcome of local policies in their interest. It is therefore unlikely that the policy 
is welfare enhancing on a wider geographic scale. Depending on the general 
restrictiveness of the planning system, historic preservation may constrain 
housing supply and generate welfare losses. The net-welfare effect to a wider 
housing market area is an interesting and important question that we leave to 
future research. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV 
 Introduction 
This appendix complements the main paper and is not designed to stand alone or 
as a replacement. Section 2 provides an illustration of how a planner determines 
the designation share and adds to the theory section of the main paper. Section 3 
complements the empirical strategy section of the main paper by providing a 
more detailed discussion of the control variables in tobit designation process 
models. The section also links the reduced form difference-in-differences 
parameters to the marginal policy effect in the theoretical model. Section 4 
provides a detailed overview of the data we use, its sources, and how they are 
processed. Finally, section 5 complements the empirical results section of the 
main paper by showing the results of a variety of robustness tests and model 
alterations not reported in the main paper for brevity. 
 Theory and context 
  Theoretical Framework 
This section briefly illustrates how a planner determines the designation share. 
The political equilibrium between the social marginal benefits (MB) of 
designation (equation 9 in the main paper) and the marginal costs (MC) (equation 
10) is depicted by Figure 1. At point A the designation share D adheres to local 
homeowner interests. The representative homeowner in each zone along x is 
happy with the designation status of their zone. However this is not a welfare 
maximizing equilibrium since a further extension would benefit all owners in 
zones to the left of A and to the right of B as they would profit from increasing the 
expected heritage in the neighborhood without experiencing a change in 
marginal cost. In zones between A and B, however, the social marginal benefit 
would also increase, but the increase would not compensate for the private 
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marginal costs associated with a change in the designation status from 
undesignated to designated. 
If there is, for instance, a change in preferences and residents develop a greater 
taste for external heritage 𝛾 their marginal benefits curve shifts to the right. The 
planner adapts to this situation and raises the designation share to set marginal 
benefits equal to marginal costs again. This new equilibrium is illustrated by 
point B where the designation share increases to D’. 
Figure 1: Designation equilibrium 
 
 Empirical strategy 
  Designation process – control variables 
This section provides a detailed description and motivation of the control 
variables we use to account for the determinants of conservation area 
designation that are unrelated to the mechanisms modeled in our theory. In 
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particular we try to control for composition effects, neighborhood sorting, 
heterogeneity in terms of homeownership, and whether the heritage in a 
neighborhood is at particular risk.  
We add the initial period (1991) degree share for two reasons. First, we assume 
that the highly educated derive higher (net-)benefits from neighborhood 
heritage. To the extent that this group is capable of more efficiently articulating 
their will in a political bargaining a higher degree share will make the designation 
more likely. It is important to control for the initial degree share since levels and 
changes may be correlated in either direction. On the one hand there may be 
catch-up growth in the degree share of less educated regions, i.e., mean reversion. 
On the other hand, people with degrees may be more likely to move to areas with 
an already high share of people with degrees, which would imply a self-
reinforcing process leading to spatial segregation.  
We also include a control for the extent of designation in the initial period (1991). 
The share of designated land area in the total ward area would be (positively) 
correlated with the change in the designation share if designations spark further 
designations as in a contagion model. Initial designation also helps to control for 
the possibility that the skilled may be attracted to areas with a lot of designated 
land. To avoid a mechanic relationship between the dependent variable and the 
lagged designation share we instrument designation in the initial period (1991) 
by its lagged value, i.e. the designation share in 1981. 
Another set of controls is driven by the interest in homeowners within the 
designation process. Homeowners experience extra benefits/costs from 
designation since, unlike renters, they are not compensated for changes in 
neighborhood quality by increases in degrees or rents. Homeowners, thus have 
additional incentives to engage in political bargaining. Similar to the other 
controls, homeownership status enters in lagged levels and differences. In a final 
specification we also add an interaction of the logged change in degree with 
homeownership (rescaled to a zero mean to make coefficients comparable). We 
use average household size (both in differences and lagged levels) to control for 
the presumption that larger households are more likely to lobby against 
designation and the resulting constraint on available floor space. We control for 
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further neighborhood characteristics by including average population age and 
the share of foreigners inside a ward (also both in differences and lagged levels). 
We expect older residents to appreciate heritage stronger making it more likely 
that they lobby for designation. Conversely, a high share of foreigners is expected 
to be negatively correlated with designation. Foreigners, on average, might not 
know the planning system that well and perhaps find it more difficult to form 
interest groups. Moreover, they might value English heritage differently due to 
their cultural background. 
A larger risk aversion increases the benefit from a policy that increases certainty 
regarding the future of the neighborhood and, thus, potentially increases the 
optimal designation share. To control for a potentially positive correlation 
between owners’ risk aversion and the value of their properties – typically their 
largest assets – we add a measure of neighborhood appreciation. We generate 
ward-level property price trends in n separate auxiliary regressions of the 
following type: 
where X is a vector of property and neighborhood characteristics and T is a linear 
time trend. To avoid a reverse effect of designation on the property price trend 
we only consider transactions that occur outside conservation areas.  
A second set of controls deals with potential development risk. Areas that 
experience development pressure or are in poor and/or declining condition may 
be more likely to be designated in order to protect against the threats to the 
heritage character of the neighborhood. We use the vacancy rate, a density 
measure of listed buildings, housing turnover, the share of pre-1945 buildings as 
well as score measures for a conservation area’s condition, vulnerability and 
trajectory provided by English Heritage to capture development pressure. We 
expect that neighborhoods with few vacancies will be put under higher 
development pressure. Vacancies enter the specification both in differences and 
lagged levels. The reason for the differenced term is that a change in development 
pressure is likely to lead to a change in designation status as a result. We argue 
that the lagged level may also capture changes (not just levels) in development 
log(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑛) = 𝛼𝑛 + 𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑏𝑛 + 𝛽𝑛𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑛 (1) 
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pressure. This is because of external factors and conditions (i.e., population 
growth) that effect areas unevenly depending on their level in certain attributes 
(e.g., vacant housing). It seems likely that general population growth would put 
greater development pressure on neighborhoods with lower vacancy rates. By 
using the total number of houses sold between 1995 and 2010 we introduce an 
alternative measure of development pressure. The share of houses built before 
1945 serves as an indicator of potential heritage. If we are not in a steady state, 
building age could affect the change in designation share. The score measures 
reflect the development risk inside a conservation area and come from a survey 
provided by English Heritage. The higher the condition score, the worse the 
heritage conditions. A higher vulnerability as well as a higher trajectory are also 
indicated by higher scores. Except for the score variables, all control variables 
enter our empirical specification in logs. 
While taking first-differences of the empirical specification will remove all time-
invariant ward-specific effects that might impact on the level of designation 
(including the heritage itself), it will not help if there are location-specific effects 
that impact on the changes in designation status. For example, if there is 
heterogeneity across Local Authorities (LAs) about how difficult or easy it is to 
designate arising from different bureaucratic practices then this would affect 
changes in designation for all wards within a particular LA. We therefore estimate 
a fixed effects specification for the 166 English Travel To Work Areas (TTWAs). 
The TTWAs are designed to approximate city regions which can be described as 
somehow self-contained economic areas from a job market perspective. By 
applying a TTWA fixed effect model we are therefore able to control for socio-
economic heterogeneity across TTWAs.  
  Difference-in-differences 
This section motivates the difference-in-differences approach for the estimation 
of the marginal policy effect. Firstly, we illustrate how the policy and heritage 
effects are difficult to disentangle in a simple cross-sectional hedonic estimation. 
Secondly, we lay out how the difference-in-differences treatment effect is used to 
estimate the marginal policy effect laid out in terms of the structural parameters 
of our model.  
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Cross-sectional hedonics 
Taking logs of the spatial equilibrium price equation (17) from the main paper 
gives:46 
The following heritage and policy effects determine the bid rent: 
Consider the cross-sectional reduced form equation: 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the transaction price for property 𝑖 in time 
period 𝑡, 𝐼𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation is internal to a 
treated conservation area, X𝑖 is a vector of controls for property, neighborhood, 
and environmental characteristics, 𝑓𝑛 is a set of 𝑛 location fixed effects and 𝑌𝑡 are 
year effects. The coefficient ℵ on the 𝐶𝐴𝑖  dummy identifies the policy cost 
associated with the location of a property inside a conservation area ?̃?(𝑥) = 1. 
The policy cost should have a negative effect on logged house prices. The 
coefficient also partly identifies the internal heritage effect. Specifically, it 
identifies the value of the difference between the mean internal heritage inside 
conservation areas and the mean internal heritage outside conservation areas 
(i.e. 𝜑/(1 − 𝛿)(ℎ𝐶𝐴𝑖=1
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − ℎ𝐶𝐴𝑖=0
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )). This should be positive because the 
                                                        
 
46 Where 𝜏 is a constant and equal to: ln(1 − 𝛿) +
𝛿
1−𝛿
ln 𝛿 +
1
1−𝛿
ln𝑊. 
ln 𝜃(𝑥) = 𝜏 +
1
1 − 𝛿
ln 𝑎(𝑥) +
𝜑ℎ(𝑥)
1 − 𝛿
+
𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
1 − 𝛿
−
𝑐?̃?(𝑥)
1 − 𝛿
 
(2) 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
𝑐?̃?(𝑥)
1 − 𝛿
 
(3) 
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =
𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
1 − 𝛿
 
(4) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 =
𝜑ℎ(𝑥)
1 − 𝛿
 
(5) 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = ℵ𝐼𝑖 + X𝑖
′μ + 𝑓𝑛 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (6) 
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policymaker would normally designate areas that have the most heritage. Finally, 
under the existence of some spatial decay in externalities, it will also identify the 
value of the difference inside and outside conservation areas in the external 
heritage effect (i.e., 𝛾(1 − 𝛿)(𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]𝐶𝐴𝑖=1
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]𝐶𝐴𝑖=0
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )). This is a function of 
internal heritage and will therefore also be positive. 
The coefficient ℵ thus reflects a composite effect of policy costs, policy benefits, 
and correlated internal heritage effect. Furthermore, in reality the actual 
distribution of internal heritage is unknown and there is likely a spatial decay to 
externalities, further complicating the estimate.47 In practice, ℵ will also be 
affected by unobserved neighborhood characteristics that are correlated with the 
distance to the conservation area. A positive ℵ parameter, at best, tells us only 
that the overall higher levels of heritage (internal and external) combined with 
the policy benefits of conservation outweigh the policy costs. This does not 
provide a comprehensive evaluation of the policy effect itself. To try and 
disentangle these effects we implement a different empirical approach. 
Difference-in-differences 
Using the difference-in-differences (DD) approach to estimate the marginal effect 
of a change in designation status offers an improved identification.  
Our empirical difference-in-differences specification is equation (26) from the 
main paper:  
Table 1 illustrates the conditional mean prices (after controlling for time effects) 
for the treatment and control group in the pre- and post-treatment periods. It is 
                                                        
 
47 In a general case the estimate would be equal to: 
ℵ =
𝜑
1 − 𝛿
(ℎ𝐶𝐴𝑖=1
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − ℎ𝐶𝐴𝑖=0
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) +
𝛾
1 − 𝛿
(𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]𝐶𝐴𝑖=1
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]𝐶𝐴𝑖=0
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) +
𝑐
1 − 𝛿
 
 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
𝐼𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐸𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐼𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐸𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + X𝑖
′μ + 𝑓𝑛
+ 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(7) 
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important to note that the year fixed effects 𝑌𝑡 capture the general development 
of price over time. Without this feature it would be necessary to control for the 
overall growth in price between the pre- and post-treatment periods via the 
inclusion of a non-interacted version of 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 . 
Table 1: Treatment effect 
Conditional mean of prices Pre Post 
Treated (Internal) ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝛽𝐼 ?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝛽𝐼 + 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡  
Control ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛 = 0 ?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑛 = 0 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = (?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 − ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡) − (?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛 − ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = ([𝛽𝐼 + 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡] − [𝛽𝐼]) − ([0] − [0]) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡  
Notes: The conditional mean of prices in the treatment group in the pre-period is denoted ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡. This 
represents the log of prices conditional on fixed and year effects (𝑓𝑛 + 𝑌𝑡) and controls X𝑖. The same 
notation is used for the other groups. 
Our treatment coefficient 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 essentially differentiates across the treatment 
and control groups before and after designation and is, thus defined as follows: 
Let’s assume that the relationship between the observed conditional mean and 
the theoretical bid rent is given by:  
where 𝑢𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 are partially unobservable factors specific to properties in the 
Treated-Post cell. The same relationship applies for the other cells (Treated-Pre, 
Control-Post and Control-Pre). At the heart of our identification strategy we 
assume that the price trends unrelated to the policy are the same within the 
treatment and the control group. The typical identifying assumption on which the 
difference-in-differences identification strategy relies can be expressed as 
follows: 
The credibility of the counterfactual rests on the likelihood that the treatment 
group, in the absence of the intervention, would have followed a trend that is 
𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 = (?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 − ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡) − (?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑛 − ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛) (8) 
?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝜃𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝑢𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 (9) 
(𝑢𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 − 𝑢𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡) =  (𝑢𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑛 − 𝑢𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛) (10) 
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similar to that of the control group. An appropriate definition of the control group 
is therefore a critical element of the identification strategy. We therefore consider 
a number of different control groups in which we try to reduce the potential 
heterogeneity between properties in the treatment and control group.  
The first treatment group is a spatial match where we choose the observations 
that fall within a 2km buffer surrounding conservation areas that changed 
designation status during the observation period (1995–2010). As an alternative, 
we consider a number of matching procedures that rest on the idea that 
properties inside conservation areas generally share similarities. Properties in 
conservation areas that did not change designation status therefore potentially 
qualify as a control group. To make the areas in the treatment and control group 
more similar, we select conservation areas based on similarities with those in our 
treatment group (Rosenbaum & Ruben, 1983). For the matching procedure we 
only make use of variables that turn out to have significant impact in the auxiliary 
propensity score matching regression.48 We use a nearest neighbor matching 
procedure, which produces a broader and a narrower group. 
Under the assumptions made it is straightforward to demonstrate that the DD 
treatment coefficient gives the pure policy effect we are interested in. Combining 
the theoretical bid rent of equation (17) from the main paper with the definition 
of ?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 in appendix equation (9) gives the conditional mean price of (treated) 
properties inside newly designated conservation areas before (pre) and after 
(post) designation can be expressed as follows49: 
                                                        
 
48 A list of significant controls in propensity score matching regressions is included in 
the next subsection. 
49 Where the theoretical locations 𝑥 have been replaced by observed housing 
transactions 𝑖. 
?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝜏 +
1
1 − 𝛿
ln 𝑎𝑖 +
𝜑ℎ𝑖
1 − 𝛿
+
𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
1 − 𝛿
+ 𝑢𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 
 
(11) 
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where a new designation is represented as an increase in designation share 𝐷. 
For a control group sufficiently far away to not be exposed to the heritage 
externality we similarly get: 
where there is (by definition) no new designation. Given the common trend 
assumption of equation (10), 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 identifies the pure net policy effect of 
designation: 
In the empirical implementation of the DD strategy we also consider alternative 
treatment groups that consist of properties just outside conservation areas, 
which are potentially exposed to spillovers, but not to the cost of designation. The 
interpretation of the external treatment coefficient can be derived analogically 
where designation leads to benefits but without the associated costs: 
Under the common trends assumption the treatment coefficient reflects the pure 
policy benefit associated with the reduction in uncertainty as predicted by the 
stylized theory: 
?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝜏 +
1
1 − 𝛿
ln 𝑎𝑖 +
𝜑ℎ𝑖
1 − 𝛿
+
𝛾
1 − 𝛿
(𝐸[𝐻|𝐷] +
𝑑𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝑑𝐷
) −
𝑐?̃?𝑖
1 − 𝛿
+ 𝑢𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 
(12) 
?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛 = 𝜏 +
1
1 − 𝛿
ln 𝑎𝑖 +
𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
1 − 𝛿
+ 𝑢𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛 
(13) 
?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑛 = 𝜏 +
1
1 − 𝛿
ln 𝑎𝑖 +
𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
1 − 𝛿
+ 𝑢𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑛  
(14) 
𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
𝛾
1 − 𝛿
𝑑𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝑑𝐷
−
𝑐?̃?(𝑥)
1 − 𝛿
 
(15) 
?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝜏 +
1
1 − 𝛿
ln 𝑎𝑖 +
𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
1 − 𝛿
+ 𝑢𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 
(16) 
?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝜏 +
1
1 − 𝛿
ln 𝑎𝑖 +
𝛾
1 − 𝛿
(𝐸[𝐻|𝐷] +
𝑑𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝑑𝐷
) + 𝑢𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 
(17) 
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Propensity score matching regression 
In order to determine the control group for the difference-in-differences 
specification a propensity score matching approach was employed. We used a 
stepwise elimination approach in order to determine which variables have a 
significant impact on propensity score. With a significance level criterion of 10% 
the following variables remained in the final CA propensity score estimation: 
CA characteristics: Urban, Commercial, Residential, Industrial, World Heritage 
Site, At Risk and Article 4 Status. 
Environmental characteristics: Land Cover Type 9 (Inland bare ground), Land 
Cover Type 3 (Mountains, moors and heathland), distance to nearest National 
Nature Reserve, distance to nearest National Park, National Park (kernel density) 
and Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (kernel density).  
Neighbourhood characteristics: Median Income and Ethnicity Herfindahl index 
Amenities: Distance to nearest Bar, distance to nearest Underground Station, 
distance to nearest Hospital, distance to nearest Motorway and distance to 
nearest TTWA centroid. 
Semi-parametric temporal and spatial estimations of treatment effects 
We estimate a semi-parametric version of (27) that replaces the 𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡  variables 
with a full set of years-since-designation bins. We group transactions into bins 
depending on the number of years that have passed since the conservation area 
they fall into or are near to had been designated. Negative values indicate years 
prior to designation. These bins (b) are captured by a set of dummy variables 𝑃𝑇𝑏: 
𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
𝛾
1 − 𝛿
𝑑𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝑑𝐷
 
(18) 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 =∑𝛽𝑏
𝐼(𝑃𝑇𝑖
𝑏 × 𝐼𝑖)
𝑏
+∑𝛽𝑏
𝐸(𝑃𝑇𝑖
𝑏 × 𝐸𝑖)
𝑏
+∑𝛽𝑏𝑃𝑇𝑖
𝑏
𝑏
+ X𝑖
′μ + 𝑓𝑛 + 𝑌𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(19) 
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The parameters 𝛽𝑏
𝐼  and 𝛽𝑏
𝐸  give the difference in prices between treatment and 
control groups in each years-since-designation bin 𝑏. The results of this semi-
parametric estimation are plotted in Figure 2 in Appendix 5.2. In order to allow 
for a casual inspection of the fit of the parametric models the semi-parametric 
point-estimates are also plotted in Figure 2 (internal) and Figure 3 (external) of 
the main paper. 
As with the temporal models, we relax the parametric constraints of the spatial 
estimations by replacing the distance variable in equation (28) with distance 
bins: 
where 𝐷𝐵𝑖
𝑑 are positive (external) and negative (internal) distance bins from the 
designation area boundary and 𝛽𝑑
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 are 𝑑 treatment effect parameters at 
different distances inside and outside the conservation area. If the planner 
designates according to local homeowner interests then the bin that corresponds 
to the locations just inside the treated conservation area should indicate a zero 
treatment effect. This may or may not be associated with a positive effect for the 
bins deepest inside the conservation area. Furthermore, if there are significant 
externalities associated with the designation (and heritage in general) then the 
bins just outside the boundary should indicate a positive effect. A lower effect for 
further out bins would indicate a spatial decay to this externality. The results 
from this specification are presented Figure 3 0in Appendix 5.2 and in Figure 4 of 
the main paper. 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 =∑𝛽𝑑 (𝐷𝐵𝑖
𝑑 × 𝑇𝑖)
𝑑
+∑𝛽𝑑
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐷𝐵𝑖
𝑑 × 𝑇𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡)
𝑑
+ X𝑖
′μ + 𝑓𝑛 + 𝑌𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(20) 
  Data 
 Data sources 
Housing transactions 
The transactions data relates to mortgages for properties granted by the 
Nationwide Building Society (NBS) between 1995 and 2010. The data for England 
comprise 1,088,446 observations and include the price paid for individual 
housing units along with detailed property characteristics. These characteristics 
include floor space (m²), the type of property (detached, semi-detached, flat, 
bungalow or terraced), the date of construction, the number of bedrooms and 
bathrooms, garage or parking facilities and the type of heating. There is also some 
buyer information including the type of mortgage (freehold or leasehold) and 
whether they are a first-time buyer. 
Importantly, the transaction data includes the full UK postcode of the property 
sold allowing it to be assigned to grid-reference coordinates. With this 
information it is possible within a Geographical Information Systems (GIS) 
environment to calculate distances to conservation area borders and to 
determine whether the property lies inside or outside these borders. 
Furthermore it is possible to calculate distances and other spatial measures (e.g., 
densities) for the amenities and environmental characteristics that will be used 
as control variables. Since the data set refers to postcodes rather than individual 
properties, it is not possible, however, to analyze repeated sales of the same 
property. This is a limitation shared with most property transaction data sets 
available in England, including the land registry data. 
Neighborhood characteristics 
The main variables used for estimating capitalization effects of neighborhood 
characteristics are median income and ethnic composition. The income data is a 
model-based estimate of median household income produced by Experian for 
Super Output Areas of the lower level (LSOA). This is assigned to the transaction 
data based on postcode. The data on ethnicity was made available by the 2001 
UK Census at the level of Output Area (OA). Shares of each of the 16 ethnic groups 
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and a Herfindahl index50 were computed to capture the ethnic composition of 
neighborhoods. 
Environmental variables 
The environmental variables capture the amenity value of environmental 
designations, features of the natural environment, different types of land cover 
and different types of land use.  
Geographical data (in the form of ESRI shapefiles) for UK National Parks, Areas of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty, and National Nature Reserves are available from 
Natural England. National Parks and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty are 
protected areas of countryside designated because of their significant landscape 
value. National Nature Reserves are “established to protect sensitive features and 
to provide ‘outdoor laboratories’ for research” (National England website). 
Straight line distances to these designations were computed for the housing units 
as geographically located by their postcodes. Furthermore, density measures that 
take into account both the distance to and the size of the features were created. 
We apply a kernel density measure (Silverman, 1986b) with a radius of 2km 
which is considered to be the maximum distance people are willing to walk 
(Gibbons & Machin, 2005). 
The location of lakes, rivers and coastline are available from the GB Ordinance 
Survey. The distance to these features is also computed for the housing units from 
the transaction data. The UK Land Cover Map produced by the Centre for Ecology 
and Hydrology describes land coverage by 26 categories as identified by satellite 
images. We follow Mourato et al. (2010) who construct nine broad land cover 
types from the 26 categories. Shares of each of these nine categories in 1km grid 
squares are calculated and the housing units take on the value of the grid square 
in which they reside. 
                                                        
 
50 The Herfindahl index (𝐻𝐼) is calculated according to the following relation: 𝐻𝐼 =
∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , where 𝑠𝑖 is the share of ethnicity 𝑖 in the LSOA, and N is the total number of 
ethnicities. 
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The generalized Land Use Database (GLUD) available from the Department for 
Communities and Local Government gives area shares of nine different types of 
land use within Super Output Areas, lower level (LSOA). These nine land use 
types are domestic buildings, non-domestic buildings, roads, paths, rail, domestic 
gardens, green space, water, and other land use. These shares are assigned to the 
housing units based on the LSOA in which they are located. 
Amenities 
The locational amenities variables capture the benefits a location offers in terms 
of accessibility, employment opportunities, schools quality, and the proximity of 
cultural and entertainment establishments. 
Employment accessibility is captured both by the distance to Travel to Work Area 
(TTWA) centroid and a measure of employment potentiality. TTWAs are defined 
such that 75 per cent of employees who work in the area also live within that 
area. Thus they represent independent employment zones and the distance to the 
center of these zones is a proxy for accessibility to employment locations. A more 
complex measure of accessibility is the employment potentiality index (Ahlfeldt, 
2011b).51 This is computed at the Super Output Area, lower level (LSOA) and 
represents an average of employment in neighboring LSOAs weighted by their 
distance. 
Key Stage 2 (ages 7–11) assessment scores are available from the Department for 
Education at the Super Output Area, middle layer (MSOA). School quality is thus 
captured at the housing unit level by computing a distance-weighted average of 
the KS2 scores of nearby MSOA centroids.52 
                                                        
 
51 Further detail on the construction of the employment potentiality measure is 
provided in section 4.2. 
52 This is calculated as an Inverse Distance Weighting (IDW) with a threshold distance 
of 5km and a  
power of 2. 
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Geographical data on the locations of motorways, roads, airports, rail stations and 
rail tracks are available from the GB Ordinance Survey. Distances were computed 
from housing units to motorways, A-roads, B-roads and rail stations to capture 
accessibility. Buffer zones were created around the motorways and roads along 
with distance calculations to rail tracks and airports in order to capture the 
disamenity noise effects of transport infrastructure. 
Further data on local amenities were taken from the Ordinance Survey (police 
stations, places of worship, hospitals, leisure/sports centers) and OpenStreetMap 
(cafés, restaurants/fast food outlets, museums, nightclubs, bars/pubs, 
theaters/cinemas, kindergartens and monuments, memorials, monuments, 
castles, attractions, artwork). The number of listed buildings was provided by 
English Heritage. Kernel densities for these amenities were computed for housing 
units using a kernel radius of 2km and a quadratic kernel function (Silverman, 
1986b). The radius of 2km is consistent with amenities having a significant effect 
on property prices only when they are within walking distance. 
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Table 2: Variable description 
Dependent Variable  
 
Price Per square meter transaction price in British pounds of the 
corresponding floor space (expressed as natural logarithm). 
Transaction data from the Nationwide Building Society (NBS). 
Independent 
Variables 
 
 
CA Effects Dummy variables denoting property transactions taking place 
within the boundaries of an currently existing conservation area, in 
a conservation area at the time when designated or where the 
designation date is unknown as well as various buffer areas 
surrounding current or treated conservation areas. 
 
Fixed Effect Control Travel to Work Areas, nearest conservation area catchment areas 
and interactives with year effects. 
 
Housing information Set of property variables from the NBS including: Number of 
bedrooms, number of bathrooms, floor size (in square meter), new 
property (dummy), building age (years), tenure 
(leasehold/freehold), central heating (full: gas, electric, oil, solid 
fuel), central heating (partial: gas, electric, oil, solid fuel), garage 
(single or double), parking space, property type (detached, semi-
detached, terraced, bungalow, flat-maisonette). 
 
Neighborhood 
information 
Set of neighborhood variables including: media income (2005, LSOA 
level), share of white population at total population (2001 census, 
output area level), share of mixed population at total population 
(2001 census, output area level), share of black population at total 
population (2001 census, output area level), share of Asian 
population at total population (2001 census, output area level), 
share of Chinese population at total population (2001 census, 
output area level), Herfindahl of ethnic segregation (including 
population shares of White British, White Irish, White others, Mixed 
Caribbean, Mixed Asian, Mixed Black, Mixed other, Asian Indian, 
Asian Pakistani, Asian others, Black Caribbean, Black African, Black 
other, Chinese, Chinese other population, 2001 census output area). 
 
Conservation area 
Characteristics 
Set of characteristic variables for conservation areas from English 
Heritage including: Conservation area land use (dummy variables 
for residential, commercial, industrial or mixed land use), 
conservation area type (dummy variable for urban, suburban or 
rural type), conservation area size (dummy for areas larger than 
mean of 128,432.04 square meters), conservation area (square 
meter), conservation area has an Article 4 Direction implemented 
(dummy), oldness of conservation area (dummy for areas older than 
mean of 1981), conservation area at risk (dummy), conservation 
area with community support (dummy), conservation area is World 
Heritage Site (dummy). 
 
Environment 
Characteristics and 
Amenities 
Set of locational variables processed in GIS including: National 
Parks (distance to, density), Areas of Outstanding Beauty (distance 
to, density), Natural Nature Reserves (distance to, density), distance 
to nearest lake, distance to nearest river, distance to nearest 
coastline, land in 1km square: Marine and coastal margins; 
freshwater, wetland and flood plains; mountains, moors and 
heathland; semi-natural grassland; enclosed farmland; coniferous 
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  Further notes on data methods 
Employment potentiality 
The employment potentiality index is computed at the Super Output Area, lower 
level (LSOA) and represents an average of employment in neighboring LSOAs 
weighted by their distances. Employment potentiality is calculated for each 
Lower Layer Super Output Area 𝑖 (LSOA) based on employment in all other LSOAs 
𝑗 using the following equation: 
where 𝑑 measures the straight line distance converted into travel time assuming 
an overall average speed of 25km/h (Department for Transport, 2009) and 
Employment the absolute number of workers in the respective LSOA. The 
indicator is weighted by a decay parameter of a = -0.073 estimated by Ahlfeldt 
(in press). Internal distances are calculated as: 
woodland; broad-leaved/mixed woodland; urban; inland bare 
ground. 
 
Other amenities Set of locational variables created in GIS including: Average key 
stage 2 test score (MSOA averages as well as interpolated in GIS), 
distance to electricity transmission lines, A-Roads (distance to, 
buffer dummy variables within 170m), B-Roads (distance to, buffer 
dummy variable within 85m), motorway (distance to, buffer dummy 
variable within 315m; buffer distances refer to the distance were 
noise of maximum speed drops drown to 50 decibel), distance to all 
railway stations, distance to London Underground stations, distance 
to railway tracks, distance to bus stations, distance to airports, 
densities of cafés, restaurants/fast food places, museums, 
nightclubs, bars/pubs, theaters/cinemas, kindergartens, 
monuments (memorial, monument, castles, attraction, artwork), 
hospitals, sports/leisure centers, police stations and worship 
locations, distance to Travel to Work Areas, employment 
potentiality (based on Travel to Work Areas with an time decay 
parameter of 0.073). 
 
Neighborhood 
Distance Controls 
Set of neighborhood distance dummy variables created in GIS 
including: Distances outside conservation area border (up to 50m, 
100m, 150m, 200m, 250m, 300m, 350m, 400m, 1km, 2km and 3km), 
distances inside conservation area border (up to 50m, 100m, 150m, 
200m). 
EPi =∑Eje
−a dij
j
, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 (21) 
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Kernel densities for National Parks, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty and 
National Nature Reserves 
The kernel density is a measure that takes into account both the proximity and 
the size of NPs, AONBs and NNRs. Every 100x100m piece of designated area is 
assigned a point and the density of these resulting points calculated for 10km 
kernels and a quadratic kernel function (Silverman, 1986, p. 76, equation 4.5) 
around each housing unit using a kernel density method. The result is similar to 
calculating a share of NP area within a circle, the one difference being that the 
points are additionally weighted by distance to the housing units according to a 
normal distribution.  
Buffers for motorways and roads 
The buffer sizes for the different roads are as follows: B-Road (85m), A-Road 
(170m) and Motorway (315m). These distances are calculated based on how far 
it is expected that the noise from traffic travelling at the speed limit of the 
respective roads (Steven, 2005) would decline to an assumed disamenity 
threshold level of noise of 50db (Nelson, 2008). 
Land cover map Broad Categories 
Table 3: Land Cover Broad categories as defined by Mourato et al. (2010) 
1 Marine and coastal margins 
2 Freshwater, wetlands, and flood plains 
3 Mountains, moors, and heathland 
4 Semi-natural grasslands 
5 Enclosed farmland 
6 Coniferous woodland 
7 Broad-leaved/mixed woodland 
8 Urban 
9 Inland bare ground 
 
dii =
1
3
√
Areai
π
 
(22) 
  Results 
  Designation process 
In order to test our theoretical implication that changes in heritage preferences 
lead to changes in designation we estimate the regression model as outlined in 
section 3.1. The prediction of the model is that positive changes in heritage 
preferences should lead to negative changes in the share of non-designated land 
in a neighborhood. OLS regression results are reported in Table 4. We drop all 
zeros and identify the effect based on the sample of observations with observable 
changes in conservation area shares. The standard OLS estimates without (1) and 
with a basic set of composition controls (2) are insignificant. Due to the potential 
sources of bias in OLS discussed in the main paper (section 3.1) we re-estimate 
the two models using our instrumental variables. The 2SLS estimates (3) and (4) 
are in line with the tobit results reported in the main paper and support the 
theory that a positive change in degree share leads to higher designation. 
 Table 4: Designation regressions: OLS/2SLS models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log degree share (t) -0.016 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
-0.602*** 
(0.096) 
-0.871*** 
(0.247) 
log degree share (t-1)  
 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
 
 
-0.379*** 
(0.105) 
log designation share 
(t-1) 
 
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.006* 
(0.004) 
Δ log homeownership 
(t) 
 
 
0.041 
(0.032) 
 
 
0.492*** 
(0.140) 
log homeownership (t-
1) 
 
 
0.011 
(0.023) 
 
 
0.056 
(0.036) 
Δ log average 
household size (t) 
 
 
0.140 
(0.107) 
 
 
-0.483** 
(0.193) 
log average household 
size (t-1) 
 
 
0.209*** 
(0.032) 
 
 
-0.107 
(0.125) 
log pop age (t-1)  0.126*** 
(0.041) 
 -0.025 
(0.103) 
Δ pop age (t)  0.183*** 
(0.047) 
 -0.222 
(0.164) 
log foreigner share (t-
1) 
 -0.019*** 
(0.007) 
 0.083*** 
(0.031) 
Δ foreigner share (t)  0.004 
(0.007) 
 0.068*** 
(0.026) 
Constant -0.040*** 
(0.011) 
-0.782*** 
(0.169) 
0.361*** 
(0.066) 
0.299 
(0.497) 
IV NO NO YES YES 
Controls NO YES NO YES 
R² 0.001 0.047 -0.733 -0.445 
F 1.516 15.628 38.934 5.724 
AIC -871.268 -925.893 -1.359 -268.685 
OVERID . . 2.936 2.103 
OVERIDP . . 0.087 0.147 
Observations 1580 1580 1580 1580 
     
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. IVs are station density, 
employment potential and the degree share in 1981. Standard errors in parentheses and 
clustered on fixed effects. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
Table 5 reports the first stage results to the second-stage results reported in 
Table 1 in the main paper. IVs are (conditionally) positively correlated with the 
change in degree share, and initial designation share respectively. 
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Table 5: Standard IV models – First stage regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Δ log 
degree 
share (t) 
Δ log 
degree 
share (t) 
Δ log 
degree 
share (t) 
Δ log 
degree 
share (t) 
Δ log 
degree 
share(t) x 
homeown
er (t-1) 
log 
designat
ion 
share 
(t) 
rail station density 0.098*** 
(0.026) 
0.100*** 
(0.024) 
0.070*** 
(0.019) 
0.102*** 
(0.020) 
0.021*** 
(0.006) 
-0.033 
(0.208) 
employment 
potentiality 
2.14E-8*** 
(0.000) 
2.08E-8*** 
(0.000) 
2.85E-8*** 
(0.000) 
2.97E-8*** 
(0.000) 
1.46E-9 
(0.000) 
7.54E-8  
(0.000) 
predicted Δ log degree 
share (t) x 
homeownership (t-1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.481*** 
(0.024) 
 
log degree share (t-1) 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.415*** 
(0.011) 
 
 
0.828*** 
(0.019) 
log designation share 
(t-2) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
-0.020 
(0.015) 
-0.021*** 
(0.008) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.025*** 
(0.008) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Δ log homeownership 
(t) 
0.527*** 
(0.063) 
0.540*** 
(0.062) 
0.636*** 
(0.074) 
0.596*** 
(0.078) 
-0.007 
(0.030) 
-0.707*** 
(0.181) 
log homeownership (t-
1) 
0.145*** 
(0.030) 
0.174*** 
(0.033) 
0.228*** 
(0.045) 
0.183*** 
(0.041) 
0.213*** 
(0.019) 
-0.536*** 
(0.131) 
Δ log average hh. size 
(t) 
-0.445*** 
(0.076) 
-0.400*** 
(0.067) 
-0.495*** 
(0.079) 
-0.529*** 
(0.089) 
0.162* 
(0.068) 
-0.153 
(0.286) 
log average hh. size  
(t-1) 
-0.235*** 
(0.070) 
-0.277*** 
(0.069) 
-0.250** 
(0.086) 
-0.091 
(0.095) 
-0.006 
(0.045) 
-1.318** 
(0.442) 
log pop age (t-1) -0.087 
(0.052) 
-0.040 
(0.055) 
-0.289*** 
(0.072) 
0.001 
(0.059) 
0.008 
(0.033) 
0.584 
(0.335) 
Δ pop age (t) -0.321*** 
(0.086) 
-0.256*** 
(0.068) 
-0.490*** 
(0.095) 
-0.552*** 
(0.079) 
0.155*** 
(0.042) 
0.216 
(0.356) 
log foreigner share (t-
1) 
0.080*** 
(0.008) 
0.083*** 
(0.009) 
0.079*** 
(0.009) 
0.076*** 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
0.053 
(0.045) 
Δ foreigner share (t) 0.091*** 
(0.019) 
0.087*** 
(0.016) 
0.093*** 
(0.020) 
0.077*** 
(0.016) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.009 
(0.068) 
Log price trend   0.001 
(0.028) 
   
Δ log vacancy rate (t)  
 
 
 
0.037** 
(0.012) 
  
 
 
 
log vacancy rate (t-1)  
 
 
 
0.070*** 
(0.013) 
  
 
 
 
Log listed buildings  
 
 
 
0.008 
(0.004) 
  
 
 
 
log turnover in housing 
transactions (t) 
 
 
 
 
-0.016** 
(0.006) 
   
log of share of building 
from pre1945 
 
 
 
 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
   
average condition score 
(1 best, 4 worst) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
average vulnerability 
score (1 low, 8 high) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
average trajectory 
score (-2 improving, +2 
deteriorating) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Constant 0.687** 
(0.233) 
0.537* 
(0.219) 
1.457*** 
(0.342) 
0.242 
(0.309) 
0.052 
(0.171) 
-0.739 
(1.446) 
       
 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV 200 
 
Table 5 (continued)       
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FE NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Price Trend NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Housing Cond. NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Residential wards NO NO NO YES NO NO 
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7379 7965 7965 
F 592.006 . 339.162 508.799 . 1852.756 
R² 0.708 0.742 0.719 0.709 0.960 0.717 
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. IVs are station density, employment potential 
and the degree share in t-2 all models. Model (3) includes a dummy variable indicating 60 wards for which no 
price trend could be computed due to insufficient transactions. We derive the instrument (predicted Δ log 
degree share (t) x homeownership (t-1)) for the interaction term in model (5) by interacting homeownership 
(t-1) with the predicted values of an auxiliary regression where we regress Δ log degree share on the 
exogenous variables, i.e. on the standard IVs and controls. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on 
fixed effects. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
We have tried four alternative IV models which are based on the benchmark 
model, i.e., including the set of controls (Table 1, column 2 in the main paper). The 
coefficient estimates reported in Table 6 remain qualitatively similar and 
quantitatively close to the main model. First stage results are reported in 
appendix Table 7. The alternative instruments, again, pass the validity tests. Only 
the overidentification test is failed by specification (1) using employment 
potentiality and museum density as instruments. 
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Table 6: Alternative IV models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log degree share (t) -0.828*** 
(0.113) 
-0.860*** 
(0.115) 
-0.845*** 
(0.111) 
-0.875*** 
(0.117) 
log degree share (t-1) -0.408*** 
(0.047) 
-0.421*** 
(0.047) 
-0.415*** 
(0.046) 
-0.427*** 
(0.048) 
log designation share 
(t-1) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Δ log homeownership 
(t) 
0.594*** 
(0.070) 
0.612*** 
(0.071) 
0.604*** 
(0.070) 
0.610*** 
(0.071) 
log homeownership 
(t-1) 
0.194*** 
(0.023) 
0.196*** 
(0.023) 
0.194*** 
(0.023) 
0.197*** 
(0.023) 
Δ log average 
household size (t) 
-0.313*** 
(0.077) 
-0.329*** 
(0.078) 
-0.324*** 
(0.077) 
-0.334*** 
(0.078) 
log average 
household size (t-1) 
-0.281*** 
(0.075) 
-0.295*** 
(0.076) 
-0.289*** 
(0.075) 
-0.299*** 
(0.076) 
log pop age (t-1) -0.240*** 
(0.062) 
-0.246*** 
(0.062) 
-0.243*** 
(0.062) 
-0.246*** 
(0.062) 
Δ pop age (t) -0.270*** 
(0.083) 
-0.280*** 
(0.083) 
-0.277*** 
(0.082) 
-0.273*** 
(0.082) 
log foreigner share  
(t-1) 
0.074*** 
(0.014) 
0.077*** 
(0.014) 
0.075*** 
(0.014) 
0.078*** 
(0.014) 
Δ foreigner share (t) 0.070*** 
(0.016) 
0.073*** 
(0.016) 
0.072*** 
(0.016) 
0.075*** 
(0.016) 
Constant 1.394*** 
(0.289) 
1.436*** 
(0.291) 
1.419*** 
(0.289) 
1.438*** 
(0.291) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
IV YES YES YES YES 
Observations  7965 7965 7965 7968 
CHI2 319.851 318.289 321.092 316.186 
EXOG_P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OVERID 2.289 0.084 0.500 0.233 
OVERIDP 0.130 0.772 0.479 0.629 
Instruments (as 
densities except 
employment pot.) 
Employment 
potentiality 
Employment 
potentiality 
Employment 
potentiality 
Rail station  
Museum  Coffee place  Bar  Coffee place  
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses 
and clustered on fixed effects. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
 Table 7: Alternative IV models – first stage regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Δ log degree 
share (t) 
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
employment 
potentiality 
3.07E-8*** 
(0.000) 
2.95E-8*** 
(0.000) 
2.85E-8*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
museum density 0.086 
(0.053) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
coffee place density  
 
0.004 
(0.004) 
 
 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
bar density  
 
 
 
0.004 
(0.003) 
 
 
rail station density  
 
 
 
 
 
0.196*** 
(0.018) 
log degree share (t-1) -0.409*** 
(0.010) 
-0.410*** 
(0.010) 
-0.411*** 
(0.010) 
-0.409*** 
(0.009) 
log designation share  
(t-2) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Δ log homeownership 
(t) 
0.521*** 
(0.064) 
0.516*** 
(0.063) 
0.521*** 
(0.067) 
0.534*** 
(0.061) 
log homeownership  
(t-1) 
0.137*** 
(0.032) 
0.135*** 
(0.034) 
0.141*** 
(0.034) 
0.128** 
(0.039) 
Δ log average household 
size (t) 
-0.465*** 
(0.070) 
-0.463*** 
(0.070) 
-0.455*** 
(0.070) 
-0.441*** 
(0.077) 
log average household 
size (t-1) 
-0.272*** 
(0.067) 
-0.276*** 
(0.066) 
-0.257*** 
(0.061) 
-0.240*** 
(0.064) 
log pop age (t-1) -0.099 
(0.051) 
-0.099 
(0.052) 
-0.088 
(0.053) 
-0.101 
(0.052) 
Δ pop age (t) -0.314*** 
(0.086) 
-0.316*** 
(0.090) 
-0.312*** 
(0.085) 
-0.345*** 
(0.086) 
log foreigner share (t-1) 0.081*** 
(0.009) 
0.082*** 
(0.009) 
0.081*** 
(0.009) 
0.087*** 
(0.010) 
Δ foreigner share (t) 0.090*** 
(0.019) 
0.091*** 
(0.019) 
0.091*** 
(0.019) 
0.091*** 
(0.018) 
Constant 0.039 
(0.092) 
0.051 
(0.094) 
0.035 
(0.091) 
-0.015 
(0.091) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7968 
F 568.539 566.433 573.506 525.781 
R² 0.706 0.706 0.707 0.705 
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses 
and clustered on fixed effects. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
Furthermore, we have split the long difference between 1991 and 2011 into two 
shorter differences of 1991 to 2001 and 2001 to 2011. For the latter short 
difference we moreover used the change in income instead of change in degree 
as a proxy for heritage preferences. The coefficient estimates remain qualitatively 
similar to the main model and are reported with their first stages in tables 8 and 
9. The coefficient of the key variable is slightly smaller in the benchmark 
specification of the short different between 1991 and 2001 (column 4) and 
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considerably larger for the period between 2001 and 2011 (column 8). In 
columns (9)–(12) we use income as a proxy of heritage preference. Focusing on 
the benchmark specification in the final column, doubling income more than 
quadruples the designation share. The respective instruments are valid and 
sufficiently strong. Overall, the results are in line with our theory; increases in 
heritage preferences, proxied by change in degree or change in income, lead to 
increases in designation shares. 
  
Table 8: Short differences and income model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 1991-2001 1991-2001 1991-2001 1991-2001 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 
 Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
Δ log 
designation 
share (t) 
             
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
-0.017** 
(0.009) 
-0.216*** 
(0.021) 
-0.066*** 
(0.014) 
-0.483*** 
(0.079) 
0.477*** 
(0.052) 
1.653*** 
(0.126) 
-0.010 
(0.080) 
-2.129** 
(0.919) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
log degree share 
(t-1) 
 
 
 
 
-0.056*** 
(0.007) 
-0.185*** 
(0.024) 
 
 
 
 
-0.117*** 
(0.027) 
-0.535*** 
(0.182) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
log designation 
share (t-1) 
 
 
 
 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
 
-0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
Δ log 
homeownership 
(t) 
 
 
 
 
-0.056*** 
(0.007) 
0.386*** 
(0.056) 
 
 
 
 
-0.117*** 
(0.027) 
0.732* 
(0.385) 
 
 
 
 
-0.027 
(0.116) 
1.194*** 
(0.434) 
log 
homeownership 
(t-1) 
 
 
 
 
0.129*** 
(0.028) 
0.077*** 
(0.014) 
 
 
 
 
-0.122 
(0.115) 
0.340*** 
(0.127) 
 
 
 
 
0.098** 
(0.042) 
0.777*** 
(0.237) 
Δ log average 
household size 
(t) 
 
 
 
 
0.068*** 
(0.013) 
-0.245*** 
(0.062) 
 
 
 
 
0.057 
(0.037) 
-0.727 
(0.450) 
 
 
 
 
0.190 
(0.181) 
0.074 
(0.272) 
log average 
household size 
(t-1) 
 
 
 
 
0.004 
(0.037) 
-0.162*** 
(0.049) 
 
 
 
 
0.219 
(0.185) 
-0.099 
(0.177) 
 
 
 
 
0.278*** 
(0.095) 
0.129 
(0.149) 
log pop age (t-1)   -0.027 
(0.037) 
-0.158*** 
(0.036) 
 
 
 
 
0.241** 
(0.095) 
0.041 
(0.185) 
  0.285** 
(0.112) 
-1.364** 
(0.559) 
Δ pop age (t)   -0.109*** 
(0.033) 
-0.188*** 
(0.056) 
 
 
 
 
0.389*** 
(0.112) 
-0.107 
(0.362) 
  0.519** 
(0.217) 
-2.009** 
(0.899) 
log foreigner 
share (t-1) 
  -0.044 
(0.048) 
0.057*** 
(0.011) 
 
 
 
 
0.557*** 
(0.211) 
-0.004 
(0.016) 
  -0.025* 
(0.015) 
0.101** 
(0.046) 
Δ foreigner 
share (t) 
  0.001 
(0.004) 
0.121*** 
(0.025) 
 
 
 
 
-0.017 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.038) 
  -0.026 
(0.028) 
-0.104** 
(0.048) 
Δ log income  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.218*** 
(0.069) 
-9.330*** 
(2.024) 
-0.142** 
(0.070) 
-7.305*** 
(2.364) 
log income (t-1)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.144*** 
(0.037) 
-0.909*** 
(0.261) 
Constant 0.159*** 
(0.005) 
0.224*** 
(0.009) 
0.489*** 
(0.143) 
0.864*** 
(0.167) 
0.317*** 
(0.022) 
-0.126*** 
(0.043) 
-1.436*** 
(0.472) 
0.367 
(0.900) 
0.549*** 
(0.027) 
2.881*** 
(0.524) 
0.007 
(0.556) 
13.647*** 
(4.552) 
  
 
Table 8 (continued) 
IV NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7965 7966 7966 7966 7966 7966 7966 7966 7966 
CHI2  103.847  202.519  170.741  203.917  21.242  88.061 
EXOG_P  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.012  0.000  0.000 
OVERID  7.555  1.413  1.385  19.198  13.526  0.741 
OVERIDP  0.006  0.235  0.239  0.000  0.000  0.389 
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
 Table 9: Short differences and income model – First stage regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 1991-2001 1991-2001 1991-2001 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 
 Δ log degree 
share (t) 
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
log designation 
share  
(t-1) 
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
log designation 
share  
(t-1) 
Δ log income 
(t) 
Δ log income 
(t) 
log 
designation 
share (t-1) 
rail station density 0.055 
(0.049) 
0.053* 
(0.021) 
-0.003 
(0.208) 
-0.062*** 
(0.010) 
0.038*** 
(0.008) 
0.059 
(0.151) 
-0.012 
(0.037) 
0.018 
(0.029) 
0.066 
(0.159) 
employment 
potentiality 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
log degree share (t-1)  
 
0.055 
(0.049) 
0.053* 
(0.021) 
-0.003 
(0.208) 
-0.062*** 
(0.010) 
0.038*** 
(0.008) 
 
 
 
 
 
log designation share 
(t-2) 
 
 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.828*** 
(0.019) 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.922*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.927*** 
(0.009) 
Δ log homeownership 
(t) 
 
 
0.586*** 
(0.067) 
-0.613** 
(0.232) 
 
 
0.408*** 
(0.048) 
-1.137*** 
(0.328) 
 
 
0.172 
(0.101) 
-1.232*** 
(0.343) 
log homeownership  
(t-1) 
 
 
0.061** 
(0.022) 
-0.431*** 
(0.118) 
 
 
0.143*** 
(0.018) 
-0.114 
(0.102) 
 
 
0.110*** 
(0.028) 
-0.141 
(0.126) 
Δ log average 
household size (t) 
 
 
-0.534*** 
(0.044) 
-0.161 
(0.325) 
 
 
-0.424*** 
(0.093) 
0.664 
(0.725) 
 
 
-0.009 
(0.089) 
0.733 
(0.733) 
log average household 
size (t-1) 
 
 
-0.253*** 
(0.041) 
-1.519*** 
(0.436) 
 
 
-0.139* 
(0.059) 
0.273 
(0.258) 
 
 
-0.004 
(0.067) 
0.227 
(0.249) 
log pop age (t-1)  0.004 
(0.048) 
0.555 
(0.337) 
 
 
-0.154*** 
(0.045) 
0.744* 
(0.350) 
 
 
-0.217*** 
(0.058) 
0.896* 
(0.345) 
Δ pop age (t)  -0.231*** 
(0.051) 
0.311 
(0.370) 
 
 
-0.325*** 
(0.077) 
0.152 
(0.455) 
 
 
-0.362** 
(0.118) 
0.245 
(0.443) 
log foreigner share  
(t-1) 
 0.110*** 
(0.009) 
0.085* 
(0.042) 
 
 
0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.064 
(0.045) 
 
 
0.015** 
(0.005) 
-0.035 
(0.046) 
Δ foreigner share (t)  0.267*** 
(0.017) 
0.061 
(0.084) 
 
 
0.026* 
(0.012) 
0.023 
(0.065) 
 
 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.021 
(0.066) 
Log income (t-1)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.114*** 
(0.020) 
0.191 
(0.101) 
Constant 0.297*** 
(0.008) 
0.278 
(0.209) 
-0.336 
(1.438) 
0.389*** 
(0.005) 
0.790*** 
(0.221) 
-3.160* 
(1.479) 
0.255*** 
(0.004) 
1.880*** 
(0.239) 
-5.076** 
(1.602) 
Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7966 7966 7966 7966 7966 7966 
F 134.968 557.956 1891.124 73.689 464.362 3091.590 8.301 17.028 2640.502 
R² 0.124 0.590 0.717 0.095 0.614 0.856 0.004 0.103 0.856 
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on fixed effects. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
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 Equilibrium designation 
Table 10 below reports the conservation area effects as well as the full set of 
hedonic controls, housing characteristics in particular, for the difference-in-
differences estimation given by equation (26) in the main paper. Column (7) 
shows that housing units with more bathrooms and bedrooms fetch higher 
prices, as do detached, semi-detached, and bungalows (over the omitted category 
flats/maisonettes). The sales price of terraced housing is insignificantly different 
from flats/maisonettes. Larger floor spaces are associated with higher price but 
with significant diminishing effects. There is a premium for new properties. 
Leased properties are of less value than those owned. Properties with parking 
spaces, single garages and double garages sell for higher prices than those 
without any parking facilities. There is a house price premium for properties with 
central heating over other types of heating. In order to control for a potentially 
non-linear relationship between housing age and house prices we included a 
series of house age bins. In order to separate the effects of pure building age 
(which may be associated with deterioration) from the build date (which may 
strongly determine the architectural style) we allow for age cohort and building 
data cohort effects. Since the ‘New property’ variable identifies all properties 
where the build age is zero years, the omitted category from the age variables is 
1–9 years. All of the bins for properties older than this indicate significant 
negative premiums. The negative premium increases with age, mostly quickly 
over the first few categories and then more slowly until the penultimate category 
and finally decreases for buildings over 100 years. The effect of the build date is 
also non-linear. The general tendency is for buildings built in earlier periods to 
have higher prices than buildings built in the omitted period 2000–2010. 
However, this effect becomes insignificant in the 60s and 70s; periods associated 
with the architectural styles of the post-ward reconstruction phase that are today 
less appreciated than other styles. The greatest premium is attached to houses 
built pre-1900, the earliest category.
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Table 10: Conservation area premium – designation effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Inside treated CA  
× Post designation 
0.028*** 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.024 
(0.070) 
-0.077 
(0.111) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
Within 500m buffer of 
treated CA × Post des. 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.027) 
-0.005 
(0.022) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
Inside treated CA -0.043*** 
(0.009) 
-0.038*** 
(0.009) 
-0.048*** 
(0.010) 
-0.037*** 
(0.012) 
-0.062 
(0.057) 
0.029 
(0.108) 
-0.024 
(0.021) 
Within 500m buffer of 
treated CA 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.030) 
0.006 
(0.023) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
Number of bathrooms 0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.057*** 
(0.008) 
0.059*** 
(0.006) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Number of bedrooms 0.166*** 
(0.002) 
0.172*** 
(0.004) 
0.169*** 
(0.005) 
0.165*** 
(0.005) 
0.170*** 
(0.014) 
0.179*** 
(0.011) 
0.158*** 
(0.006) 
Number of bedrooms 
squared 
-0.019*** 
(0.000) 
-0.020*** 
(0.001) 
-0.020*** 
(0.001) 
-0.019*** 
(0.001) 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
-0.018*** 
(0.001) 
Detached house 0.254*** 
(0.003) 
0.222*** 
(0.005) 
0.211*** 
(0.008) 
0.194*** 
(0.007) 
0.235*** 
(0.015) 
0.216*** 
(0.014) 
0.193*** 
(0.007) 
Semi-detached house 0.119*** 
(0.003) 
0.097*** 
(0.004) 
0.088*** 
(0.007) 
0.070*** 
(0.006) 
0.082*** 
(0.014) 
0.066*** 
(0.012) 
0.073*** 
(0.006) 
Terraced 
house/Country cottage 
0.040*** 
(0.003) 
0.026*** 
(0.004) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.000 
(0.006) 
Bungalow 0.311*** 
(0.003) 
0.285*** 
(0.006) 
0.281*** 
(0.008) 
0.257*** 
(0.009) 
0.292*** 
(0.019) 
0.269*** 
(0.016) 
0.257*** 
(0.009) 
Floorsize (m²) 0.006*** 
(0.000) 
0.006*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
Floorsize (m²)  
× Floorsize (m²) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
New property 0.084*** 
(0.002) 
0.087*** 
(0.004) 
0.088*** 
(0.005) 
0.088*** 
(0.006) 
0.047** 
(0.024) 
0.076*** 
(0.017) 
0.077*** 
(0.006) 
Leasehold -0.054*** 
(0.003) 
-0.067*** 
(0.004) 
-0.065*** 
(0.006) 
-0.073*** 
(0.006) 
-0.100*** 
(0.014) 
-0.104*** 
(0.012) 
-0.070*** 
(0.006) 
Single garage 0.112*** 
(0.001) 
0.097*** 
(0.002) 
0.100*** 
(0.003) 
0.097*** 
(0.003) 
0.096*** 
(0.007) 
0.097*** 
(0.005) 
0.098*** 
(0.003) 
Double garage 0.190*** 
(0.002) 
0.162*** 
(0.003) 
0.161*** 
(0.005) 
0.159*** 
(0.005) 
0.160*** 
(0.015) 
0.156*** 
(0.010) 
0.158*** 
(0.005) 
Parking space 0.076*** 
(0.001) 
0.063*** 
(0.002) 
0.065*** 
(0.003) 
0.061*** 
(0.003) 
0.052*** 
(0.007) 
0.049*** 
(0.005) 
0.063*** 
(0.003) 
Central heating 0.089*** 
(0.001) 
0.094*** 
(0.002) 
0.098*** 
(0.003) 
0.100*** 
(0.003) 
0.085*** 
(0.007) 
0.094*** 
(0.007) 
0.095*** 
(0.003) 
Building age: 10–19 
years 
-0.047*** 
(0.002) 
-0.063*** 
(0.003) 
-0.062*** 
(0.004) 
-0.075*** 
(0.005) 
-0.071*** 
(0.016) 
-0.068*** 
(0.015) 
-0.069*** 
(0.005) 
Building age: 20–29 
years 
-0.079*** 
(0.002) 
-0.106*** 
(0.005) 
-0.104*** 
(0.007) 
-0.125*** 
(0.008) 
-0.133*** 
(0.026) 
-0.126*** 
(0.021) 
-0.113*** 
(0.007) 
Building age: 30–39 
years 
-0.092*** 
(0.003) 
-0.127*** 
(0.006) 
-0.123*** 
(0.010) 
-0.150*** 
(0.011) 
-0.169*** 
(0.032) 
-0.141*** 
(0.027) 
-0.133*** 
(0.009) 
Building age: 40–49 
years 
-0.104*** 
(0.004) 
-0.148*** 
(0.008) 
-0.142*** 
(0.012) 
-0.180*** 
(0.013) 
-0.199*** 
(0.036) 
-0.165*** 
(0.031) 
-0.158*** 
(0.011) 
Building age: 50–59 
years 
-0.121*** 
(0.004) 
-0.171*** 
(0.009) 
-0.167*** 
(0.015) 
-0.207*** 
(0.016) 
-0.232*** 
(0.044) 
-0.204*** 
(0.038) 
-0.175*** 
(0.014) 
Building age: 60–69 
years 
-0.135*** 
(0.005) 
-0.198*** 
(0.011) 
-0.194*** 
(0.019) 
-0.238*** 
(0.020) 
-0.320*** 
(0.051) 
-0.265*** 
(0.042) 
-0.215*** 
(0.018) 
Building age: 70–79 
years 
-0.136*** 
(0.006) 
-0.213*** 
(0.013) 
-0.207*** 
(0.021) 
-0.263*** 
(0.022) 
-0.326*** 
(0.053) 
-0.273*** 
(0.046) 
-0.234*** 
(0.019) 
Building age: 80–89 
years 
-0.132*** 
(0.007) 
-0.218*** 
(0.014) 
-0.213*** 
(0.023) 
-0.277*** 
(0.024) 
-0.339*** 
(0.062) 
-0.313*** 
(0.054) 
-0.243*** 
(0.021) 
Building age: 90–99 
years 
-0.111*** 
(0.008) 
-0.208*** 
(0.016) 
-0.204*** 
(0.025) 
-0.280*** 
(0.027) 
-0.360*** 
(0.068) 
-0.304*** 
(0.063) 
-0.248*** 
(0.023) 
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Building age: Over 100 
years 
-0.083*** 
(0.009) 
-0.176*** 
(0.017) 
-0.176*** 
(0.027) 
-0.261*** 
(0.030) 
-0.348*** 
(0.074) 
-0.284*** 
(0.065) 
-0.227*** 
(0.025) 
Build date: 1900–1909 0.040*** 
(0.009) 
0.121*** 
(0.018) 
0.128*** 
(0.028) 
0.208*** 
(0.031) 
0.256*** 
(0.077) 
0.222*** 
(0.067) 
0.173*** 
(0.025) 
Build date: 1910–1919 0.074*** 
(0.008) 
0.153*** 
(0.016) 
0.158*** 
(0.027) 
0.226*** 
(0.028) 
0.262*** 
(0.071) 
0.256*** 
(0.059) 
0.196*** 
(0.024) 
Build date: 1920–1929 0.093*** 
(0.007) 
0.157*** 
(0.014) 
0.162*** 
(0.024) 
0.215*** 
(0.025) 
0.225*** 
(0.062) 
0.189*** 
(0.050) 
0.190*** 
(0.021) 
Build date: 1930–1939 0.082*** 
(0.006) 
0.128*** 
(0.013) 
0.130*** 
(0.021) 
0.168*** 
(0.023) 
0.187*** 
(0.058) 
0.163*** 
(0.045) 
0.151*** 
(0.020) 
Build date: 1940–1949 0.040*** 
(0.005) 
0.078*** 
(0.012) 
0.078*** 
(0.018) 
0.111*** 
(0.021) 
0.063 
(0.058) 
0.053 
(0.048) 
0.096*** 
(0.018) 
Build date: 1950–1959 0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.033*** 
(0.010) 
0.041*** 
(0.016) 
0.057*** 
(0.018) 
0.017 
(0.047) 
-0.004 
(0.039) 
0.046*** 
(0.015) 
Build date: 1960–1969 0.001 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.023 
(0.015) 
-0.017 
(0.044) 
-0.012 
(0.037) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
Build date: 1970–1979 -0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.059 
(0.042) 
-0.046 
(0.033) 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
Build date: 1980–1989 0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
-0.023 
(0.038) 
-0.010 
(0.029) 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
Build date: 1990–1999 0.022*** 
(0.002) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.022*** 
(0.006) 
0.029*** 
(0.008) 
-0.020 
(0.034) 
-0.008 
(0.025) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
Build date: pre 1900 0.098*** 
(0.009) 
0.149*** 
(0.018) 
0.162*** 
(0.029) 
0.244*** 
(0.031) 
0.312*** 
(0.081) 
0.259*** 
(0.070) 
0.216*** 
(0.026) 
Location cont. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighborhood cont. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ward effects YES YES      
Nearest treated CA 
effects 
  YES YES YES YES  
Matched CA effects       YES 
Treatment group: CAs 
designated 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2002 
1996-
2002 
1996-
2010 
Control group Full 
England 
sample 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of 
pre-
1996 CA 
& within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of 
CA 
designat
ed 1987-
1995 & 
within 
4km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of 
CA 
designat
ed 2003-
2010 & 
within 
4km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of 
pre-
1996 CA 
matched 
on 
propensi
ty score 
R² 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.915 0.861 0.864 0.909 
AIC -587375 -156426 -130469 -67044 -5410 -8475 -41206 
Observation 1088k 302k 302k 178k 214k 323k 133k 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on location fixed effects. Conservation area control groups in 
Columns (4)-(7) have separate fixed effects for the areas inside and outside a conservation area. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
Semi-parametric temporal and spatial treatment effects 
Figure 2 reports the results for the semi-parametric estimation of the temporal 
effects of designation using appendix equation (19). Instead of simply presenting 
our two strongest specifications, as we do in the main paper, here we present a 
different dimension to the results bin by comparing the bin estimates for the 
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naïve DD in the left panels to the matched CA control group in the right panels. 
The left charts show that the post-period internal and external estimates deviate 
significantly from the pre-period mean (hence the significant DD estimates) but 
that this is driven by a general upward trends. This corroborates the results in 
Table 2, column (1) of the main paper where no significant discontinuity nor shift 
in trend for the naïve control group exists and hence the advantages of the RDD-
DD over the standard DD method is highlighted. The charts in the right panels 
also corroborate the evidence presented using the parametric trends equations 
in the main paper. Specifically, they show that for the internal effects the post-
treatment estimates tend not to deviate significantly from the pre-treatment 
effects but that there are upward shifts in the trend when compared to the pre-
treatment trend. For the external effects there is a general upward trend in the 
less carefully matched control groups and a downward trend in the stronger 
control groups but no shift in the trend at the designation date. 
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Figure 2: Semi-parametric temporal bins estimates 
Internal effects: Full dataset 
Appendix Tab. 10. column (1) 
 
Internal effects: Matched CA 
Appendix Tab. 10. column (7) 
 
External effects: Full dataset 
Appendix Tab. 10. column (1) 
 
External effects: Matched CA 
Appendix Tab. 10. column (7) 
 
Notes:  The solid black line plots the estimated differences between treatment group and control group 
against year since designation date using equation (19). The dashed lines indicate the 5% 
confidence intervals. The left charts show results for the control group used in column (1) of 
appendix Table 10. The right charts show results for the control group used in column (7) of 
appendix Table 10. The horizontal red line illustrates the mean of the pre-treatment estimates. 
Figure 3 demonstrates the semi-parametric spatial effects using different bin 
sizes of 100m and 200m using appendix equation (20). These semi-parametric 
charts closely resemble their parametric counterparts. Notably, there is no 
significant and positive effect in the first bin outside the conservation area when 
using the preferred specification of column (7) from Table 10 This is consistent 
with the parametric findings and baseline DD findings that there is no significant 
external policy effect and that our second hypothesis cannot be accepted. There 
is, however, one significant bin inside the conservation area at 200–300m. This 
provides some support for the idea that heritage externalities are stronger 
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deeper within the conservation areas such that there may be a positive policy 
effect. This effect then declines to zero for the deepest bin of greater than 300m.  
Figure 3: Semi-parametric spatial bins estimates 
200m bins: Full dataset 
Control group of appendix Tab. 4, column (1) 
 
200m bins: Matched CA 
Control group of appendix Tab. 4, column (5) 
 
100m bins: Full dataset 
Control group of appendix Tab. 4, column (1) 
 
100m bins: Matched CA 
Control group of appendix Tab. 4, column (5) 
 
Notes:  The solid black line plots estimate the difference-in-differences treatment effect at different 
distances from the conservation area boundary using appendix equation (20). The dashed lines 
indicate the 5% confidence intervals. The left charts show results for the control group used 
appendix Table 4, column (1). The right charts show results for the control group used in 
appendix Table 4, column (5). The horizontal red lines illustrate the mean of the pre-treatment 
estimates, the final pre-period bin and the first post-period bin. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF 
HERITAGE CONSERVATION AREAS: 
QUALITY OF LIFE VS. HOUSING 
PRODUCTIVITY 
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 Introduction 
The key to success for any city is to offer a high quality of life whilst remaining 
affordable to live in. Therefore, whether or not to regulate development to 
preserve historic districts is an important policy decision for any urban area. 
Such policies improve the quality of life in cities by preserving districts of special 
architectural and historic character. But they do so by restricting the supply of 
new housing space therefore increasing housing costs. A crucial policy 
consideration is how large each of these effects are and what the net effect is. Put 
simply, are conservation areas welfare improving or are they welfare decreasing? 
Evidence suggests the costs of housing regulation are very significant. Hilber and 
Vermeulen (In Press) examine planning constraints in England finding that they 
lead to significantly higher housing costs. Such policies are usually intended to 
provide benefits by avoiding the negative externalities of density53. However the 
literature suggests that the regulatory tax outweighs any benefits of externality 
zoning. For example, Glaeser et al. (2003) examine building height restrictions in 
Manhattan, a policy that is intended to prevent towering developments that block 
the light and view available to existing structures. They find that the restrictions 
lead to such large increases in house prices that residents are left worse off even 
after accounting for the policy benefits. This finding is repeated in other studies 
such as that by Albouy and Ehrlich (2012) who look at the regulatory constraints 
                                                        
 
 This work has been supported by English Heritage in terms of data provision. I also 
acknowledge the property data provided by the Nationwide Building Society. I thank 
participants of the work-in-progress seminar of the Economic Geography cluster at 
LSE, especially Gabriel Ahlfeldt, Paul Cheshire, Steve Gibbons, Christian Hilber, 
Kristoffer Moeller, Henry Overman, Olmo Silva and Nicolai Wendland for helpful 
comments and suggestions. I thank Christian Hilber and Wouter Vermeulen for 
supplying the data on planning refusals. 
53 Or in the case of conservation areas also to preserve positive externalities. 
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across U.S. cities and Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) who examine land use 
planning in the city of Reading, England.  
The literature on conservation areas, however, has tended to focus only on the 
determinants of designation and the local impacts on quality of life. The 
externality zoning effect has been found to be significant. Ahlfeldt et al. (2014a) 
find a positive impact of designation on house price growth that is related to the 
security designation gives residents about the future character of their 
neighbourhood (Holman & Ahlfeldt, 2014). Furthermore, in a model of the 
political economy of conservation areas (Ahlfeldt et al., 2014a) demonstrate that 
local homeowners may have a strong influence over the designation process. 
Hence designations that impose wider costs will still occur where there exist local 
benefits to those who have influence over the political process. So whilst the 
literature on conservation areas does not include any estimates of the size of the 
regulatory tax they impose on housing, the evidence does not preclude the 
possibility that such an effect exist.  
This paper estimates the net effect of conservation areas on economic welfare, a 
question that is of clear policy importance but as yet unanswered in the 
literature. It does so by looking at ten years of conservation area designations in 
England (1997-2007). The two-step approach is based on the theoretical model 
and empirical strategy outlined by Albouy and Ehrlich (2012). Firstly, I estimate 
housing productivity across English Housing Market Areas (HMAs) using a 
unique panel dataset of house prices, land values and construction costs. HMAs, 
unlike other urban area definitions are endogenously defined to capture 
individual housing markets, based on evidence from patterns of commuting, 
migration and house prices. As such they typically approximate recognisable city 
regions. Housing productivity is defined as the amount of physical housing that 
can be produced for given quantities of inputs. I estimate the effect of various 
city-specific characteristics on housing productivity finding that conservation 
area designation significantly increases housing costs. Secondly, I generate a 
quality of life index for cities based on house prices and wages. Differences in 
housing productivity predicted by designation are not found to be significantly 
correlated with quality of life. My results therefore suggest that the overall 
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impact of conservation areas is to reduce welfare by increasing housing costs 
without sufficiently compensating for this with quality of life improvements. 
In addition to filling a gap in the literature by estimating both the supply-side 
costs and demand-side benefits of conservation I make a number of further 
contributions to the literature. To my knowledge, I estimate the first housing 
production function for England producing the first estimates of a land cost share 
and elasticity of substitution, which are of wider significance. I provide 
descriptive (cross-sectional) indications of the net welfare effect of protected 
land statuses in England such as Green Belts, National Parks and Areas of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty (albeit aggregated together). I also note the 
empirical problems specific to this methodological approach and demonstrate 
how fixed effects estimation serves as an improvement to both stages. Finally, I 
construct a unique dataset making use of some previously unused data for land 
values and constructions costs for England. 
This analysis of the conservation areas adds to a growing body of literature on 
the effects of designation policies (e.g. Ahlfeldt et al., 2014a; Asabere et al., 1989; 
Asabere & Huffman, 1994; Asabere et al., 1994; Coulson & Lahr, 2005; Coulson & 
Leichenko, 2001; Glaeser, 2011; Leichenko et al., 2001; Noonan, 2007; Noonan & 
Krupka, 2011; Schaeffer & Millerick, 1991) and a literature that looks into the 
value amenities add to neighbourhoods and cities more generally (e.g. Ahlfeldt et 
al., 2012; Albouy, 2009; Bayer et al., 2007; Brueckner et al., 1999; Chay & 
Greenstone, 2005; Cheshire & Sheppard, 1995; Gibbons et al., 2011; Glaeser et al., 
2001).  
The results are also relevant to research that investigates the costs and benefits 
of restrictive planning regimes (e.g. Albouy & Ehrlich, 2012; Cheshire & Hilber, 
2008; Cheshire et al., 2011; Glaeser et al., 2003; Glaeser et al., 2005; Hilber & 
Vermeulen, In Press)  and a literature that estimates production functions for 
housing (e.g. Albouy & Ehrlich, 2012; Epple et al., 2010; McDonald, 1981; 
Thorsnes, 1997). The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next 
section I lay out the theoretical model which demonstrates the potential effects 
of conservation areas on quality of life and housing productivity. In section 3, I 
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develop the two-stage empirical approach explaining the need to estimate a fixed 
effect model. In section 4, I go over the data used in empirical analysis and in 
section 5, I present the results. Section 6 concludes. 
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 Model 
The theoretical model presented here is a general equilibrium model of a system 
of cities from Albouy and Ehrlich (2012), which was developed from the earlier 
models of Roback (1982a) and Albouy (2009). Each city 𝑗 is small relative to the 
national economy and produces a traded good 𝑋 and a non-traded good 𝑌 
(housing). The city-specific price of a standard housing unit is 𝑝𝑗  and the uniform 
price of the traded good is equal to the numeraire. Households with homogenous 
preferences work in either the 𝑌-sector or the 𝑋-sector and consume both 
housing and the traded good. The model involves two important assumptions; 
that of perfect competition which gives the zero profit conditions and that of 
labour mobility which gives the spatial equilibrium conditions. 
 Housing production under zero profits 
Since the focus of this paper is on the housing sector the derivations for the 
traded good are relegated to footnotes. The housing good 𝑌 represents physical 
housing services. By physical, it is meant that the services are derived solely from 
the unit itself. This does not include any benefits derived from locational 
amenities, which come in to the individual utility function via a quality of life 
measure defined separately later on. Firms produce housing in each city 
according to54: 
 𝑌𝑗 = 𝐴𝑗
𝑌𝐹𝑌(𝐿,𝑀) (1) 
where  𝐴𝑗
𝑌 is a city-specific housing productivity shifter, 𝐹𝑌 is a constant returns 
to scale (CRS) production function, 𝐿 is land (price 𝑟𝑗  in each city) and 𝑀 is the 
                                                        
 
54 The traded good is produced from land, labour and capital according to 𝑋𝑗 =
𝐴𝑗
𝑋𝐹𝑋(𝐿, 𝑁𝑋, 𝐾) where 𝐴𝑗
𝑋 is traded good productivity which is a function of city 
characteristics, 𝑁𝑋 is traded good labour (paid wages 𝑤𝑗
𝑋) and 𝐾 is mobile capital 
paid a price 𝑖 everywhere. 
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materials (non-land) input to housing (paid price 𝑣𝑗). Materials is conceptualised 
to include all non-land factors to housing production including labour and 
machinery. The housing productivity shifter represents the efficiency with which 
developers can convert land and non-land inputs into physical housing and is a 
function of city specific attributes which may include the level of conservation 
area designation. Conservation areas decrease housing productivity because it 
increases to planning restrictiveness making it more difficult and costly for 
developers to build on a given plot of land. 
Firms choose among inputs to minimise the unit cost for given factor 
prices 𝑐𝑗(𝑟𝑗 , 𝑣𝑗; 𝐴𝑗) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐿,𝑀
 {𝑟𝑗𝐿 + 𝑣𝑗𝑀 : 𝑓(𝐿,𝑀; 𝐴𝑗) = 1}. Perfect competition 
means zero profits are given when the price of a unit of housing is equal to this 
unit cost i.e. 𝑝𝑗 = 𝑐𝑗(𝑟𝑗 , 𝑣𝑗; 𝐴𝑗).  Log-linearisation plus taking deviations around 
the national average gives55:  
 𝑝𝑗 = 𝜙𝐿 ?̃?𝑗 +𝜙𝑀?̃?𝑗 − ?̃?𝐽
𝑌
 (2) 
where for any variable 𝑧 the tilde notation represents log differences around the 
national average i.e. ?̃?𝑗 = ln(𝑧𝑗) − ln(𝑧̅), where 𝑧̅ is the national average56 (so 𝑝𝑗  
is the log price differential for housing units), 𝜙𝐿 is the land cost share for housing 
and 𝜙𝑀 is the non-land cost share,. This condition tells us that the equilibrium 
price differential for housing is given by the sum of the input price differentials 
weighted by their cost shares, subtracting the city-specific productivity shifter. 
                                                        
 
55 Zero profits in the traded good sector is given by ?̃?𝐽
𝑋 = 𝜃𝐿?̃?𝑗 + 𝜃𝑁?̃?
𝑋 where 𝜃𝐿 and 𝜃𝑁 
are the land and labour cost shares, respectively, for the traded good. 
56 Taking deviations from the national average is not theoretically necessary to solve 
the cost function or empirically necessary since the same effect can be achieved by 
using a constant (or year effects in a panel). However, the differentials are necessary 
is other parts of the model, such as for the traded good side, to eliminate the interest 
rate 𝑖, and for the spatial equilibrium equation, to eliminate the unobserved 
reservation utility 𝑢. Therefore for simplicity and consistency it is adopted 
throughout the paper. 
CHAPTER V 221 
 
This means that lower levels of housing productivity (perhaps due to 
designation) must be accounted for by higher house prices and/or lower land 
and materials prices in order to maintain zero profits. Next we examine the 
household side of the model57. 
 Consumption and spatial equilibrium58 
Households with homogenous preferences have a utility function 𝑈𝑗(𝑥, 𝑦; 𝑄𝑗) 
that is quasi-concave in the traded good 𝑥 and housing 𝑦 and increases in city-
specific quality of life 𝑄𝑗. Quality of life is determined by non-market amenities 
that are available at each city ranging from air quality and green space to rail 
access and consumption amenities. These may also include conservation area 
designation. Households supply one unit of labour to receive a wage 𝑤𝑗 , to which 
a non-wage income 𝐼 is added to make total household income 𝑚𝑗 . Households 
optimally allocate their budget according to the expenditure function 
𝑒𝑘(𝑝𝑗 , 𝑢; 𝑄𝑗) = min
𝑥,𝑦
𝑥 + 𝑝𝑗𝑦 ∶   𝑈𝑗(𝑥, 𝑦; 𝑄𝑗) ≥ 𝑢. Households are assumed to be 
perfectly mobile, therefore, spatial equilibrium occurs when all location offer the 
same utility level ?̅?. Locations with higher house prices or lower levels of quality 
of life amenities must be compensated with higher income after local taxation 𝜏, 
i.e. 𝑒(𝑝𝑗 , ?̅?; 𝑄𝑗) = (1 − 𝜏)(𝑤𝑗 + 𝐼). Log-linearised around national average this is: 
 ?̃?𝑗 = 𝑠𝑦𝑝𝑗 − (1 − 𝜏)𝑠𝑤?̃?𝑗 (3) 
where 𝑠𝑦 is the average share of expenditure on housing, 𝜏 is the average 
marginal income tax rate and 𝑠𝑤 is the average share of income that comes from 
                                                        
 
57 To complete the firm-side of the model, the non-land input is produced using labour 
and capital 𝑀𝑗 = 𝐹
𝑀(𝑁𝑌, 𝐾) and the equivalent zero profit condition gives ?̃?𝑗 = 𝛼?̃?
𝑌, 
where 𝛼 is the labour cost share of the non-land input. 
58 There are two types of worker, those who work in housing and those who work in 
the traded good sector. They may each receive a different wage and may be attracted 
to different amenities. The condition for only one type of worker is presented here 
for simplicity. 
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wages. The spatial equilibrium condition tells us that the (expenditure-
equivalent) quality of life differential in each location must be equal to the unit 
house price differential minus the wage differential, weighted by their shares in 
total expenditure. Essentially, if prices are high or wages are low then there must 
be plenty of quality of life amenities making a city attractive. This means that if 
designation impacts on quality of life, there must be a corresponding increase in 
house prices and/or decrease in wages to compensate. The two conditions, zero 
profit and spatial equilibrium, both suggest that conservation areas increase 
house prices but the two channels are entirely separate. Next, I examine each 
mechanism in turn to provide an intuition behind the different effects.  
 The effects of designation 
Firstly, the zero profit implies that if two cities have similar equilibrium land 
values and material costs, then the one with lower housing productivity must 
have higher house prices. Figure 1 is adapted from Albouy and Ehrlich (2012) 
and illustrates this point for Cambridge, York and Brighton. The average 
productivity curve shows what house prices should be given different input 
prices (here just land values) for cities of average productivity if zero profits are 
maintained. Note that the curve is concave since developers substitute away from 
land as it becomes more expensive. For equally productive cities, if house prices 
are higher, then it must be that land values are higher, as in the case of Cambridge 
over York. Brighton, however, is less productive than Cambridge and this can be 
inferred from the fact that it has more expensive housing than Cambridge but has 
the same land values. This means that Brighton is less effective at converting 
housing inputs into housing outputs i.e. it is less productive. Therefore if we 
observe higher levels of designation in Brighton than in Cambridge and York, this 
may be because designation is reducing housing productivity in Brighton. 
Obviously, a sample size of three without any controls for other factors is not a 
very robust analysis but this should highlight the idea that underpins the 
empirical approach.  
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Figure 1: Cost function for housing 
 
Note: this figure is an adaptation of Figure 1A from Albouy and Ehrlich (2012). 
Secondly, the spatial equilibrium condition implies that if two cities have similar 
equilibrium wage levels, then the one with higher house prices must offer a 
higher quality of life. If cities that have higher level of quality of life also have high 
levels of designation then this may be because there exists a relationship 
between the two. It is important to note that this quality of life effect will look 
different to the relationship created by the housing productivity effect. If 
designation increases quality of life and housing productivity remains unchanged 
then house prices will increase to maintain spatial equilibrium but land values 
will also need to increase in order to maintain zero profits for developers. Hence, 
the city will have both higher house price and higher land values, moving 
upwards along the same productivity curve, e.g. from York to Cambridge in 
Figure 1. Thus the quality of life effect cannot be confused with the housing 
productivity effect. And vice versa, the housing productivity effect cannot be 
confused with the quality of life effect. If house prices are higher due to 
productivity difference (as in Brighton over Cambridge) but quality of life is the 
same then it must be that equilibrium wages are higher to maintain spatial 
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equilibrium. Now that the intuition behind measuring the separate effects is 
clear, I move on to the empirical approach. 
 Empirical approach 
The empirical approach takes two stages. First I estimate house prices as a 
function of input prices and factors that may affect housing productivity. Then I 
construct a quality of life index for each city using house prices and wages and 
relate this to productivity differences resultant from the level of designation. I 
conclude the section with a discussion of identification issues. 
 Estimation of housing productivity 
Following Albouy and Ehrlich (2012) and Christensen et al. (1973) I first estimate 
an unrestricted translog cost function: 
 
𝑝𝑗𝑡  = 𝛽1?̃?𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2?̃?𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3(?̃?𝑗𝑡)
2
+ 𝛽4(?̃?𝑗𝑡)
2
+ 𝛽5(?̃?𝑗𝑡?̃?𝑗𝑡) + 𝜋?̃?𝑗𝑡 + 𝜎?̃?𝑗𝑡 + 𝜔?̃?𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛿?̃?𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡  
(4) 
where  ?̃?𝑗𝑡  (regulatory environment), ?̃?𝑗𝑡 (natural constraints), ?̃?𝑗𝑡  (population) 
are factors that are thought in the literature to affect housing supply (e.g. by Saiz 
2010), ?̃?𝑗𝑡  is conservation area designation, and 𝜋, 𝜎, 𝜔 and 𝛿 are the parameters 
to be estimated. In this panel format, the log-differentials are taken around the 
national average in each year 𝑡. This is equivalent to using year effects in the 
regression, however, I continue to use the differentials that are suggested by the 
theoretical model. Imposing the restriction of CRS: 𝛽1 = 1 − 𝛽2;  𝛽3 = 𝛽4 =
−𝛽5/2 makes this equivalent to a second order approximation of equation (2) 
and imposing the further restrictions of 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 0 makes this a first order 
estimation i.e. a Cobb-Douglas cost function (Fuss & McFadden, 1978). 
Comparing equation (4) with equation (2) reveals that housing productivity is 
given by: 
 ?̃?𝐽
𝑌 = −?̃?𝑗𝑡𝜋 − ?̃?𝑗𝑡𝜎 − ?̃?𝑗𝑡𝜔 − 𝛿?̃?𝑗𝑡 − 𝑢𝑗𝑡  (5) 
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Housing productivity is the (negative of) observed and unobserved city 
attributes that impact on unit house prices after taking into account input prices. 
If designation (or any other factor) impacts negatively on housing productivity 
then its coefficient 𝛿 (𝜋, 𝜎, or 𝜔) is expected to be positive i.e. it will raise house 
prices above what is predicted by factor prices alone.  
 Quality of life index 
Increasing the cost of housing is not the intended effect of conservation areas. 
Rather they reduce housing productivity in order to preserve or improve the 
attractiveness of neighbourhoods. The second stage investigates the demand side 
effect of conservation areas by relating the housing productivity predicted by 
designation to a measure of quality of life. I compute a city quality of life index 
according to the spatial equilibrium condition of equation (3)59. I then regress the 
index on the components of housing productivity predicted in the regression of 
equation (4). The regression takes the form: 
 ?̃?𝑗𝑡 = 𝜇1(−?̃?𝑗𝑡?̂?) + 𝜇2(−?̃?𝑗𝑡?̂?) + 𝜇3(−?̃?𝑗𝑡?̂?) + 𝜇4(−?̂??̃?𝑗𝑡) + 𝜇5(−𝜀𝑗𝑡) + 𝜀𝑗𝑡  (6) 
where 𝜇1-𝜇5 are the parameters to be estimated. Specifically 𝜇4 tells us how 
differences in housing productivity predicted by different levels of designation 
are associated with differences in quality of life. If conservation areas make areas 
more attractive then we expect this parameter to be negative. It is important to 
estimate this equation controlling for other amenities that impact on quality of 
life and may be correlated with housing productivity. The overall welfare effect 
can then be interpreted from the parameter estimates in the two stages of this 
approach in a way that is explained in the results section. 
It is important to acknowledge the potential mechanical link between the quality 
of life index which includes the price index (minus wages) and the determinants 
of housing productivity that are also components of the price index (minus factor 
                                                        
 
59 For robustness, I create two separate quality of life indices, one using equation (3) 
and the other using an alternative concept of housing costs. These two measures are 
constructed in the data section below. 
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costs). If the theoretical model holds, however, this mechanical link should not 
exist. Higher prices due to unobserved demand factors will show up in the quality 
of life index but not the productivity residual since land prices will be higher to 
maintain zero profits. Higher prices (for given input prices) due to unobserved 
supply factors will show up in the productivity residual but not the quality of life 
index since wages will compensate for price differences spatial equilibrium. 
 Identification issues 
There are three important problems with this strategy as it stands.  
Unobservable productivity factors 
Firstly, unobservable productivity factors in 𝜀𝑗𝑡  may bias the estimates in 
equation (4). If, for example, soil quality is an important determinant of housing 
productivity then good quality soil for building will be associated with lower 
house prices. If this soil quality is unobserved and correlated with designation (a 
correlation is plausible if historical cities were built on good soil) then it will bias 
the estimate of 𝛿 downwards. An upwards bias could be the result of, for example, 
congestion in historical centres than lower housing productivity. Further, 
according to the model, omitted productivity factors are capitalised into land 
values leading to a necessary bias for the land cost share. Going back to the 
example of soil quality increasing housing productivity, this will both lower 
house prices and increase land values to maintain zero profits leading to a bias.  
This is problematic since the land cost share, and the elasticity of substitution are 
interesting parameters in their own right and are ideally estimated without bias. 
Furthermore, this implies that only the observed components of ?̃?𝐽
𝑌 in equation 
(5) are reliable since the residual part will be contained in the estimate of the 
land cost share. 
An IV strategy is employed by Albouy and Ehrlich (2012) to address this first 
concern. They find plausible instruments for variation in land values (inverse 
distance to saltwater coast and mean winter temperature) that are exogenous to 
housing productivity. Such an instrument for land values is particularly 
important in their paper since they wish to estimate the total housing 
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productivity ?̃?𝐽
𝑌 including the unobserved factors, which would otherwise be 
captured in the endogenously determined land values. Given that I wish to 
investigate specifically the housing productivity effect of observed designation 
this is a lesser concern. Furthermore, the IV approach has a number of problems. 
Firstly, the exogeneity is in doubt if the instruments are correlated with 
unobserved geographic factors that affect housing productivity such as if 
distance to coast were correlated with soil quality. Secondly, the exclusionary 
restriction is violated if the instruments directly affect housing productivity such 
as if it were harder to build in cold temperatures60. Thirdly, it is very difficult to 
find plausible instruments for all the endogenous variables. No instruments 
could be found by Albouy and Ehrlich (2012) for the regulatory restrictiveness 
of cities.  Finally, the IV approach does not help with the next two problems. 
Unobservable housing characteristics 
Secondly, unobservable housing characteristics contained in the ‘standardised’ 
unit price of housing may bias the estimate. The standardised house prices are 
created using hedonic regression on housing characteristics and city-level 
indicator variables (see data section below). This entails that if there are 
unobserved housing characteristics that are typical to a certain city, they will not 
be removed from the hedonic regression and will be contained in the city price. 
If, for example, the quality of architecture is unobserved and varies across cities 
then this will be captured in the city price of housing. If this is correlated with 
designation (highly plausible) then designation may appear to increase house 
prices when in fact it does not. 
Unobservable quality of life factors 
In the quality of life regression there may be factors correlated with designation 
that are not captured in the control variables and hence bias the effect. Since a 
very wide range of amenities has been demonstrated to impact on quality of life 
                                                        
 
60 This particular problem is noted by Albouy and Ehrlich (2012). 
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indicators, there are many potential sources of bias. Therefore the use of control 
variables is limited in the extent to which it can eliminate bias. 
Fixed effects estimation as a solution 
Since the IV approach is problematic, I propose the implementation of a fixed 
effects model to address the three empirical issues outlined above. By adding city 
fixed effects to equation (4) the parameters are estimated using only time-
variation for each city.  
∆𝑝𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1∆?̃?𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2∆?̃?𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3∆(?̃?𝑗𝑡)
2
+ 𝛽4∆(?̃?𝑗𝑡)
2
+ 𝛽5∆(?̃?𝑗𝑡?̃?𝑗𝑡) + 𝜋∆?̃?𝑗𝑡
+ 𝜎∆?̃?𝑗𝑡 + 𝜔∆?̃?𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿∆?̃?𝑗𝑡 + ∆𝑓𝑗 + ∆𝑢𝑗𝑡 
(7) 
where the difference operator ∆ signifies the difference from the within-city 
mean i.e. the average over the time observations and 𝑓𝑗  are fixed unobserved 
factor that affect housing productivity in city-𝑗. Since ∆𝑓𝑗 = 0 this helps deal with 
the first problem if unobserved factors that impact housing productivity such as 
soil quality are fixed. Time variant unobservable factors that impact on housing 
productivity remain a problem however. This means it will be important to 
control for the underlying regulatory restrictiveness in ?̃?𝑗𝑡  for each city so that 
the effect of this is not confused with an effect of designation if the two are 
correlated over time. The second problem is also dealt with if unobservable 
housing characteristics are fixed. Given that I look at a time period of only one 
decade I expect that the average characteristics of the housing stock at the city 
level to be approximately fixed. This should ensure that time variation in 
standardised house prices is predominantly due to change in the actual unit value 
of housing rather than changes to unobserved structural characteristics.  
Further by adding fixed effects to equation (6) the quality of life effects are 
estimated from only time variation in quality of life and designation: 
∆?̃?𝑗𝑡 = 𝜇1∆(−?̃?𝑗𝑡?̂?) + 𝜇2∆(−?̃?𝑗𝑡?̂?) + 𝜇3∆(−?̃?𝑗𝑡?̂?) + 𝜇4∆(−?̂??̃?𝑗𝑡)
+ 𝜇5∆(−𝜀𝑗𝑡) + ∆𝑞𝑗 + ∆𝜀𝑗𝑡 
(8) 
where the difference operator ∆ again signifies the difference from the average 
over all time periods for each city and 𝑞𝑗  are fixed unobserved factors that affect 
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quality of life in city-𝑗. Demeaning eliminates all fixed factors that affect quality 
of life. This represents an important empirical step since for a lot of these factors 
there will be far more variation over locations then there will be over a decade of 
time within a location. However, time variant unobservables remain a problem. 
Whilst FE estimation of both stages represents a probable improvement over the 
IV approach, a major drawback is the requirement of panel dataset with sufficient 
time variation in each city. This may be difficult to obtain for most variables due 
to data availability. Therefore, critical to this research is the construction of a 
panel dataset of land values, house prices, construction costs and designation 
presented in the next section. 
 Data 
The empirical analysis is conducted at the housing market area (HMA) level61. A 
map of these areas is presented in the appendix. Unlike other urban area 
definitions, HMAs are rigorously defined to separate individual housing markets 
and are therefore considered a suitable empirical counterpart to the theoretical 
𝑗-locations. The HMA boundaries are defined based on evidence from patterns of 
commuting, migration and house prices. As such they typically approximate 
recognisable city regions. The study period is 1997-2007 since this represents 
the greatest period of overlap of the different data. The final panel dataset, 
therefore, has T = 11 and N = 74. This dataset is a longer and narrower panel than 
that used by Albouy and Ehrlich (2012) and hence is more fitted to the 
implementation of a fixed effects model. 
                                                        
 
61 In particular, I make use of ‘strategic’ rather than ‘singular’ HMAs since the former 
defines whole housing market areas whereas the latter defines housing markets sub-
areas. I also make use of the ‘silver standard’ definition which sacrifices some detail 
in order to be more easily aggregated from smaller geographical units, such as the 
local authority district (LAD), which much of the data in the analysis are available on. 
The map in the appendix shows how these areas relate to LADs. 
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 House prices and factor prices  
House prices (𝑝𝑗𝑡) 
House prices for 1,087,896 transactions in England over the period 1995-2010 
come from Nationwide, the largest building society in the UK. In addition to the 
price paid, the data has property characteristics including postcode location, 
which is used to identify which HMA the transacted unit belongs to. All 
transactions that are ‘leasehold’ are dropped from the data since the price of 
these properties should not come into the quality of life index62. Following the 
empirical approach of Albouy and Ehrlich (2012) the house price index is 
computed by regressing the log of the transaction price 𝑝 for unit 𝑖 in HMA 𝑗 and 
year 𝑡 on a vector of property characteristics 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 and a set of HMA-year indicator 
variables: 
 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽 + 𝜑𝑗𝑡(𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑗 × 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡) + 𝜖 𝑖𝑗𝑡 (9) 
The house price index is then constructed taking the predicted HMA-year effects 
?̂?𝑗𝑡 and subtracting the national average in each year, i.e.  𝑝𝑗𝑡 = ?̂?𝑗𝑡 − ?̅̂?𝑡. As 
discussed earlier, one particular worry is if there are unobserved property 
characteristics in the error term that are correlated with the HMA-year effects. In 
this case the price differential may mistakenly be attributed to housing 
productivity differences (or quality of life differences) when it simply reflects 
differences in for example, architectural quality. This is of special significance 
when identifying the effects of conservation areas which will very likely correlate 
with certain unobservable housing characteristics. This is a particularly 
important motivation for employing a fixed effects strategy. A further potential 
problem highlighted by Albouy and Ehrlich (2012) is that the distribution of 
observed transactions within each HMA-year may differ from the actual 
                                                        
 
62 The rationale here is that the spatial equilibrium in the housing market is the result 
of free movement of homeowners. The free movement of renters may deliver spatial 
equilibrium as well but it would be more direct to examine rents in this case rather 
than house prices of leasehold properties. 
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distribution of housing stock in the HMA. Therefore, I apply a population weight 
to the above regression. Each observation is weighted by the LAD dwellings count 
in 2003 divided by the LAD-year transaction count63. The results of this hedonic 
regression and a brief discussion of the coefficients are presented in the 
appendix. 
Land values (?̃?𝑗𝑡) 
Residential land values are obtained from the Valuation Office Agency (VOA). The 
residential land values are produced for the Property Market Report which has 
been released biannually since 1982. Land values for the full set of local authority 
districts (LADs) were, however, not made available until 2014 when they were 
placed online following my requests for the data. As such the full dataset has 
never previously been used in empirical analysis. The values are assessed for 
small sites (<2ha), bulk land (>2ha) and flat sites (for building flats) for vacant 
land with outline planning permission. The three different site categories have 
approximately the same value in each LAD therefore I use only small sites since 
this category has no missing values in any year for any LAD. Due to a 
reorganisation of local government in England some districts were merged 
together between 1995 and 1998 (but most were unaffected)64. Reflecting these 
adjustments I converted the data from the earlier definition to the current 
definition. I then took the mean of the biannually reported land values and 
                                                        
 
63 The dwelling stock numbers are available from 2001-2011 for Output Areas from the 
Department for Communities and Local Government. Since this covers only part of 
the study period of this analysis I simply use the dwelling stock from 2003, in the 
middle of the sample period. Furthermore, I reweight the distribution at the LA level, 
rather than the much finer OA because other data (e.g. land values) are only 
available on the LA level and all the data should be weighted in the same way. Since 
there are only around 5 LAs per HMA in England this represents a fairly crude 
reweighting of the distribution but is the finest level possible. The main estimations 
reported are also conducted with no weights applied to any of the variables and the 
results are not changed significantly (see appendix). 
64 Of the original 366 original districts, 21 were merged into 9 new districts, making the 
new total 354 districts.  
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aggregated to the HMA level, again using the distribution of housing stock in 2003 
as weights. Finally I normalised by subtracting the national average in each year. 
Construction costs (?̃?𝑗𝑡) 
In order to capture the costs of non-land inputs to construction an index of 
rebuilding costs was obtained from the Regional Supplement to the Guide to 
House Rebuilding Cost published by the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors 
(RICS). Rebuilding cost is an approximation of how much it would cost to 
completely rebuild a standard unit of residential housing if it has been entirely 
destroyed. This takes into account the cost of construction labour (wages), 
materials costs, machine hire etc. and is considered to be an appropriate measure 
of the price of non-land inputs to housing. The data is based on observed tender 
prices for construction projects and the sample size of tenders is given with each 
factor. I make use of location adjustment factors that are available in annually 
from 1997-2008 at the LAD level and take into account the local variations in 
costs. To my knowledge this data has not been used before in empirical analysis 
at this level of detail. The location factors were scanned from hard copies and 
digitised using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The separate years 
were then matched to form a panel dataset. Some districts were missing from the 
data, especially in the earlier years. However, a higher tier geography 
(corresponding in most cases with counties) was recorded completely enabling 
a simple filling procedure described in the appendix. In short though, the county 
factor and sample size is compared with factors and sample size for the available 
districts in that county in order to impute the values for the missing districts. 
These data were subject to the same district boundary changes as with the land 
value data and were corrected in the same way. Finally, the filled district level 
data was aggregated to HMA weighted by dwelling stock and then normalised as 
before. 
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Figure 2: Initial designation share against change for housing market areas (HMAs) 
 
 Conservation area designation (?̃?𝑗𝑡) 
In order to identify the impact of conservation area designation on housing 
productivity and quality of life a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) map of 
conservation areas (CAs) was obtained from English Heritage. This is a polygon 
dataset that precisely maps the borders of all CAs in England and has only been 
used once before in empirical analysis by Ahlfeldt et al. (2014a). The data include 
the date of designation, which lies between 1966 and 2011. Using this 
information I calculated in each year the share of land in each HMA that was 
covered by CAs. Figure 2 plots the initial designation share in 1997 against the 
change in share over 1997-2007. The chart clearly shows significant variation in 
both the initial share and change over the period.  Blackburn & Burnley HMA is 
not depicted since the change in designation share over the period is ‘off the 
chart’ at 2.6% of the land area. The CA designation share is first computed at the 
LAD level in order to be aggregated to HMAs weighted by dwelling stock, 
ensuring all the data are produced comparably. The logged land shares are then 
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normalised to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. This is 
achieved by taking log-differences around the national average and then dividing 
by the standard deviation in each year. Such ‘z-values’ are created for each of the 
housing productivity factors to ensure the effects on log costs are comparable 
across each component. The estimated parameters after normalisation give the 
effect on log costs of a one standard deviation increase in that factor. 
 Regulatory restrictiveness (?̃?𝑗𝑡) 
Planning refusal rates 
In order to control for the underlying regularity restrictiveness in each city, the 
share of planning applications that are refused in each year from 1997-2007 was 
obtained. A more geographically detailed version of this data was first used by 
Hilber and Vermeulen (In Press) to analyse the effect of planning restrictiveness 
on housing costs in England. The authors kindly agreed to share their data for use 
in the current paper. The HMA level data were aggregated from Local Authority 
level (weighted by dwelling stock). The variation in refusal rates is volatile over 
time and only a small part of year-to-year variation is thought to represents 
actual changes in planning restrictiveness. The data were therefore smoothed in 
order to eliminate the short-term noise whilst keeping the long run trends in 
planning restrictiveness. This was done by estimating a quasi-probit regression 
of refusal share on a time trend (see appendix). The predicted refusal rates from 
this trend regression are used in the empirical analysis after normalising to z-
scores. 
Protected land 
In order to control for other protected statuses that impact on housing 
productivity, GIS polygons were obtained for the following protection statuses: 
Greenbelt, National Parks, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty, Sites of Specific 
Scientific Interest, National Nature Reserves and Registered Common Land. 
These spatial data were obtained from the University of Edinburgh (Greenbelt) 
and Natural England (everything else). The share of land in each HMA that falls 
under any one of these protected statuses was computed using GIS. The resulting 
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protected land shares were weighted with dwelling stock and z-values were 
computed. Notably, there is no time variation in these designations, therefore, 
they are used only in the preliminary cross-sectional regressions. 
 Natural constraints (?̃?𝑗𝑡) 
Undevelopable land 
In order to control for geographic factors that may influence housing productivity 
I follow Saiz (2010) in constructing a measure of geographical constraints based 
on entirely natural factors. I compute the developable share of land within 25-km 
of each HMA centroid65. Developable land is defined as land that is flat (< 15 
degree slope) and dry (solid land covers). To calculate the slopes I use the OS 
Terrain 50 topography dataset which is a 50m grid of the UK with land surface 
altitudes recorded for the centroid of each grid square. I calculate the slope in the 
steepest direction for each grid square and if this is greater than 15 degrees then 
the 50m grid square is also defined as undevelopable. To identify dry land I use 
The Land Cover Map 2000, which is a 25m grid for the whole of Great Britain 
where each square is assigned to one of 26 broad categories of land cover. The 
grid square is defined as undevelopable if it is water, bog, marsh etc. The final 
developable land share is computed for each HMA as the total land area that not 
undevelopable divided by the total area in the 25-km circle. Finally, z-scores are 
computed but the shares are not weighted since they are intended to be entirely 
exogenous. 
                                                        
 
65 Saiz (2010) uses 50-km circles around U.S. MSA centroids – whereas I define 25-km 
circles to adjust for the smaller size of English HMAs. The average area of a U.S. MSA 
is about 7,000 km2, the area of circle of a radius of around 50-km. This may be the 
reasoning behind Saiz’s choice of radius. Since the average HMA in England is about 
1,800 km2, an appropriately sized circle would have a radius of about 25-km. 
CHAPTER V 236 
 
 City population (?̃?𝑗𝑡) 
Population density (z-scores) 
To account for agglomeration economies or congestion that may impact on 
housing productivity, either positively or negatively, I obtained population data 
for 2004 at the local authority level from NOMISWEB. These were aggregated to 
HMA (without weights) and divided by the land area to reach population 
densities. Finally z-scores were computed. 
 Quality of life (?̃?𝑗𝑡) 
Quality of life index 
I construct two alternative quality of life indices. The first is most closely related 
to equation (3) and computed as follows: 
 𝑄𝑜𝐿𝑗𝑡
1 = 0.31 × 𝑝𝑗𝑡 − (1 − 0.225) × 0.64 × ?̃?𝑗𝑡   (10) 
where 0.31 is the share of expenditure on housing, which comes from the 
Expenditure and Food Surveys (EFS) 2001-2007. The same price differential 𝑝𝑗𝑡 
is used as in the first stage, computed via hedonic regression. The annual wages 
?̃?𝑗𝑡 comes from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings at the local authority 
level and are aggregated (weighted by the number of jobs) to HMAs before taking 
log differences. Unlike the price data, the wage data has not been adjusted for 
characteristics. Hence city differences in wages may be due to different personal 
characteristics or a differential occupational or industrial composition rather 
than any effect of place. Controlling for these factors, therefore, represents an 
area for improvement66. The marginal income tax rate of 0.225 was computed 
using data from the HM Revenue and Customs for 2005/05 and the share of 
                                                        
 
66 Gibbons et al. (2011) overcome this problem by identifying individual and city effects 
from movers. However, I require time variation in the wages variable so this is 
probably not a viable approach. Rather I would simply control for observable 
characteristics using the ASHE dataset on wages. 
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income from wages of 0.64 is from the Department for Work and Pensions for 
2005/0667. Gibbons et al. (2011) note that the above measure assumes a constant 
expenditure share on housing which may not be the case across different 
locations in reality. Therefore they propose a number of other measures that aim 
to compute actual housing costs from house prices. One of these is the interest-
rate method which I compute according to: 
 ℎ𝑗𝑡 = [𝑙𝑣𝑡𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑡 + (1 − 𝑙𝑣𝑡)𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑠𝑡](1 + 0.19) + 𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑗𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑗𝑡 (11) 
where 𝑙𝑣𝑡  is the loan-to-value ratio in year t, 𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the standardised house price68 
in HMA j and year t, 𝑖𝑡 is the standard variable rate of interest on mortgages in 
year t and 𝑠𝑡 is the interest rate on savings in year t (interest data are available 
from the Bank of England), 0.19 is the maintenance and transaction costs 
reported in the EFS as a fraction of mortgage costs (in square brackets), 𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑗𝑡  is 
council tax and 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑗𝑡 is stamp duty as in Gibbons et al. (2011). The second 
quality of life index is computed as: 
 𝑄𝑜𝐿𝑗𝑡
2 =
∆ℎ𝑗𝑡 − ∆𝑑𝑗𝑡
1.7
  (12) 
where the difference operators ∆ represent the difference (not logged) from the 
national average in each year and 1.7 is the average number of workers per 
household from the EFS. The city ranking for both of these quality of life indices 
is presented in the appendix. 
Amenities 
The above indices will be used to relate housing productivity (from designation) 
to quality of life. However, it is important to control for other factors. Therefore I 
obtain an array of environmental amenities and locational factors that may 
                                                        
 
67 Notably these shares are UK averages but breakdowns for only homeowners (which 
would likely be higher) were not available from these sources. 
68  The house price is not a differential as before but the predicted price a property with 
average national characteristics located in each HMA-year.  
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influence quality of life. These are listed in Table 1 below and come from a variety 
of sources including OpenSteetMap, the Land Cover Map and the UK Census. 
These data were initially merged with the housing unit (Nationwide) dataset and 
then are collapsed to the HMA mean across all years. This means they capture the 
incidence of amenities on the actual distribution of the dwelling stock. For 
example, it is more meaningful to know the average distance to a lake for housing 
units in an HMA than the average distance to a lake from all points in an HMA. 
Table 1: Summary statistics for amenities 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Employment potentiality 74 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.40 
Distance to rail station 74 3.53 1.79 1.04 9.68 
Distance to airport 74 28.21 15.90 8.48 73.09 
Cafes (kernel density) 74 0.19 0.19 0.01 1.06 
Food establishment (kernel density) 74 0.55 0.42 0.02 2.37 
Bar (kernel density) 74 0.96 0.54 0.16 2.69 
Museum (kernel density) 74 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.21 
Theatre (kernel density) 74 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.13 
National Park (kernel density) 74 1.88 5.05 0.00 29.38 
Distance to Lake 74 6.05 3.11 0.98 16.89 
Distance to River 74 1.02 0.54 0.52 3.37 
Distance to Coastline 74 18.59 19.95 0.95 77.37 
Mountains, moors, and heathland (land share) 74 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Semi-natural grasslands (land share) 74 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.16 
Broad-leaved/mixed woodland (land share) 74 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.13 
Urban (land share) 74 0.49 0.11 0.23 0.75 
Gardens (land share) 74 0.21 0.06 0.04 0.33 
Greenspace (land share) 74 0.53 0.12 0.28 0.84 
Water (land share) 74 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.12 
Key Stage 2 score (IDW) 74 27.27 0.45 25.24 28.16 
Income 2005 74 24.26 2.87 19.88 33.96 
Ethnicity Herfindahl index 74 0.90 0.06 0.61 0.97 
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 Results 
 Housing cost function 
Figure 3 illustrates a cross-sectional (linear and binomial) regression of mean 
house prices 𝑝?̅? on mean land values ?̃??̅? i.e. the average differential for across all 
years for each HMA. The binomial regression is a simplified version of equation 
(4), which using the corresponding parameters is: 𝑝?̅?  = 𝛽1?̃??̅? + 𝛽3(?̃??̅?)
2
. The slope 
of the linear trend would suggest 𝜙𝐿 = 𝛽1 = 0.380. The binomial slope is convex 
(𝛽3 = 0.093) suggesting an elasticity of substitution less than one. Specifically, it 
is 𝜎𝑌 = 0.220.69 However, since land values are likely correlated with 
construction costs and other factors these estimates are biased.  
Figure 3: house price index vs. land value index for English HMAs 
 
                                                        
 
69 This is computed from the biased estimates as 𝜎𝑌 = 1 −
2𝛽3
[𝛽1(1−𝛽1)]
= 1 −
(2×0.093)
[0.372(1−0.372)]
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The estimates in Table 2 are for the housing production function of the cross-
sectional model in equation (4) using the weighted versions of the variables (the 
unweighted models presented in the appendix illustrate robustness with respect 
to weightings). The first two columns present the Cobb-Douglas results 
(restricted and unrestricted models) and the last two columns present the 
translog results. Across the four different models, the land cost share varies 
between 0.25 and 0.29, which is smaller than the 0.35-0.37 estimated for U.S. 
cities (Albouy & Ehrlich, 2012). The elasticity of substitution is estimated to be 
0.373 in the restricted translog log model which is very similar to the 0.367 for 
the same model for the U.S. (Albouy & Ehrlich, 2012). This result suggests that 
developers in England face a similar degree of substitutability of inputs as 
developers in the United States. Since the elasticity of substitution is less than 
one, an increase in the relative price of either factor is accompanied by an 
increased expenditure on that factor i.e. the factors are gross complements. 
Across all these cross-sectional models, the relationship between designation 
and house prices is positive but insignificant suggesting that heritage 
conservation does not lower housing productivity significantly. For other 
protection statuses (such as National Parks, AONB, etc.) and for planning 
restrictiveness (as proxied by predicted refusal rates) the effect is positive 
(between 0.03 and 0.04) and significant. The effect for planning is slightly larger 
at around 0.04-0.05, meaning a standard deviation increase in planning refusals 
is associated with a 4-5% increase in house price. The Saiz undevelopable land 
share is small, positive and insignificant, suggesting that, in contrast to the U.S., 
natural factors may not play an important role in determining housing 
productivity in England. Finally, population density has a negative coefficient 
that is insignificant. This insignificance could be because population density is 
expected to have both positive and negative effects due to agglomeration 
economies or congestion. In terms of model selection, the Cobb-Douglas 
restriction is rejected in both columns (1) and (2). I choose to proceed with the 
restricted translog model since this is the functional form assumed in the theory, 
even though the CRS restriction is rejected in the translog model in column (4). 
This is also justifiable given the results of interest do not differ greatly across 
models.
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Table 2: Cross-sectional cost function 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent variable: house price differential 
Land value differential 0.271*** 
(0.024) 
0.287*** 
(0.024) 
0.251*** 
(0.025) 
0.285*** 
(0.023) 
Construction price differential 1.128*** 
(0.193) 
0.713*** 
(0.024) 
1.124*** 
(0.167) 
0.715*** 
(0.023) 
Conservation area land share (z-score) 0.010 
(0.014) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.014) 
Protected land share (z-score) 0.033** 
(0.014) 
0.034** 
(0.014) 
0.038*** 
(0.014) 
0.034** 
(0.014) 
Predicted refusal rate (z-score) 0.042*** 
(0.011) 
0.046*** 
(0.012) 
0.044*** 
(0.011) 
0.045*** 
(0.011) 
Undevelopable land share <25km  
(z-score) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
Population density (z-score) -0.016 
(0.016) 
-0.014 
(0.016) 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
-0.015 
(0.015) 
Land value differential squared  
 
 
 
0.019 
(0.020) 
0.064*** 
(0.021) 
Construction price differential squared  
 
 
 
-6.763*** 
(2.173) 
0.064*** 
(0.021) 
Land value differential  
x Construction price differential 
 
 
 
 
1.119*** 
(0.342) 
-0.128*** 
(0.042) 
Constant -0.000 
(0.009) 
-0.000 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.016* 
(0.009) 
R² 0.812 0.806 0.831 0.817 
AIC -1454.8 -1429.5 -1533.1 -1474.2 
Numbers of HMAs 74 74 74 74 
Observations 814 814 814 814 
p-value for CRS  0.033  0.001 
p-value for CD 0.000 0.000   
p-value for all restrictions  0.000   
Elasticity of substitution 1.000 1.000  0.373 
The estimates in this table are for the regression of equation (4). The EoS is 𝜎𝑌 = 1 − 2𝛽3/[𝛽1(1 − 𝛽1)]. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on HMAs. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
As described in the empirical strategy the estimates from this cross sectional 
approach are likely to be biased either by unobserved housing characteristics 
captured in the price differential or unobserved factors that influence 
productivity. Table 3 presents the results from the fixed effects model in equation 
(7) where bias from fixed unobservables is removed. Across all four 
specifications the land cost share varies between 0.14 and 0.15 and the elasticity 
of substitution is 0.11 in the restricted translog model. Again, CRS is rejected at 
the 1% level. The relationship between designation and house prices is larger in 
the fixed effects model at around 0.07-0.09 and is now significant.  A standard 
deviation increase in the designated land share, an increase of 0.013, increases 
house prices by around 7-9%. This represents the main result of the cost 
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function. The coefficient for regulation is much lower at just over 0.01 and 
statistically insignificant. The other protected statuses as well as population 
density have dropped out since they are fixed over time.  
Table 3: Fixed effects cost function 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent variable: house price differential 
Land value differential 0.141*** 
(0.020) 
0.140*** 
(0.020) 
0.150*** 
(0.017) 
0.151*** 
(0.017) 
Construction price differential 0.541*** 
(0.115) 
0.860*** 
(0.020) 
0.531*** 
(0.103) 
0.849*** 
(0.017) 
Conservation area land share (z-score) 0.068*** 
(0.021) 
0.083*** 
(0.020) 
0.071*** 
(0.023) 
0.085*** 
(0.021) 
Predicted refusal rate (z-score) 0.011 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
Land value differential squared  
 
 
 
0.057*** 
(0.012) 
0.057*** 
(0.013) 
Construction price differential squared  
 
 
 
-1.483 
(1.139) 
0.057*** 
(0.013) 
Land value differential  
x Construction price differential 
 
 
 
 
-0.178 
(0.208) 
-0.114*** 
(0.026) 
R² 0.953 0.952 0.956 0.955 
AIC -2587.0 -2574.0 -2632.7 -2619.6 
Numbers of HMAs 74 74 74 74 
Observations 814 814 814 814 
p-value for CRS  0.006  0.006 
p-value for CD 0.000 0.000   
p-value for all restrictions  0.000   
Elasticity of substitution 1.000 1.000  0.110 
The estimates in this table are for the regression of equation (7). The EoS is 𝜎𝑌 = 1 − 2𝛽3/[𝛽1(1 − 𝛽1)]. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on HMAs. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The fact that the estimated land cost share has dropped is most likely due to 
unobservable housing characteristics since factors such as high architectural 
quality are expected to lead to higher land values due to externalities. If they are 
unobserved and captured in the standardised house price then this would lead 
to an upwards bias. If the fact that designation now has a larger effect is to do 
with housing characteristics then it is because negative factors are correlated 
with designation, perhaps disrepair. Since we would typically assume designated 
areas to be associated with desirable property characteristics it is more likely 
that fixed unobserved housing productivity factors were the source of bias in the 
cross-sectional regression. That is, cities with lots of conservation areas have 
fixed factors that increase housing productivity. This is very plausible if there are 
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unobserved environmental conditions that are amenable to development and 
drove the location of historic settlements.  
Interpreted one way, the fact that refusal has becomes insignificant could suggest 
that the positive effect before was due to unobserved housing characteristics. 
However, if this were true it is unlikely that we would see such a drastically 
different story for designation. It seems more likely that the noisiness of the 
refusals data means it is not possible to identify an effect from time variation 
alone. It is also possible that the actual restrictiveness of LADs varies more 
systematically over areas than over time. To this extent, no great attention should 
be paid to the estimates for refusals, and it should be rather considered as simply 
an important control. Finally, the elasticity of substitution is much lower in the 
fixed effects model suggesting that there is very low substitutability of inputs 
witnessed in the time series variation over the 11-year period. This is what we 
would expect to see if it takes developers time to adjust their construction 
methods (i.e. to substitute) in response to significant changes to the relative 
prices of inputs. For example developers may be specialised in constructing taller 
buildings in London where they are used to high land prices relative to non-land 
prices. So compared with a cheaper-land city the price differential may not be so 
great. However, if a single town changes from low land prices to high land prices 
the price change is likely to be much larger since developers may continue for 
some time building low rise units. This could be because of either the lag between 
buying land and selling the house, the time it takes to shift methods (different 
skills, materials, etc.) or time to adjust for the planning regime. 
To recap, the estimated effect for a standard deviation increase in designation is 
a 7-9% increase in house prices. In the next section I investigate whether the 
quality of life effect of designation outweighs this increase in housing costs. 
 Quality of life and conservation areas 
In the next step I regress housing productivity as predicted from the above cost 
function on the two indices for quality of life. Table 4 presents the cross sectional 
estimates i.e. equation (5). All specifications include the controls for 
environmental amenities discussed in the data section and the full estimates are 
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reported in the appendix. This model takes the predicted housing productivity 
from the cross-sectional version of the cost function estimated above. Columns 
(1) and (2) present the estimates for the constant share quality of life index and 
column (2) for the interest-based measure. In column (1) a one point increase in 
total housing productivity is associated with a 0.349 point decrease in the quality 
of life index, which is in expenditure equivalent units. Since a one point reduction 
in housing productivity corresponds to a 0.32 point increase in expenditure (i.e. 
the expenditure share on housing) and a 0.349 increase in expenditure 
equivalent quality of life, this implies that policies that reduce productivity are 
welfare improving. A policy that decreases housing productivity by one standard 
deviation will increase welfare by an amount equivalent to 4% of expenditure 
(0.349 − 0.31 = 0.039). It is reasonable to imagine that the each housing 
productivity factor impacts have different effects on quality of life. Therefore, in 
column (2) I use as regressors the constituent elements of housing productivity 
as predicted by city characteristics. Broken down this way, housing productivity 
predicted from designation has a much larger impact on quality of life than the 
aggregate indicator. This may not be necessarily surprising considering in light 
of the fact that conservation areas preserve positive externalities in addition to 
preventing negative externalities. A standard deviation increase in designation is 
equivalent to an 83% increase in expenditure. Given that designation was 
insignificant in the cost function estimation this would suggest that designation 
only increase quality of life70. Planning restrictiveness is associated with a lower 
quality of life impact. In fact the net effect is negative suggesting a standard 
deviation increase in refusal rates is equivalent to a 5.5% drop in expenditure. 
                                                        
 
70 Given that designation has no significant effect on housing productivity in the first 
stage, it may seem counterintuitive to then use housing productivity predicted by 
designation in the next stage. In this case, −?̂??̃?𝑗𝑡 should simply be considered as a 
measure of designation that is simply scaled by the coefficient on housing costs in 
order that welfare comparisons are possible. Notably, the magnitude or significance 
of the coefficient on housing costs makes no difference to the significance of the 
coefficient in the second stage. It only affects the magnitude of the coefficient in the 
second stage in a way that makes for neat comparison with overall expenditure. 
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Protection statuses add to quality of life overall (equivalent to a 12.5% increase 
in expenditure) but since this is a mix of different types of designation it is not 
possible to attribute this effect to any one of them. Geographic constraints are 
associated with a very large increase in quality of life, quite probably because 
these constraints (e.g. mountains, lakes, sea) represent environmental amenities 
not perfectly captured by the controls. The quality of life effect from unobserved 
factors does not deviate to far from the aggregate effect and is overall roughly 
welfare-neutral.  
Table 4: Cross-sectional quality of life regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Constant share (𝑄𝑜𝐿𝑗𝑡
1 ) Interest-based (𝑄𝑜𝐿𝑗𝑡
2 ) 
Predicted housing productivity 
 Total (?̃?𝐽
𝑌) -0.349*** 
(0.045) 
 
 
-6.002*** 
(0.989) 
 
 
 From designation (−?̂??̃?𝑗𝑡)  
 
-1.140** 
(0.488) 
 
 
-13.827 
(11.630) 
 From planning refusals (part of 
−?̃?𝑗𝑡?̂?) 
 
 
-0.255** 
(0.100) 
 
 
-2.561 
(2.637) 
 From protected (part of −?̃?𝑗𝑡?̂?)  
 
-0.435*** 
(0.140) 
 
 
-3.589 
(3.313) 
 From geo. constraints (−?̂??̃?𝑗𝑡)  
 
-2.011*** 
(0.752) 
 
 
-41.281** 
(17.532) 
 From unobserved factors (-𝜀𝑗𝑡)  
 
-0.320*** 
(0.043) 
 
 
-5.765*** 
(0.972) 
Constant 0.101 
(0.315) 
0.023 
(0.320) 
1.070 
(8.235) 
-0.765 
(8.455) 
Environmental Amenity controls YES YES YES YES 
R² 0.670 0.685 0.615 0.625 
AIC -2892.4 -2920.3 -2315.0 -2302.0 
Observations 814 814 814 814 
Cross sectional estimation – eq. (5) – with controls for environmental amenities. Full table presented 
in the appendix.  Predicted housing productivity is taken from cross-sectional cost model – eq. (4), 
Table 2. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on HMAs. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The columns (3) and (4) represent a robustness check of the results in columns 
(1) and (2), since they do not easily lead to overall welfare estimates. Column (3) 
confirms the negative relationship between housing productivity and quality of 
life. The estimate suggests a one point increase in productivity is associated with 
a £6,000 decrease in expenditure. In column (4) the estimates have the same sign 
as in column (2), however, they are insignificantly different from zero apart from 
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for geographic constraints. This weakens the overall result from the cross 
sectional regressions that designations increases quality of life (whilst having no 
effect on housing productivity). Furthermore, as noted in the empirical section, 
the cross-sectional estimates are subject to several sources of bias and are 
therefore unreliable.  
Next in Table 5 I estimate the fixed effects model of equation (8) taking the 
predicted housing productivities from the fixed effects cost function estimation 
above. Column (1) continues to support that housing productivity has a negative 
relationship with quality of life. The coefficient is slightly smaller than the cross-
sectional version and represents a small welfare gain. However, when broken 
down into constituent parts in column (2) designation and planning are both 
insignificant. Notably designation is only marginally insignificant with a t-
statistic of −1.51 (𝑝 > 0.136). Accepting this coefficient would imply that 
designation does increase quality of life but that the overall effect is welfare 
reducing, with a standard deviation of designation being equivalent to a 4% 
reduction in expenditure. The interest-based quality of life measure in columns 
(3) and (4) confirm the overall pattern that only aggregate housing productivity 
significantly impacts on quality of life (here a lower estimate equivalent to 
£4,100). The designation and planning effects in these models are both hugely 
insignificant.  
Table 5: Fixed effects quality of life regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Constant share (𝑄𝑜𝐿𝑗𝑡
1 ) Interest-based (𝑄𝑜𝐿𝑗𝑡
2 ) 
Predicted housing productivity 
 Total (?̃?𝐽
𝑌) -0.320*** 
(0.032) 
 -4.166*** 
(0.938) 
 
 
 From designation (−?̂??̃?𝑗𝑡)  
 
-0.268 
(0.178) 
 
 
1.379 
(5.105) 
 From planning refusals (part of 
−?̃?𝑗𝑡?̂?) 
 
 
-0.392 
(0.438) 
 
 
-1.626 
(12.683) 
 From unobserved factors (−𝜀𝑗𝑡)  
 
-0.320*** 
(0.036) 
 
 
-4.247*** 
(1.003) 
Environmental amenity controls NO NO NO NO 
R² 0.906 0.906 0.856 0.857 
AIC -3959.0 -3955.6 -1467.0 -1468.7 
Observations 814 814 814 814 
Fixed effects estimation – eq. (8). Environmental amenity controls are time invariant and drop out. 
Predicted housing productivity from fixed effects cost model – eq.(7), Table 3. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered on HMAs. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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To summarise the results, the cross-sectional models suggest that conservation 
areas do not increase housing costs significantly and are associated with large 
welfare gains. However, these estimates are likely to be subject to a significant 
bias. The fixed effects model eliminates the bias from time invariant 
unobservables and suggests the opposite result. Here designation is associated 
with large increases in housing costs and the quality of life benefits are neither 
not statistically significant nor large enough in magnitude to outweigh the costs 
due to lower housing productivity. An alternative explanation for the difference 
between the cross-sectional and fixed effects results is that the fixed effect model 
only examines recent designations that occurred between 1997 and 2007. The 
cross sectional model examines the effect of all designations since the policy was 
introduced in 1967. It may be that the earlier designations provided the most 
value in terms of quality of life improvements. This is, in fact, similar to the model 
presented in Ahlfeldt et al. (2014a) where the planner designates the areas with 
the most heritage first. 
 Conclusions and areas for improvement 
This paper has provided the first evidence on the net effect of conservation area 
designation on economic welfare. The results suggest that designations (at least 
those between 1997 and 2007) may lead to higher expenditure on housing that 
is not outweighed by any benefits to quality of life. In fact the benefits are found 
to be statistically insignificant. Before coming to any strong conclusions or policy 
recommendations, it is important to acknowledge these results are preliminary. 
The following areas are to be improved in ongoing research. Firstly, the wages 
that go into the quality of life measure must control for individual characteristics. 
This would change the quality of life results. Secondly, the protected statuses 
should be broken down and their effects examined individually in the cross-
sectional regression. The impact of Green Belts for example may be quite 
different to the impact of National Parks. Thirdly, the empirical model should be 
adapted to allow for factor non-neutral productivity factors. Providing that the 
results are robust to these important empirical steps, the conclusion would be 
that there is too much conservation area designation. This does not imply that 
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there is no requirement for designation at all, but rather, that they are being 
applied excessively and should be relaxed to enable more development.
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 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V 
 Introduction 
This appendix complements the main paper and is not designed to stand alone 
or as a replacement. Each section provides additional material on the section 
from the main paper with the same section number. As such there is no section 2 
or section 3 since there is no additional theoretical or empirical is this appendix.  
Section 4 complements the data section from the main paper providing extra 
detail on their sources and how they are processed. Section 5 complements the 
empirical results section of the main paper by showing the results of a variety of 
robustness tests and model alterations not reported in the main paper for 
brevity. 
 Data 
 Housing market areas (HMAs) 
Figure 1 illustrates the HMAs for England with a solid black outline and how they 
aggregate up from the (multi-coloured) local authority districts. Note: this is Map 
P11.4 from ‘Geography of housing market areas’ by DCLG (2010). 
 Hedonic regression 
Table 1 below present the results of the hedonic regression of equation (9) from 
the main paper. The 1,184 MSA-year effects themselves are omitted to save 
space. The coefficients on the property characteristic are significant and in line 
with expectations. Most interesting are the results for building age and build 
year. Houses built during historical periods are associated with a higher price, in 
particular those built pre 1900, which are 36% more expensive than houses built 
post-2000. Houses built between 1910 and 1939 are also associated with very 
large premia of 21%-24%. The lowest premium is observed for houses built in 
the 1970s.
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Figure 1: Housing markets areas over original local authority districts 
 
HMAS (silver standard) 
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Since the data cover a period of 15 years it is possible to identify both age and 
build year separately. Given that the general trend is for earlier build dates to 
have higher prices, one might expect house age to be positively correlated with 
price as well. However, the opposite is true. After controlling for build date, which 
captures the effect of architectural styles and build materials associated with a 
particular period, the effect of ageing is to lower the housing value. This ageing 
penalty is incurred fairly linearly with age up until about 100 years when it begin 
to reverse. Houses with 90-99 and over 100 years are less valuable than new 
houses (controlling for build date) but more valuable than houses of 80-89, 70-
79 and even 60-69 years. This could be attributed to the effect of an accumulation 
of ‘character’ over the years which begin to really set in at around 90 years. 
Table 1: hedonic regression of house prices on characteristics and HMA-year effects 
 ln (price) 
Number of bathrooms 0.009** 
(0.004) 
Number of bedrooms 0.093*** 
(0.007) 
Number of bedrooms × Number of bedrooms -0.009*** 
(0.001) 
House type: Detached house -0.032 
(0.026) 
House type: Semi-detached house -0.157*** 
(0.023) 
House type: Terraced house/Country cottage -0.251*** 
(0.021) 
House type: Bungalow 0.052** 
(0.023) 
Floorsize (m²) 0.008*** 
(0.000) 
Floorsize (m²) × Floorsize (m²) -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
New property 0.070*** 
(0.004) 
Parking: Single Garage: 0.106*** 
(0.010) 
Parking: Double garage 0.163*** 
(0.016) 
Parking: Parking space 0.050*** 
(0.010) 
Central heating 0.133*** 
(0.003) 
Building age: 10-19 years -0.061*** 
(0.007) 
Building age: 20-29 years -0.098*** 
(0.015) 
Building age: 30-39 years -0.125*** 
(0.025) 
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Building age: 40-49 years -0.152*** 
(0.039) 
Building age: 50-59 years -0.180*** 
(0.051) 
Building age: 60-69 years -0.201*** 
(0.059) 
Building age: 70-79 years -0.212*** 
(0.067) 
Building age: 80-89 years -0.226*** 
(0.074) 
Building age: 90-99 years -0.190*** 
(0.072) 
Building age: Over 100 years -0.147** 
(0.069) 
Build date: pre 1900 0.355*** 
(0.079) 
Build date: 1900-1909 0.174** 
(0.074) 
Build date: 1910-1919 0.223*** 
(0.077) 
Build date: 1920-1929 0.237*** 
(0.074) 
Build date: 1930-1939 0.211*** 
(0.066) 
Build date: 1940-1949 0.145** 
(0.057) 
Build date: 1950-1959 0.108** 
(0.048) 
Build date: 1960-1969 0.101*** 
(0.035) 
Build date: 1970-1979 0.068*** 
(0.025) 
Build date: 1980-1989 0.104*** 
(0.016) 
Build date: 1990-1999 0.093*** 
(0.009) 
Constant 10.664*** 
(0.019) 
R² 0.850 
AIC 232410.5 
Numbers of HMA-years effects 1,184 
Observations 904,075 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on HMA-years. The omitted category for House 
Type is ‘Flat/Maisonette’ and for Parking it is ‘No parking’. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 Construction price index 
The construction price index data was taken from the Regional Supplement to the 
Guide to House Rebuilding Cost published by the Royal Institute of Chartered 
Surveyors (RICS). The factors and sample sizes were available at the LAD level 
but not for every LAD in every year. Figure 2 plots the share of districts that are 
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missing in each year and shows that the problem is worse at the beginning of the 
data period. In order to fill these missing values, data were taken from a higher 
level geography (48 counties) which was fully available over the whole period. 
The following provides a description of how this filling procedure was carried 
out.  
Figure 2: Share of missing construction price factors at LAD level, 1997-2007 
 
Table 2 presents a (fictitious) example to illustrate the filling procedure. Table 2a 
presents the fictitious data for County 1, which is made up of three districts. 
Factors are missing in some of the years for some districts. Starting with 2008 
LAD 1 is filled by first comparing the sample for the districts that are observed, 
21+28= 49, with the whole county sample, 57. We know there are 8 observed 
tender prices in the county total that must have come from LAD 1. This value was, 
however, not reported presumably because the sample size was not considered 
large enough to give a reliable location factor. It is simple to recover the value, 
though, using the following equation: 
𝑓𝑅𝑂𝐶,𝑐 =
𝑓𝑐𝑠𝑐 − ∑ 𝑓𝑑,𝑐𝑑 𝑠𝑑,𝑐
𝑠𝑐 − ∑ 𝑠𝑑,𝑐𝑑
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where 𝑓𝑅𝑂𝐶,𝑐 is the factor for the ‘rest of county’ (i.e. aggregate of all missing 
districts) for county 𝑐, 𝑓𝑐  is the county fact, 𝑠𝑐 is the county sample, 𝑓𝑑,𝑐  is the 
factor for all available districts 𝑑 in county 𝑐, and 𝑠𝑑,𝑐 is the sample for those 
districts. 
The data are then filled as follows. The 𝑓𝑅𝑂𝐶,𝑐 value is computed in each year for 
all counties with missing districts. Then starting from the last year (2008) all the 
missing districts in a county are made equal to the rest of county value 𝑓𝑅𝑂𝐶,𝑐 only 
if they have are at least 20 observations among them (note it may be only one 
district). Otherwise, if there are less than 20 observations among them they are 
simply made equal to the county factor 𝑓𝑐 . Then for 2007, the growth rate is 
computed between the rest of county factor for 2007 and the aggregate factors 
(imputed or otherwise) for the same districts in 2008. Note that this may not be 
simply the rest of county factor for 2008 since there may be additional missing 
factors in 2007. In this case a sample weighted average is computed between the 
rest of county factor for 2008 and the factors observed in 2008 that were missing 
in 2007. Finally if there are more than 20 observations the missing 2007 factors 
are computed by applying this rest of county growth rate to the relevant 2008 
factors. If there are less than 20 observations then they are computed by applying 
the overall county growth rate to the relevant 2008 factors. The same growth rate 
based filled procedure is then applied to all previous years working backwards 
one year at a time. The filled values for the dummy example above via an 
application of this procedure is presented in Table 2b. 
So whilst the number of missing districts is quite large, especially at the 
beginning, the method used to fill them makes use of actual information on their 
values imputed from higher tier geographies. This will be more accurate where 
the missing districts within a county have similar factors, since they are all 
treated as an aggregate ‘rest of county’. Where they differ significant, this will 
only matter where they end up being aggregated to different HMAs later on in the 
process. Finally, the filled districts are likely to be smaller local authorities with 
less dwellings so will contribute less when eventually aggregated with other 
districts to the HMAs level. 
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Table 2: Filling example 
a. Fictitious construction price index data 
b. Illustration of filling procedure 
 
Note: * imputed values 
 Predicted refusal rates 
In order to generate the trend in refusal rates, that vary between zero and one, I 
carried out a ‘quasi-probit’ regression. This involves generating probit scores for 
refusal rates i.e. 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡  =  probit (𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡) and regressing this on a 
time trend variable (in a 354 separate regressions, one for each local authority): 
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
The predicted refusal rates are then computed as: 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡 = normal (𝛼 + ?̂?𝑡) 
since the normal function is the inverse of the probit function. Alternative 
specifications were tried using predicted trends from a OLS regression and 
simply 3-year moving averages of the refusal rates with no substantive 
differences in the results. 
 
Factor
s      
Sample
s     
 2006 2007 2008  2006 2007 2008 
County 1 0.99 1 1.02  50 55 57 
LAD 1 n/a n/a n/a  n/a n/a n/a 
LAD 2 n/a n/a 1.01  n/a n/a 21 
LAD 3 1.01 1.02 1.03  19 24 28 
 Factors      Samples     
 2006 2007 2008  2006 2007 2008 
County 0.99 1 1  50 55 57 
LAD1 0.988* 1.014* 1.000*  n/a n/a n/a 
LAD2 0.998* 1.024* 1.01  n/a n/a 21 
LAD3 1.04 1.02 1.03  19 24 28 
Rest of County 0.959* 0.985* 0.869*  31* 31* 8* 
RoC Growth 0.974* 1.014*      
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 Quality of life rankings and other variables 
Table 3 presents the HMAs when ranked by quality of life index 1. It also lists 
values or quality of life index 2 and various differentials used in the cost function. 
The quality of life ranking in many cases corresponds to that presented in 
Gibbons et al. (2011) with areas such as Penzance (West Cornwall), Brighton and 
London coming near the top and areas such as Coventry, Grimsby and 
Scunthorpe coming near the bottom. This is of course no confirmation of its 
validity but nevertheless reassuring.  
 Results 
 Weights applied to variables 
The variables in the cost function estimations in the main paper are weighted in 
most cases by the local authority district (LAD) dwelling stock in 2003. This is to 
ensure that land values and construction costs that are only available for LADs 
contribute proportionally to their respective HMAs in aggregation. Other 
variables such as house prices are more finely disaggregated so finer weight 
could be used. Further, there is less need for weighting since the number of 
observed housing transactions in each area is likely to be quite reflective of the 
number of units in that area. However, in order to treat all the data in the same 
way, the same dwelling stock weights at LAD level were applied. The same 
concept applies to the designation share which could have been computed 
directly at the LAD level but in order to remain consistent was computed at the 
LAD level then aggregated with dwelling stock weights. The wages data were 
aggregated using employment weights since this represent a more appropriate 
weight in this case than dwelling stock. 
 Unweighted cost functions 
As a robustness check to ensure that the results are not driven by the application 
of the above described weights I ran the same cost function regressions without 
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applying any weights. The results presented in Table 4 (cross section) and Table 
5 (fixed effects) below confirm the findings are not particularly sensitive to this 
alternative specification. 
 Full quality of life regressions 
Finally, Table 6 has the quality of life regressions reporting coefficients for the 
full set of amenities. Since the amenities do not have time variation this is only 
possible for the cross sectional model. Most of the amenities are insignificant, 
apart from employment potentiality, perhaps due to the fact that this is a 
regression of time varying quality of life on cross-sectional controls.
  
Table 3: Quality of life indices, and other variables used in regression for HMAs ranked by 𝑸𝒐𝑳𝟏 
HMA name Quality of 
life 1 
Quality of 
life 2 
House price 
differential 
Land value 
differential 
Construction 
differential 
Designation 
(z-score)  
Refusals  
(z-score) 
Saiz index 
(z-score) 
Pop. Dens. 
(z-score) 
Penzance .1748749 4.041012 .1201186 -.5154164 .0205554 .4027876 1.063867 1.742146 .3841833 
Launceston & Bude .1209284 3.061542 -.0034237 -.5928693 -.0181151 -.8495921 -.0345297 1.088675 -1.40396 
Dorchester & Weymouth .1162691 2.486161 .2024558 .2588946 .0248221 .4217503 .4247046 .8817478 -.6226798 
Torquay .1094972 2.528172 .0996985 .1270983 .0072404 -.1985833 .493426 .9432183 -.2392697 
Eastbourne & Hastings .0957999 1.901977 .2191557 .0891539 .1128275 -.9755577 1.211647 .4845025 .10153 
Barnstaple .0933124 2.402505 .0020034 -.148629 .0128873 -1.239168 .8658185 .6525307 -1.173521 
Truro .0835354 2.00567 .0576955 -.4213167 -.0297201 -.0087404 .2311356 1.398037 -.0548038 
Berwick-upon-Tweed .0825197 2.914932 -.2066538 -.7894496 -.0096095 -.2189362 -1.939814 .9942439 -1.303494 
Whitby & Malton .0777847 2.01629 .0001219 -.2524159 -.0474827 -.7302982 .4994154 .0265572 -1.615291 
Exeter .0767771 1.614198 .1529287 .2849956 -.0055938 -.1372057 .6094738 .2143445 -.3274927 
Isle Of Wight .0709547 1.634968 .0811052 -.4321653 .0390167 .3399208 1.183168 1.637262 .1348928 
Hereford .0688622 1.620825 .032801 .0902431 -.0521581 -.1415526 .1110398 -.2277416 -1.96225 
Brighton .0681903 .5908297 .4389919 .6182157 .1003152 .626514 1.10135 .5253294 1.182136 
Salisbury .0668977 .845564 .3011554 .4869249 .0327468 .3165572 .9456481 -.9170603 -1.017824 
Portsmouth .0633265 .7199718 .2827992 .6773527 .0680665 .2658433 .4612454 .4039899 .8577416 
Bournemouth .0580704 .5651845 .2845983 .5277739 .031433 .7329295 1.586967 .2243664 1.114399 
London .045809 -.6283653 .6729144 1.466262 .1608097 1.56711 1.055731 -.4844624 2.11523 
St. Austell .0419626 1.22459 -.0257393 -.4912469 -.0234298 -.7432572 .4712216 1.183882 .0605792 
Worcester .0407854 .7036474 .0995754 .3534656 .0038802 .2893965 .4240983 -.8757589 .3328288 
Oxford .0401428 -.4014238 .4478698 1.034714 .0296097 1.058582 .4791276 -1.62609 -.0264372 
Northallerton .037721 .9795524 .0305561 .0891995 -.0239968 .7174332 .2731695 -.4551694 -1.439301 
Kendal .03555 .9757729 .0344136 -.0059003 -.0449821 -2.872396 .0694618 1.061351 -1.957032 
Bury St. Edmunds .03391 .6047176 .0685332 .3040491 .0147841 .6769759 .1371992 -1.744014 -.2404939 
Penrith .0337431 1.337003 -.1359842 -.646639 .0506416 -1.026646 .161751 .7426788 -2.181731 
  
Colchester .0326705 .1281692 .1859719 .4773568 .0587389 .4243762 .1356406 .4337539 .2122067 
Taunton .0323786 .6581894 .0537481 .0964978 -.0167749 -.7269992 -.0715295 1.128597 -.2670196 
Bath .0314628 .1196719 .1965416 .4293391 .0053724 .8348815 .8495953 -.9032843 -.260534 
Canterbury & Ramsgate .0270131 .2250142 .1017886 .3011911 .1127833 1.743533 .1835109 1.410649 .8476974 
Southampton .0232588 -.6404214 .324944 .79694 .0376942 .4274551 1.23917 -.3421783 .2252178 
Plymouth .0217539 .5442572 -.0121209 -.183727 -.0274279 .5018246 .2806453 .2648701 .3308013 
Yeovil .0150851 .2692574 .0417652 .2939881 -.0006801 .2513024 -.6695567 -.7363273 -.9831621 
Norwich .0130271 .3945286 -.0189269 -.2011903 -.0202074 1.473927 -.3359978 -1.538954 -.6802416 
Dover & Ashford .0082121 -.2718897 .1303035 .1626383 .0692776 .032474 .5790684 .8432153 -.0357876 
Telford .0004606 .31522 -.0939855 -.0435052 -.0446569 .2947777 -.1399163 -.8698649 .3713332 
Ipswich -.0059641 -.3420231 .0434211 .0400581 -.0017854 -.642316 -.5778478 -.3611045 -.3280059 
Shrewsbury -.0063295 -.189459 -.0308219 -.0294618 -.0331013 -.2957175 .5585713 -.7702245 -.2372272 
Skegness -.0063977 .9545041 -.2751873 -.7936414 -.0467874 -1.290385 -.2124492 .3226032 -1.913885 
Gloucester & Cheltenham -.0118531 -.8899357 .1244772 .5199157 .0143194 .6542948 .5254654 -.0215238 .7120445 
Gt. Yarmouth & Lowestoft -.0157651 .2366053 -.172397 -.506815 -.0285266 1.198439 -.0134713 1.205927 .5883129 
York -.0174523 -.9319368 .0766135 .2319583 -.0142185 .2641008 .0414582 -1.474025 .3683264 
Kings Lynn -.0181789 .0474466 -.1396545 -.6680577 -.0005372 -4.436656 -.4363794 .4997105 -1.698803 
Scarborough -.0188904 .0514419 -.1430337 -.2626733 -.014353 -1.743852 -1.885918 1.226753 -.9501941 
Luton & Milton Keynes -.0236189 -1.7161 .230356 .5772777 .0669386 .3326925 .580462 -1.543522 .3218922 
Cambridge -.0236919 -1.964639 .2674485 .7332953 .0350737 .1668022 .0986282 -1.132483 -.411296 
Carlisle -.0238237 .527517 -.2856138 -.6408678 -.0049096 -.5769531 -2.248244 .1122106 -1.157776 
Swindon -.0259481 -1.751079 .2020796 .5093177 .019086 .7501397 .131756 -.7908713 -.3293924 
Birmingham -.0278887 -.9080172 .014102 .357072 -.0271343 .6342802 -.0667836 -1.440721 1.140164 
Stoke-on-Trent -.0284236 -.049347 -.1841703 -.4483824 -.0394365 .0527071 .2412704 -1.144556 .5731892 
Boston -.0290396 .3425296 -.2766386 -.7550336 -.043035 -1.174484 -.4050871 .7180421 -.4258476 
Northampton -.0352644 -.879933 -.0374386 .1796185 .0062151 .1416526 -.7358488 -1.466784 .6694034 
Bristol -.0383921 -1.875332 .1646922 .5927054 .0120666 1.379932 .5521712 .7936411 .4106238 
  
Peterborough -.0387341 -.578837 -.1270543 -.1285913 -.0153099 -.0864503 -.539092 -.9565665 -.2504492 
Leicester -.038744 -.9171153 -.0545564 .2015361 -.0496952 -.0684525 -.3871188 -1.851532 1.091083 
Preston & Blackpool -.0395169 -.548206 -.1274953 .0804635 .0080509 -.6386784 -.0801868 .9303237 1.455531 
Newcastle -.0406363 -.2250763 -.2081874 -.1382696 -.0366937 .5070782 -1.098418 -.4833578 .8496456 
Blackburn & Burnley -.0425029 .155392 -.295668 -.61082 .0164479 -.0513102 -.3680387 .2451761 1.322036 
Lincoln -.0428959 -.0109036 -.2728742 -.610543 -.0519543 -.6299734 -.7065682 -1.52467 -.5540223 
Manchester -.0452312 -1.110136 -.0523245 .2040993 .0006325 .8264966 -.1088838 .4968396 1.451962 
Chester & Birkenhead -.0470149 -1.078217 -.0481329 -.3407554 .0110274 .6193644 -.2678246 .4772341 .6702492 
Reading -.0500049 -4.023621 .5289406 .9701431 .0971964 .5882065 1.55285 -1.196539 .8579007 
Leeds -.0506516 -1.160767 -.0830887 .2083186 -.0487053 .6802205 -.4047064 -.8770029 -.1272039 
Coventry -.0528183 -1.794884 .0444801 .3272323 -.0128265 .0722621 -1.182278 -1.545372 1.444338 
Bradford -.0556584 -.9469037 -.1513738 -.2168574 -.091564 -.4579769 .0507732 .2902476 .164763 
Nottingham -.05856 -1.010447 -.1638802 -.0138851 -.0593015 1.005685 -.1778953 -1.395453 1.316201 
Hull -.0678501 -.6308898 -.2828378 -.3012572 -.014088 .5831054 -.2788041 .2546056 -1.52862 
Liverpool -.0680634 -1.278547 -.1485327 -.0993855 -.0009579 .2717642 -.824234 .2979475 1.29969 
Sheffield -.0690217 -.9420145 -.2307913 -.2252075 -.0299915 -.0594628 -.4454331 -1.072128 .2992715 
Derby -.0697926 -1.435417 -.1279016 -.1197283 -.0750313 1.123991 -.7222173 -.4974088 .6916831 
Middlesbrough -.0891621 -1.202655 -.2725548 -.312224 -.0463525 .3455042 -1.445998 1.110684 1.460353 
Lancaster -.0938686 -1.9768 -.1483829 .1641139 -.0554756 -.1813166 -.6489716 1.036746 -.4363867 
Grimsby -.0982928 -1.03629 -.3597342 -.670701 -.1003745 .2284887 .1040826 .9658943 1.131006 
Barrow-in-Furness -.1087013 -1.366392 -.3606662 -.6114543 .0372966 -.1854468 -.9998756 1.741746 1.674028 
Workington & Whitehaven -.1463763 -2.281826 -.391403 -.9909865 .0372966 -2.712434 -.8770335 1.248103 -1.239445 
Scunthorpe -.1715267 -2.748983 -.411935 -.6433497 -.0481687 -.726763 -.2288348 .0063662 -.8535949 
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Table 4: Unweighted cost function regression (cross-sectional) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent variable: ln house price 
Land value differential 0.278*** 
(0.024) 
0.296*** 
(0.024) 
0.256*** 
(0.025) 
0.293*** 
(0.023) 
Construction price differential 1.148*** 
(0.208) 
0.704*** 
(0.024) 
1.169*** 
(0.185) 
0.707*** 
(0.023) 
Conservation area land share 
(z-score) 
0.010 
(0.014) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
Protected land share (z-score) 0.031** 
(0.013) 
0.031** 
(0.013) 
0.036*** 
(0.013) 
0.031** 
(0.013) 
Predicted refusal rate (z-score) 0.041*** 
(0.011) 
0.046*** 
(0.012) 
0.043*** 
(0.011) 
0.045*** 
(0.011) 
Undevelopable land share 
<25km (z-score) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
Population density (z-score) -0.020 
(0.015) 
-0.019 
(0.015) 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.019 
(0.015) 
Land value differential squared  
 
 
 
0.019 
(0.019) 
0.066*** 
(0.023) 
Construction price differential 
squared 
 
 
 
 
-6.316*** 
(2.317) 
0.066*** 
(0.023) 
Land value differential x 
Construction price differential 
 
 
 
 
1.164*** 
(0.336) 
-0.133*** 
(0.046) 
Constant 0.000 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.016* 
(0.010) 
R² 0.811 0.804 0.829 0.815 
AIC -1448.7 -1420.6 -1525.2 -1465.2 
Numbers of HMAs 74 74 74 74 
Observations 814 814 814 814 
p-value for CRS  0.036  0.001 
p-value for CD 0.000 0.000   
p-value for all restrictions  0.000   
Elasticity of substitution 1.000 1.000  0.358 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on HMAs. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5: Unweighted cost function regression (fixed effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent variable: ln house price 
Land value differential 0.142*** 
(0.020) 
0.141*** 
(0.020) 
0.151*** 
(0.017) 
0.152*** 
(0.017) 
Construction price differential 0.544*** 
(0.115) 
0.859*** 
(0.020) 
0.532*** 
(0.104) 
0.848*** 
(0.017) 
Designation (z) 0.074*** 
(0.021) 
0.088*** 
(0.021) 
0.076*** 
(0.024) 
0.089*** 
(0.023) 
Predicted refusal (z) 0.012 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
Land value differential 
squared 
 
 
 
 
0.059*** 
(0.012) 
0.059*** 
(0.013) 
Construction price differential 
squared 
 
 
 
 
-1.255 
(1.147) 
0.059*** 
(0.013) 
Land value differential x 
Construction price differential 
 
 
 
 
-0.184 
(0.216) 
-0.119*** 
(0.026) 
Constant -0.031 
(0.041) 
-0.027 
(0.041) 
-0.049 
(0.035) 
-0.049 
(0.035) 
R² 0.953 0.952 0.956 0.955 
AIC -2583.5 -2571.1 -2629.8 -2618.5 
Numbers of HMAs 74 74 74 74 
Observations 814 814 814 814 
p-value for CRS  0.006  0.012 
p-value for CD 0.000 0.000   
p-value for all restrictions  0.000   
Elasticity of substitution 1.000 1.000  0.076 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on HMAs. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6: Quality of life regression reporting full set of amenities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Constant share (𝑄𝑜𝐿𝑗𝑡
1 ) Interest-based (𝑄𝑜𝐿𝑗𝑡
2 ) 
Predicted housing productivity 
 Total (?̂?𝑗𝑡) -0.349*** 
(0.045) 
 
 
-6.002*** 
(0.989) 
 
 
 From designation (-𝛿?̂?𝑗𝑡)  
 
-1.140** 
(0.488) 
 
 
-13.827 
(11.630) 
 From planning (part of -?̂?𝑗𝑡𝛾)  
 
-0.255** 
(0.100) 
 
 
-2.561 
(2.637) 
 From protected (part of -?̂?𝑗𝑡𝛾)  
 
-0.435*** 
(0.140) 
 
 
-3.589 
(3.313) 
 From geo. constraints (part of -
?̂?𝑗𝑡𝛾) 
 
 
-2.011*** 
(0.752) 
 
 
-41.281** 
(17.532) 
 From unobserved factors (-𝜀𝑗𝑡)  
 
-0.320*** 
(0.043) 
 
 
-5.765*** 
(0.972) 
Employment potentiality 0.253** 
(0.120) 
0.188 
(0.128) 
8.043** 
(3.626) 
7.847** 
(3.797) 
Distance to rail station 0.002 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.014 
(0.070) 
0.056 
(0.074) 
Distance to airport -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
Cafes (kernel density) 0.042 
(0.037) 
0.039 
(0.038) 
1.118 
(1.116) 
1.109 
(1.106) 
Food establishment (kernel 
density) 
-0.016 
(0.026) 
-0.019 
(0.027) 
-0.130 
(0.709) 
-0.225 
(0.724) 
Bar (kernel density) -0.020 
(0.018) 
-0.020 
(0.018) 
-0.720 
(0.461) 
-0.665 
(0.453) 
Museum (kernel density) 0.071 
(0.155) 
0.210 
(0.153) 
-0.343 
(3.880) 
2.746 
(3.863) 
Theatre (kernel density) 0.457** 
(0.193) 
0.421** 
(0.185) 
8.903* 
(5.020) 
9.750* 
(4.924) 
National Park (kernel density) -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.025 
(0.024) 
-0.041 
(0.026) 
Key Stage 2 score (IDW) 0.000 
(0.011) 
0.000 
(0.011) 
0.025 
(0.253) 
-0.021 
(0.262) 
Income 2005 -0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.189** 
(0.074) 
-0.153* 
(0.080) 
Ethnicity Herfindahl index 0.160 
(0.182) 
0.077 
(0.191) 
7.860* 
(4.581) 
7.580 
(4.737) 
Distance to Lake 0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.021 
(0.029) 
0.005 
(0.033) 
Distance to River 0.015 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
0.476* 
(0.252) 
0.348 
(0.272) 
Distance to Coastline 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
Mountains, moors, and heathland 
(land share) 
-0.177 
(0.825) 
0.212 
(0.747) 
-12.673 
(19.557) 
-2.657 
(17.951) 
Semi-natural grasslands (land 
share) 
-0.554*** 
(0.158) 
-0.550*** 
(0.156) 
-10.214** 
(3.942) 
-11.548*** 
(3.895) 
Broad-leaved/mixed woodland 
(land share) 
0.227 
(0.187) 
0.213 
(0.198) 
3.853 
(4.972) 
6.440 
(5.058) 
Urban (land share) -0.143 -0.055 -2.227 -1.154 
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(0.138) (0.144) (3.423) (3.545) 
Gardens (land share) -0.364 
(0.325) 
-0.230 
(0.309) 
-10.261 
(8.180) 
-7.427 
(7.919) 
Greenspace (land share) -0.149 
(0.191) 
-0.021 
(0.191) 
-2.577 
(4.673) 
-0.237 
(4.544) 
Water (land share) -0.224 
(0.417) 
-0.269 
(0.410) 
-7.630 
(10.466) 
-9.628 
(10.585) 
Constant 0.101 
(0.315) 
0.023 
(0.320) 
1.070 
(8.235) 
-0.765 
(8.455) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Fixed effects NO NO NO NO 
R² 0.670 0.685 0.615 0.625 
AIC -2892.4 -2920.3 2315.0 2302.0 
Observations 814 814 814 814 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on HMAs. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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